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Preface 
The place was indeed sacred.  I felt it within my bones, as I wandered 
through the remains of the camp.  I easily made out the concrete 
foundations and support blocks, and determined which ones served as 
barracks for the internees and which ones as the toilets, washrooms, and 
mess halls.  I could see them, as clearly as the desert sky, the flimsy 
structures of two-by-fours covered with tar paper nailed to joints with 
wood strips.  Small windows let light into barren rooms barely ten by 
twenty feet, but they also let in the cold and heat and the ever present dust 
and sand.  Row upon row of those barracks, spare and drab, extended in 
straight lines that covered where the earth met the sky.1 
  
Gary Y. Okihiro, 1996 
 
Visiting the Past 
Summer 2007—as we turned off the highway onto the long dirt road, I felt a rush 
of anticipation.  My wife Stephanie and I had planned this trip for months, and with my 
usual sense of compulsion, I had spent hours figuring our daily navigations.  The trip, 
which took us as far west as Yellowstone National Park, was originally conceived as a 
plan to see one of the ten Japanese American internment camps.  I chose the Heart 
Mountain Relocation Center not because of its closeness to Indiana (Arkansas has two 
centers), but its proximity to Yellowstone and other areas of interest.  Heart Mountain 
stands serenely in the background of the camp that bears its name (see Photo A.1).  
Located between Powell and Cody, Wyoming, the facility was no easy task to locate.  
The camp is not a major tourist attraction since many Americans are still naively unaware 
of the wartime confinement of the Japanese Americans and their parents.  A quaint 
website dedicated to the creation of a memorial directs visitors to the area, but it is quite 
                                                            
1 Gary Y. Okihiro, Whispered Silences: Japanese Americans and World War II (Seattle & London: 
University of Washington Press, 1996), 92.  Okihiro writes of his exploration of the Manzanar camp 
located 200 miles northeast of Los Angeles. 
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vague in its explanation on how to find the remnants of the center.2  Careful internet 
research lead me to the geographical location of the facility, and after studiously 
comparing the numbers to a topographic map in conjunction with a road map, I charted 
our eventual course. 
The camp was not as difficult to find as my research had led me to believe.  Along 
the way, signs directed curious visitors to the remains of the center.  After passing over 
an old train track (Photo A.2), which had been used to bring the Japanese internees to the 
relocation center, we parked in an empty gravel lot.  Heart Mountain stood serenely to 
our west and a small memorial to our southeast. 
The memorial (Photo A.3) contains a glass plaque inscribed with the names of 
individuals who resided in the camp sixty years ago (Photo A.4) as well as a dedication to 
those fifteen Japanese Americans who were, at one point, interned at the Heart Mountain 
Center before fighting and dying in the Second World War (Photo A.5).  At its peak 
population level in January of 1943, the Heart Mountain Center interned nearly 11,000 
individuals with Japanese ancestry.3  Near the memorial site stands the remains of the 
hospital (Photo A.6), administrative office (Photo A.7), and platform where the residents 
were gathered by the guards (Photo A.8).  Open range surrounds the once vast relocation 
center that now survives in silent memory.   
In 2006, the U.S. federal government approved legislation to protect and preserve 
the ten relocation centers.  After working closely with the National Park Service, the 
Heart Mountain Wyoming Foundation (a group dedicated to the preservation of the 
                                                            
2 Heart Mountain Wyoming Foundation, http://www.heartmountain.us/ (Accessed on November 14, 2008). 
3 War Relocation Authority, The Evacuated People: A Quantitative Description (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1946), 15. 
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former internment camp) fought to get the remnants of the relocation center designated a 
National Historic Landmark and won.  At present, a plan exists to create an interactive 
learning center at Heart Mountain. 
At this point, the people of Wyoming are solely protecting this area.  There are no 
guides to show visitors around the memorial or to answer questions.  A small leaflet 
container holds a few yellow brochures bleached by the sun, and a short path meanders 
behind the glass plaque.  Guests can walk this short trail and read the informational signs 
posted along the path to learn a brief history of the Japanese people brought to Heart 
Mountain. 
As I paced slowly upon the blacktop walking tour where many of the buildings 
once stood, I felt transported to the past for brief moments.  Scattered around the area 
were artifacts from a time long past.  Bricks, old can lids, and other forgotten relics lay 
strewn around the area (see Photos A.9 and A.10).  Back at the plaque, visitors had left 
various artifacts from the area at the altar in front of the glass dedication.  I bent over and 
touched one of the broken bricks.  I had been conducting research on the topic of the 
forced Japanese American relocation for years now, and to actually stand on historic 
land, feeling history underneath my fingertips, left me in awe.  My parents had taken me 
to historic locations during my childhood, but these were always places of interest to 
them.  For the first time in my life, I walked a forgotten path, something for which I had 
developed a deep appreciation.  Perhaps it was my maturity, or maybe it was from the 
hours of research spent in libraries, but for the first time in my life, I felt connected to the 
history of our country by more than an intellectual interest.  An historical appreciation 
exists that cannot be gleamed from books and study alone.  I stood on the precipice of all 
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that which I had worked for up to that point, and I knew that I had more to learn.  I saw 
the sad tragic path forced upon the Japanese immigrants and their children in front of me.  
Anti-immigration nativism toward anyone with Japanese ancestry was not a singular 
event. 
In the late 1800’s, Japanese men originally migrated for labor and financial 
purposes in the western portion of the United States and only for short periods of time.  
These individuals faced nativist aggression over the fear of declining wages and labor 
competition caused by the introduction of Japanese migrants into the workforce.  Once 
the U.S. federal government outlawed the use of foreign contract labor, many Japanese 
workers settled permanently, sent for their families still in Japan, and created 
communities.  The shift from migrant work created a greater influx of individuals of 
Japanese ancestry into the country. These burgeoning communities on the West Coast 
fought an uphill battle against discriminatory policy backed by U.S. nativism toward the 
Japanese that kept them from gaining naturalized status, owning land, and having the 
right to attend white schools.  The Japanese immigrants and their children worked against 
this nativist tide and still managed to assimilate by creating homes and families modeled 
after the typical American dream.  The December 1941 attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor 
ushered in the next step in the gradual decline of Japanese American freedoms.  These 
family units had their lives dashed and their belongings sold.  They were then shipped to 
various internment camps spread predominantly around the western half of the United 
States, where they would stay for the duration of the Second World War. 
Though their lives improved after the end of the war, the damage inflicted upon 
the Japanese American community took years to repair, while internal wounds still linger 
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to this day.  These events built upon a larger tapestry of racism based regionally on the 
western coast of the United States before growing into national fears after the Japanese 
attack.  I see the internment camps not as a mere byproduct of the Second World War, 
but as another step in a gradually declining narrative about social freedoms—a story that 
began as many other immigrant stories do with the search for a better life supported by 
U.S. civil liberties.  These protections, however, were denied to the Japanese immigrants 
and their children for nearly 60 years. 
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Introduction 
The Japanese are starting the same tide of immigration which we thought 
we had checked in the case of the Chinese twenty years ago.  In the 
beginning of her history the gates of America were thrown open to the 
liberty loving and oppressed of the world, but these people do not come 
under the guarantees of our constitution.  The Chinese and Japanese are 
not bona fide citizens.  They are not the stuff of which American citizens 
can be made.  History has idly taught us unless we can draw lessons from 
it and in the fate of Rome, which fell into decay by reason of importation 
of a servile population that displaced the small farmer and industrious 
artisan, we may read our own doom unless we have the wisdom to take 
effective measures for our protection.  This is not a labor question, nor a 
local one, but an American question involving the existence of our 
republic.1 
 
James D. Phelan, 1900 
 
Nativism and the Decline of Social Freedoms 
The excerpt above comes from a speech given in the summer of 1900 to 
Californian labor groups by San Francisco Mayor James D. Phelan, who articulated 
nativist fears toward the immigration and Americanization of anyone of Asian ancestry in 
his comments. 
This thesis concentrates on how nativism, through a series of discriminatory 
policies over the span of fifty years, influenced the creation of the Japanese American 
internment camps during the Second World War.  My research into the experiences of the 
Japanese immigrants from 1885 to the early 1930’s has led me to believe that the racisms 
and cultural and economic segregations they dealt with were for the most part regionally 
based on the West Coast.  Although federal laws like the Cable Act of 1922, the 
Gentleman’s Agreement of 1908, and the Immigration Act of 1924 all existed, the impact 
of these laws did not affect the social consciousness of the American public as a whole.  
                                                            
1 James D. Phelan, “Would Exclude the Japanese,” in The San Francisco Chronicle, 5 (May 8, 1900), 5. 
  1
   
They did, however, reflect nativist opinions during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the regional nativism directed at the Japanese 
immigrants and the Japanese Americans was incorporated into the American national 
consciousness. 
This national nativism aimed at anyone of Japanese descent directly led to the 
complete separation of a particular ethnic community from the entire western coast of the 
United States and saw this group moved to internment camps.  The creation of these 
camps was not a plan put into action simply because of the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, but a final decision made after careful consideration.  Once all of the Japanese 
Americans and Japanese immigrants on the coast had been relocated, the Office of 
Commanding General J.L. DeWitt released a report regarding the relocation process.  
The report begins by stating that “the ultimate decision to evacuate all persons of 
Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast under Federal supervision was not made 
coincidentally with the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States.  It was 
predicated upon a series of intermediate decisions, each of which formed a part of the 
progressive development of the final decision.”2  Nativism alone did not call for the 
confinement of the Japanese living on the West Coast, or it would have happened in the 
decades prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.  The needs of total war and the influence of 
nationalism in conjunction with the fears represented by nativism all worked together to 
incite the creation of the internment camps. 
 
 
                                                            
2 Western Defense Command, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942 (Washington 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), chapter 1. 
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Terminology and Statement of Thesis 
It is important that I describe some of the terminology that I use throughout my 
writing.  In my thesis, I refer to the terms immigrant and migrant.  An immigrant is an 
individual who has changed residence from one country to another with the intent of 
establishing a permanent residency.  A migrant worker is normally described as a person 
who works for hire for a preset period of time before moving onto another location within 
the same country in search of another temporary job.  For the purposes of my thesis, I 
have broadened the term migrant to also describe an individual who travels from one 
country to another for the purposes of contractual labor.  These individuals have the 
initial intent of only remaining in the foreign country for a finite amount of time.  Once a 
migrant establishes a home with the purpose of staying indefinitely, then this individual 
has become an immigrant. 
Nativism is the ideology that establishes the importance of the racial and ethnic 
majority above those ethnic communities that have newly immigrated into the nation.  
Nativism calls for a homogenous racial, cultural, national, and economic inclusion.  In 
some cases, cultural and national ties are required to be purged so that the immigrant 
group can obtain social and political acceptance.  In other cases, and depending on the 
individual nativist, racism can influence the acculturation and assimilation of an 
immigrant group, making it impossible to gain acceptance.  In the case of the Japanese 
immigrants and their children, the term unassimilable alien was used quite frequently by 
nativists.  This refers to an immigrant group that the dominant ethnic community felt was 
incapable of ever obtaining any true measure of cultural assimilation. 
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A nativist is a member of the ethnic majority who harbors distrust toward the 
immigrating community.  Nativists have many motivating reasons behind their fears, 
whether it is racism, culture, economics, politics, or national security.  These will vary 
depending entirely upon the individual.  At the turn of the twentieth century, nativism 
toward different racial and ethnic groups was regionally based.  The threat of war, 
however, and technological advancements in communication allowed for the elevation of 
nativist concerns toward national stability to encompass a much wider population base. 
I define discriminatory policy as any legislation that limits civil liberties based on 
race, ethnicity, cultural background, national origin, gender, religious affiliation, or 
sexual preference.  My thesis will concentrate on how the ideological concept of nativism 
decreases the protection of civil liberties within a democratic country when the 
government (state and/or federal) creates discriminatory policy to bypass constitutionally 
protected social freedoms and civil equalities under the declaration that is helping the 
people living within national borders.  I use legal documents (both state and federal) 
supported by nativist propaganda, media reports, and academic studies levied against the 
Japanese immigrants and their children, the Japanese Americans, from the period of 1885 
to 1945 to explore this issue.  The various laws created to discriminate against anyone of 
Japanese descent act as parts of the over-arching immigrant narrative of the Japanese 
Americans and illustrates a decline in the protection of personal freedoms because of 
nativism. 
Many times nativism consumes a society in the years preceding an eventual 
conflict or in a post-war world, where dissolution and anger still remain in the forefront 
of public thought.  The initial case best describes American nativism and its attitudes pre-
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World War II toward anyone of Japanese ancestry.  Tensions in the Pacific region had 
been high for over thirty years even before the U.S. placed an oil embargo on Japan 
directly leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Public fears toward Asian Americans 
and their foreign customs grew during the early part of the twentieth century as illustrated 
by the enactment of the Japanese Alien Land Laws and the inability of the Japanese to 
gain citizenship.  These nativist fears culminated with the creation of internment camps 
and the removal of more than a hundred thousand immigrants and American citizens of 
Japanese ancestry from 86 restricted zones on the West Coast. 
By using the experiences of the first—and second—generations of Japanese 
immigrants, my thesis explores how nativism supported the creation of laws meant to 
preserve racial homogeneity, cultural superiority, economic segregation, and national 
security from the Japanese immigrants living in California during the end of the 
nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century.3  While the majority of public 
discomfort with Japanese immigration was focused in California, other Pacific states also 
created discriminatory laws aimed at the Japanese immigrants and the Japanese 
Americans.  The largest population of people with Japanese ancestry was concentrated in 
Hawaii, but this community was so large that it actually constituted the ethnic majority.  
Hawaii was also not a state until after the end of World War II, which is why I found 
California the best example to show how nativism can cause a decline in the protection of 
civil liberties. 
 
 
                                                            
3 The Sansei, or third generation, were generally much younger, so for the purposes of my thesis, I will 
concentrate on the Issei and Nisei. 
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Historiography 
Mayor Phelan expressed his nativist opinion more than a hundred years ago, and 
although nativist fears toward the immigration of the Japanese has virtually disappeared 
since the end of the Second World War, the conceptual basis behind nativist opinions of 
immigration has only transferred itself to other groups.  Nativism is a salient discourse 
that changes its concerns and moves its focus from one ethnic group to another depending 
on the decade and the region in question. 
John Highman defines nativism in his book Strangers in the Land “as intense 
opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) 
connections.”4  Even within a country where nativism has yet to take hold, racial fears of 
an immigrant group can be found to exist.  It is important to mention the difference 
between the fear of immigration and the fear of a particular immigrant group.  Fear of 
immigration is concerned with the implications and influences that immigration in 
general has upon the country and does not focus on one particular group.  Although, the 
fear of a particular immigrant community does not discount the fear of other immigrant 
communities, it does however, only explore public and personal concerns regarding a 
single group.  Both discussions are important to nativism, but I will concentrate on the 
fear of a single immigrant community for the purposes of my thesis. 
Immigrant groups come to the United States with what would seem strange 
customs to the existing cultural communities and remain in small close-knit groups for 
the same reasons as the rest of the country.  Humanity naturally congregates toward 
likeness.  Nathaniel S. Shaler, who wrote during the early twentieth century when the fear 
                                                            
4 John Highman, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925 (New Brunswick & 
London: Rutgers University Press, 1955), 4. 
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of the Japanese immigrants was increasing, states: “Seen as we may now behold it, the 
common bond of mankind is in effect an instinctive desire of each individual to identify 
himself with what he conceives to be his community.”5  This conceived community is 
important to understanding the underlying motivations of a nativist and his/her desires for 
a homogenous society.  Shaler’s book discusses the creation of human groups.  The tribe 
concept strengthened the individual by making him/her “strong enough to resist the 
impact of the disintegrating forces of the savagery in which it originated.”6  Shaler 
believes that “the dislike of unrelated men which remained after the tribe was knit 
together was no new evil, but the remnant of the hatred with which the primitive men 
regarded their fellows.”7  The fear of strange groups is a natural antipathy created by 
primitive man as an instinctual manner in which one ethnic group deals with another.  It 
is then a natural progression that nativism would increase beyond tribal limitations to 
include a growing civilization and its governing body.  Because of its minority status, the 
subordinate ethnic community finds itself at the epicenter of questions pertaining to its 
motives and its loyalties either as a response to culture, race, economics, national 
protection, etc. 
William H. Katerberg’s book on nativism and liberal democracy argues that these 
two ideologies can go hand in hand.  Discriminatory policies, like those experienced by 
the Japanese immigrants and their children, were enacted through democratic means.  
Katerberg states that many Americans are beginning to ignore nativism.  They ignorantly 
believe that society has moved beyond the social and political intolerance of nativism.  
                                                            
5 Nathaniel Shaler, The Neighbor: The Natural History of Human Contacts (Boston & New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1904), 258.   
6 Ibid., 47. 
7 Ibid., 47. 
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Katerberg argues that “such hopes need to be reevaluated.  Parochial identities and 
conflict have made a profound comeback worldwide and have caught the attention of 
politicians, the media, and the academy.”8  He argues that nativism and liberal ideals 
traditionally come from the same mould.  American nativists fight against individuals 
with different cultural backgrounds, who they fear will not assimilate to the established 
democratic political structure.  In their views, by enacting new legislation against these 
different ethnicities, nativists feel they are protecting democracy. 
In the case of the Japanese immigrants, race, economics, and politics inspired and 
supported legislation restricting social freedoms of anyone of Asian ancestry.9  
Historiography papers written by Roger Daniels and Sucheng Chan cover the first 
hundred years of Asian immigration.  Daniels organizes his article on the Japanese, 
Chinese, and Filipinos into a chronological investigation of how events shaped 
historiography from the mid-eighteen hundreds to the early nineteen seventies.10  Early 
academic analysis of Asian immigration discussed the so-called “Yellow Peril” and the 
threat Asian immigration posed to American national stability.11  Noted Asian historian, 
Sucheng Chan, wrote another historiography.12  Although she briefly mentions the works 
covered by Daniels, her intent was to focus on the writings released after the publication 
                                                            
8 William H. Katerberg, “The Irony of Identity: An Essay on Nativism, Liberal Democracy, and Parochial 
Identities in Canada and the United States,” in American Quarterly 47, no. 3, 493–524 (September 1995), 
494. 
9 See Charles McClain, editor, Asian Americans and the Law: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 
(Berkeley: Garland Press, 1994) for an informative analysis by various authors on the subject of the 
Japanese immigrants and American politics. 
10 See Roger Daniels, “American Historians and the East Asian Immigrants,” in The Pacific Historical 
Review 43, no. 4, 449–72 (November 1974). 
11 See Samuel Busey, Immigration: Its Evils and Consequences (New York: DeWitt & Davenport 
Publishing, 1856; New York: Arno Press, 1969).  For contradictory views see Harvard professor Josiah 
Royce, Race Questions, Provincialism and Other American Problems (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 
1908; Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1967). 
12 See Sucheng Chan, “Asian American Historiography,” in The Pacific Historical Review 65, no. 3, 363–
99 (August 1996). 
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of Daniels’ work.  Chan’s historiography brings the analysis in upon itself by comparing 
scholarly debate and the progression of academic thought up to the mid-nineties.  She 
argues that once scholarly study moved beyond racial debate over whether or not Asians 
posed a national threat, academia solely concentrated on exploring prejudicial events 
through white perspectives and motivations.  It was not until later in the twentieth century 
that academics gave agency to Asians and explored events, such as the Japanese 
internment, through their perspective. 
The first chapter of my thesis will concentrate on the exclusion of an immigrant 
group based on cultural reasons and will begin with the first social contacts between 
residents of the state of California and the Japanese immigrant population.  Yuji Ichioka, 
a pioneer in the field of Asian American study, has written many works regarding 
Japanese immigration.  In his book The Issei: the World of the First Generation Japanese 
Immigrants, 1885-1924, Ichioka lays the groundwork for Japanese American study that is 
still used by scholars today.13  Ichioka breaks Japanese immigration into chronological 
phases.  He writes that Japanese immigration did not pick up until around 1885.  Ichioka 
explains that the creation of the trans-continental railroad and the need for inexpensive 
labor had a significant effect on Asian immigration to the United States.  After the 
creation of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1880 barred Chinese immigrant workers to the 
country, labor companies sought cheap labor from other countries like Japan.  Ichioka 
labels this initial period the dekasegi phase, which is a Japanese word that describes 
temporary migratory laborers.  This period lasted until 1908 when an agreement between 
the United States and Japan stopped all labor migration to the U.S.  Ichioka explains, 
                                                            
13 Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: the World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924 (New York: 
MacMillan Publishing, 1988). 
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however, that this had a different result than intended.  Japanese families were still 
permitted to join their relatives in the U.S.  Since the dekasegi workers could no longer 
travel between countries for work, they simply stayed. 
The second phase of Ichioka’s chronology describes the time in which the 
Japanese immigrants formed family units, established homes, farms, businesses, and 
communities.  Ichioka’s work gives a great deal of study to the chronology of Japanese 
immigration and an exploration into the Japanese American lifestyle.  He also delves 
deeply into the influences upon American nativism and the effects of discriminatory 
legislation upon the Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans.  Although Ichioka’s 
work has greatly influenced my writing, my thesis does not deal with these laws as 
separate events but instead as single parts of a larger narrative. 
David Palumbo-Liu’s book Asian/American: Historical Crossings of a Racial 
Frontier, offers a wealth of knowledge regarding Japanese immigration.14  Palumbo-Liu 
goes a step further than Ichioka by exploring both the international interactions between 
the U.S. and Japan as well as immigration issues.  He concentrates his work on the ethnic 
and social conflicts that arise between the two countries as Japan grew into an 
imperialistic world power during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  He 
also discusses the nativist concern that the Japanese represented a group incapable of 
assimilation.  He writes that “bodily transformations are considered only in terms of 
Eastern European and Mediterranean immigrants; it seemed to go without saying that 
‘Orientals,’ whom the [Immigration] Commission agreed should be excluded from the 
nation, were not susceptible to such transformation, no matter how intense or lengthy 
                                                            
14 David Palumbo-Liu, Asian/American: Historical Crossings of a Racial Frontier (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999).   
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their exposure—both the physiognomic and psychic gaps to be crossed were too great.”15  
Walter LaFeber wrote The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations, a factual study of 
the interactions between the U.S., Japan, and Japanese immigrants.16  Both Palumbo-Liu 
and LaFeber agree on the social exclusionary problems inherent within the United States 
regarding the Japanese immigrants, and both discuss the process in which each country 
progressed from the initial influences of Western culture upon Japan to the end of the 
twentieth century.  LaFeber’s work, however, gives greater consideration to the political 
interactions between the two countries, while Palumbo-Liu’s book deals in larger detail 
with how the interactions between the two countries affected the Japanese immigrants 
and the Japanese Americans. 
America’s vast immigrant background and large regional structure allows for the 
existence of many variations of an American culture.  Because of this, Americans look to 
democracy as the force drawing the country together.  For many Americans, nativism 
hinges on the support and continuation of democracy.  In American nativist views, 
democracy is more than simply a political structure, but a force that gives them a shared 
history and a reason for existing.  Within the United States, democracy has evolved 
beyond its original structure to become a cultural institution.  Hans Kohn writes in his 
book on American nationalism that: 
In its very origin the United States was the embodiment of an idea.  […]  
The ideology was a supra-national ideology, the philosophy of the 
eighteenth century.  But it was based upon, and limited by, the English 
tradition which continued to be the single most important factor in the 
development of American life.  Only by accepting and maintaining the 
English idea of constitutional liberty—and by thus remaining Anglo-
                                                            
15 Ibid., 86. 
16 Walter LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations (New York & London: Norton 
Publishing, 1997). 
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American—could the English colonies in North America continue and 
solidify their political existence.17 
 
Kohn’s book centers on the creation and continuation of American nationalism.  
Nativism, an aspect sometimes incorporated by nationalism, is the representation of 
national fears toward any individual with a different ethnic or national background, 
whom nativists fear will not fully conform to the cultural expectations of the dominant 
ethnic community.  Highman writes: “Specific nativistic antagonisms may, and do, vary 
widely in response to the changing character of minority irritants and the shifting 
conditions of the day; but through each hostility ran the connecting, energizing force of 
modern nationalism.”18 
Neither Kohn nor Highman’s works explicitly discuss the influence of 
nationalism or nativism upon the Japanese immigrants and the Japanese Americans.  
Kohn’s book does provide an understanding of the dire pressures felt by nativists in 
California, though.  The 1890 census reported that 2,039 individuals of Japanese descent 
were living in the United States.19  This is a small number when compared to other 
immigrant groups, but still highly concentrated in the three Pacific coast states.  By 1900, 
however, 27,440 more Japanese had immigrated to the U.S.20  Nativists feared that the 
immigrating Japanese would not Americanize and that they represented a slow invasion 
force—one that was supplanting white anglicized culture as the dominant culture, one 
that was taking American jobs, and one that was providing economic competition in the 
                                                            
17 Hans Kohn, American Nationalism (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1957), 13. 
18 John Highman, Strangers in the Land, 4. 
19 Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States: A Critical Study of the Problems of the Japanese 
Immigrants and their Children (New York: Arno Press, 1969; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), 
53.  Citations are to the 1969 edition. 
20 Ibid., 55. 
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farming and retail markets.  Their xenophobia was so strong that nativists gladly set 
examples for the restricting of the civil liberties of anyone with Japanese ancestry. 
Highman’s book uses a less analytical approach to the exploration of nativism.  
After establishing his definition, he then chronologically follows changing social 
opinions toward minority groups for a sixty-five year period from 1860 to 1925.  
Highman takes a broad approach to the concept of nativism by covering many minority 
groups; he barely touches on the experiences of Asian Americans on the West Coast 
though.  Discriminations against Asians are only off-handedly acknowledged in favor of 
his greater analysis of the east coast with its large Jewish and Italian populations as well 
as the southern U.S. with its large African American population.  Highman’s discussion 
of these groups still provides themes (i.e. the increase and decrease in anti-immigrant 
rhetoric during a soft economy) which can be applied to a discussion of the Asian 
experience.  The structure of my work closely resembles that of Highman’s.  Kohn writes 
to explain the causes behind nationalism and nativism; Highman, on the other hand, uses 
his writing to explore the results of these beliefs.  His lack of depth into the West Coast 
immigrant environment provides me with fertile ground to explore. 
  Nicholas Robins’ book Native Insurgencies and the Genocidal Impulse in the 
Americas has also influenced my structure and analysis of nativism.21  Robins’ work 
concentrates on Native American nativism toward the colonists in the western United 
States.  Robins uses three narratives showing a breakdown in relations between the 
dominant ethnic group and the immigrant community to illustrate the evolution of Native 
American nativism in three separate areas.  He writes that these native communities rose 
                                                            
21 Nicholas Robins, Native Insurgencies and the Genocidal Impulse in the Americas (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
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up to protect themselves from a group that they saw as a threat to their culture.  He begins 
by exploring the birth of the conflict, the encouragement by political leaders upon the 
masses to rise up against this presumed threat, and finally the slaughter of white settlers.  
Major differences exist in the experiences of these Native American groups and the 
Japanese immigrants and the Japanese Americans.  The Native American groups that 
Robins discusses did not regulate white rights, nor intern them into camps.  The nativist 
aggression propagandized by powerful leaders who call for their fellow country men and 
women to arms does, however, parallel the rise of men like P.H. McCarthy and James 
Phelan.22 
Mae M. Ngai’s book Impossible Subjects discusses the creation of the term alien 
citizen.  Ngai believes that some American citizens, who are labeled unassimilable 
because of their racial and ethnic background, are presumed to be aliens by mainstream 
America despite their citizenship status.23  She writes that her book charts “the historical 
origins of the ‘illegal alien’ in American law and society and the emergence of illegal 
immigration as the central problem in U.S. immigration policy in the twentieth 
century.”24  She argues that race study changed from simply looking at physical 
differences by adding national origins to the mix.  The national heritage of an immigrant 
influenced public and political opinion toward an immigrant community.  Ngai continues 
                                                            
22 See the September 1909 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science for a 
discussion of whether or not to exclude Asians from the United States.  Of special interest is the article by 
Fresno Republican editor, Chester H. Rowell, “Chinese and Japanese Immigrants—A Comparison,” in The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 34, no. 2, 3–10 (September 1909), who 
discussed the ethnic differences between the Chinese and the Japanese.  He feared that the Japanese, 
although hard-working and industrious, could not be trusted because of their ambivalence toward 
contractual obligations. 
23 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton & 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2. 
24 Ibid., 3. 
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later in her work to discuss in detail the enactment and implementation of the 
Immigration Act of 1924, which limited the number of non-white immigrants from other 
countries into the United States.  She also explores the effects of the racially prejudicial 
legislation like the 1924 Act and the Japanese internment.  The 1924 Act caused the 
Japanese government to impose a 100% tariff on all U.S. goods and ruined the trading 
business between the two countries.25 
My second chapter will explore Japanese attempts to gain citizenship.  Alexander 
M. Bickel discusses the role of citizenship in the American Constitution in an article he 
wrote for the Arizona Law Review.  In this article, he explains that the topic of citizenship 
was not discussed in the Constitution prior to Reconstruction except to designate who 
could hold certain offices such as the presidency.  He discusses the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, which stated that “all persons born in the United States […] are hereby declared to 
be citizens of the United States.”26  The Civil Rights Act allowed the second generation 
of Japanese immigrants to gain citizenship, while their parents were unable to become 
naturalized citizens.  Bickel’s article chronicles the advancement of the birth-right 
citizenship topic in the political arena, and his work provides readers with a basis for 
understanding how the question of citizenship has progressed historically. 
Linda Bosniak defines citizenship as a means of conveying “a state of democratic 
belonging or inclusion, yet this inclusion is usually premised on a conception of a 
community that is bounded and exclusive.”27  Citizenship paradoxically acts as a manner 
of including and excluding.  It is meant, as Bosniak describes, to work against 
                                                            
25 Ibid., 49. 
26 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, April 9, 1866. 
27 Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton & 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 1. 
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subordination of the general populace by those in power, but the exclusion of citizenship 
and the desire of immigrants to gain citizenship status allows for the subordination of the 
immigrant community.  This is important to the study of the Japanese immigrants who 
were denied the right of naturalization.  Ngai’s book argues that, even though Japanese 
immigrant children gained citizenship by birth, the nativist belief that Asians were 
incapable of full assimilation forced alien citizenship status upon them.28  They might 
have been legally present in the U.S., but to nativists, the Japanese Americans were not 
rightfully present in the United States. 
Bosniak also questions whether or not non-citizens can gain acceptance since they 
are excluded.  She comes to the conclusion that academics should not accept citizenship 
as the normative goal sought by all immigrants, many of whom may be content with 
simply adopting select cultural norms and the economic structures of the host society.  
This can be seen in the different attitudes of the Japanese immigrants and their children 
toward Americanization—a topic I will discuss in greater detail in the first and second 
chapters.  She also states that “citizenship too often seems to represent all things to all 
people; in the process it is often hard to know what is at stake and how the concept 
advances discussion at all.”29  Bosniak’s work influenced my understanding of the 
influences of citizenship on immigration and how the denial of citizenship acts as 
exclusionary concept used to govern the lives of those excluded. 
Rogers Brubaker discusses the scholarly need to group races, individuals with 
similar cultural backgrounds, and people with similar national origins together for 
academic exploration, which he calls groupism.  He defines groupism as the “tendency to 
                                                            
28 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 2–3. 
29 Ibid., 35. 
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take discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life [and treat these] ethnic 
groups, nations, and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be 
attributed.”30  He believes that cultures, communities, tribes, and races do not have to be 
bounded together.  He argues that groupism is only one way of viewing ethnicity.  He 
believes that scholars should view groupness as an ever-changing variable.  Brubaker 
does not intend to belittle the group dynamic, but instead wants to analyze the fact that 
there is a dynamic and how it changes.  As Ngai and Bosniak discuss, the groupness 
associated with the Japanese immigrant community was not just the result of likeness but 
also as a direct result of their exclusion by the rest of society, and their own attempts to 
maintain their cultural heritage. 
The third chapter of the paper will go beyond social fears and explore the 
legislative results of nativist actions.  Restrictions against the Japanese immigrants were 
no longer relegated to the question of citizenship. 
In his book, The Politics of Prejudice, Roger Daniels argues that prejudice is a 
learned behavior, one that is pushed by both political and economic interests.31  His 
concerns lie with how politics can create a racially prejudicial environment with the 
intent of preserving racial, political, and economic homogeneity.  The influx of Japanese 
immigrants to California created a large minority group.  Tensions in the Pacific region 
had been high since the turn of the century, and the white majority in the state feared that 
the Japanese immigrant growth represented an invading force that would eventually 
sweep through the country supplanting white anglicized culture as the dominant culture 
                                                            
30 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 8. 
31 Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle 
for Japanese Exclusion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962). 
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within America.  He writes that “the Anti-Japanese movement was in many ways merely 
a continuation of the long-standing agitation against the Chinese which began in the early 
1850’s.”32  In another book about race and the Asian American experience, American 
Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice, Daniels along with Harry L. Kitano 
argue that racial anger by white America ran deeper for the Japanese than the Chinese 
because white America viewed China as a geographic location and Japan as a nation.33 
This is perhaps indicative of the Westernization of Japan and its imperial presence in the 
Pacific. 
White America created a two-category racial system in the United States 
consisting of whites and non-whites.  The American social, economic, and political 
system strove to maintain this status quo, while early academic analysis concentrated 
mainly on the discussion of whether or not Asians and other minority groups posed a 
threat to national survival.  As the century progressed and Japan grew as a world power, 
the Japanese became the central group targeted by nativism on the Pacific coast. 
In the book Farming the Home Place, Valerie Matsumoto studies the forces that 
shape a rural ethnic community and how these changes progress over time.  She uses the 
small town of Cortez, California to demonstrate the ethnic support network between the 
earliest Japanese immigrants.  She writes that: “Cortez illustrates the cultivation of ethnic 
community and culture as a choice reflective of shared history and changing needs.”34  
The influx of these homogenous communities allowed for unified strength in the face of 
                                                            
32 Ibid., 16. 
33 Roger Daniels & Harry H.L. Kitano, American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), 45. 
34 Valerie Matsumoto, Farming the Home Place: A Japanese American Community in California, 1919–
1982 (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 11. 
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discrimination, but also exacerbated existing racial fears that the Japanese immigrants 
were resistant to Americanization. 
Although both Daniels’ and Matsumoto’s books provide an understanding of the 
influences upon American nativism toward the Japanese immigrants and the Japanese 
Americans, they also give a great deal of study into the factors that existed within a 
society that allow for the creation of these discriminatory laws and provide a greater 
understanding of how these laws were created.   
In 1913, the state of California enacted a land law which kept anyone of Asian 
ancestry from owning land.  It also limited the number of years that these individuals 
could lease land to three year segments.  Historians still debate the cause of the California 
Alien Land Laws.  Some like Daniels argue that racial reasons influenced the creation of 
these discriminatory policies, while others argue that economic competition forced the 
enactment of these laws.  Masakazu Iwata writes in his article about the influence of 
Japanese farmers on Californian agriculture: 
The Japanese worked diligently under the most trying circumstances.  
Their vaulting ambitions soon enabled them to make successfully the 
transition from laborers to tenant farmers.  As farm operators, the 
[Japanese immigrants] continued a life of struggle not only against the 
elements but also against adverse social, economic, and political pressures.  
But despite such discriminatory legislation as the anti-alien land laws, the 
Japanese, many of whom sought protection in organization, made notable 
advances in agriculture.35 
 
The contribution of Japanese immigrant farmers upon the agricultural success of 
California has been veiled by the forced relocation of the Japanese during the Second 
World War.  Early Japanese migrants came to the U.S. as labor for railroad construction.  
                                                            
35 Masakazu Iwata, “The Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture,” in Agricultural History 36, no. 1, 
25–37 (January 1962), 25. 
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After the creation of the Gentleman’s Agreement, many of these workers transitioned to 
mine work, factory work, and large scale farm labor.  Iwata writes that these immigrants 
were also used as strike breakers against white unionized employees.  Their willingness 
to work longer hours at less pay and the resistance of white unions to include Japanese 
workers gave business owners the upper hand in strike negotiations.   
Japanese desires to improve themselves both financially and socially drew them 
to farming, an occupation highly respected in Japan, and one in which they could control 
their own destiny.  Iwata states that “after the first World War, agitation against the 
Japanese farmers was revived.  Agitators found no difficulty in winning adherents for the 
Anti-alien movement among the stream of returning doughboys and workers released 
from war industries, many of whom now felt their own economic insecurity in contrast to 
the established position of the Japanese.”36  Despite these social feelings, Iwata’s article 
reveals that the Japanese, in actuality, posed no real competition to white farmers.  
Instead, they farmed areas avoided by white farmers and made these undesirable 
environments fertile.  They also increased food production, thereby reducing food costs. 
Robert Higgs writes in his article, “Landless by Law: Japanese Immigrants in 
California Agriculture to 1941,” that even before the advent of the land laws, many 
Japanese immigrants did not even own farms.  A study from the Immigration 
Commission in 1909 shows that two thirds of all Japanese immigrant workers held 
positions in agriculture with most of these individuals actually working as farm hands or 
tenant farmers.  Higgs’ article concentrates on farm tenancy by Japanese migrants in 
California.  After the first land law went into effect in 1913, ownership of land by 
                                                            
36 Ibid., 30. 
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Japanese immigrants sharply decreased, while land tenancy increased.  Higgs’ article 
discusses the economic competition that existed within the leasing of land.  Out of 
respect for white landlords, the California state government did not forbid land tenancy 
but instead restricted it to three year increments.  This allowed the white landlords to 
frequently raise the lease rates of Japanese tenants, who had no other alternatives but to 
pay the higher costs.  It became more financially beneficial for white owners to lease 
their land to Japanese families instead of white ones, who expected lower costs.  Unlike 
Iwata, Higgs writes that “Japanese tenants invariably occupied more valuable land than 
their white neighbors; in some places, such as Alameda, Orange, Sacramento, and Solano 
Counties, much more valuable land.”37  Both authors provide a breakdown of the number 
of Japanese farms in select areas, but neither provides the reader with an explanation as to 
the financial condition of the land.  It is likely that Japanese families owned less desirable 
land than tenant farmers who leased better quality and more expensive land from white 
owners. 
Like Daniels and Matsumoto, Higgs later blames pure racism (supported by 
Japanese economic success) as the main reason for white discrimination.38  Problematic 
is the fact that Higgs’s structure does not quite support his final claim.  Although he 
states that economic desires influenced preexisting racial problems, he interestingly uses 
economics to explain these racially prejudicial laws.  On the other hand, Iwata structures 
his paper as an economic deconstruction of the land laws.  He may come to the final 
conclusion that no real economic competition existed between whites and Japanese, but 
                                                            
37 Robert Higgs, “Landless by Law: Japanese Immigrants in California Agriculture to 1941,” in The 
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he does acknowledge, however, that even though economic competition between the 
races might have been illusory, it still existed in the minds of the white voting majority.  
To Iwata, race supports economic interests, not the other way around.   
Some academics focus their analysis of the land laws on the political nature of the 
United States, specifically the state of California.  These scholars study the political 
climate, changes in majority power of a bipartisan system, or in the case of Brian J. 
Gaines and Wendy K. Tam Cho, the voting records for the enactment of the land laws.  
Gaines and Tam Cho study whether or not race or economics played a greater role in 
political decision making like the 1920 amendment to the existing land law.  They argue 
“that racially discriminatory policy may be the result of self-interest and competition in 
the face of scarcity or prejudices and affects based on group identities.”39  Their work 
concentrates on county voting records which they use to gauge public support for the 
1920 amendment.  A racial cause for the enactment of the land laws would argue that an 
area with a high degree of racial tension and a large minority group would more than 
likely see greater backing for a law that gave the solitary ethnic group with voting rights 
economic control of the environment.  All of these expectations turned out to be false, 
however.  Instead they found that counties with lower population numbers of Japanese 
immigrants and their off-spring actually gave greater support to the law, while those areas 
with large numbers of Japanese farmers generally provided less backing for the law.  
Gaines and Tam Cho come to the conclusion that “a simple economic model of support 
for this racially discriminatory policy is inadequate because purely economic, nonracial 
                                                            
39 Brian J. Gaines & Wendy K. Tam Cho, “On California’s 1920 Alien Land Law: The Psychology and 
Economics of Racial Discrimination,” in State Politics and Policy Quarterly 4, no. 3, 271–93 (Fall 2004), 
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variables had no effect.  But a simple psychological model is also inadequate, insofar as 
some of the racial variables had unexpected effects.”40  Even this quantitative study by 
political scientists was unable to draw a firm conclusion, which is why my thesis does not 
take a stance on the cause behind the land laws.  Whether or not race, economic 
competition, or politics are acting as motivations behind nativist concerns will depend 
entirely upon the individual. 
The final chapter of my thesis will concentrate on the nativist question of whether 
or not an ethnic group has the right to exist in a select area and the creation of laws 
forcibly removing them from these places.  During the Second World War, propaganda 
dehumanized the Japanese by making them into subhuman villains who threatened the 
American way of life.  Ads and literature attacking an enemy country during a time of 
war is an integral part of war propaganda.  The attacks upon the Japanese were, however, 
not against an enemy regime (such as Hitler and the Nazis or Mussolini and fascism) but 
against their very racial existence.  John W. Dower explores the differences in war 
propaganda during World War II between Germany, Italy, and Japan and how these 
differences illustrate varied racial opinions toward these groups.  The Germans and 
Italians were never seen as the true enemy.  Americans concentrated their rage upon the 
ideological regimes at the head of these countries.  Dower uses war posters showing 
Hitler, Mussolini, and a non-descript Japanese soldier with exaggerated features to 
support his theory that wartime propaganda from World War II revealed the racist 
concept that the Japanese as an ethnic group were evil.  The fact that Germans and 
Italians were white Europeans provided white Americans with racial and cultural 
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connectivity and allowed them to view only the leaders of Germany, Italy, and their 
ideological principles as actually bad. 
The Japanese represented an enemy both across the Pacific Ocean but on 
American soil as well.  The belief that the Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans 
were incapable of Americanization, made them prime targets of nativist concerns that 
these communities would ally themselves with their Japanese brethren and strike at the 
U.S.41  Although some fears were directed toward German and Italian Americans, their 
similar skin tones, appearance, and cultural attributes allowed them to more easily 
assimilate and thereby show their allegiance than immigrants from Japan. 
In the book By Order of the President, Greg Robinson discusses the racial 
environment that led to the creation of the internment camps.42  Like Dower, he uses the 
idea that some individuals within white America felt that the Japanese immigrants and 
Japanese Americans represented an invasion force, and he discusses the evolution of this 
thought process into the belief that internment camps were a necessary by-product of war.  
Unlike Dower, Robinson does not delve into comparative study of how Americans 
treated Germans and Italians versus anyone of Japanese ancestry.   He instead looks at the 
chronology of events related to the creation of the camps and the relocation of the 
Japanese immigrants and the Japanese Americans.  My thesis utilizes his concept that the 
camps were the end result of a larger narrative.  My work, though, gives greater detail to 
the events that transpired in the decades prior to 1940, an area of focus only given brief 
                                                            
41 See headline “Japanese Invasion: The Problem of the Hour for the United States,” in San Francisco 
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attention in Robinsons’ work.  His book instead pays great detail to the political decision-
making process involved in the creation of the internment camps.  As I wrote my fourth 
chapter, I found Robinsons’ work helpful in understanding the chronology of events and 
the persons involved.  Although both of our discussions have narrative structures, his 
book looks at the process not as a decline in the social stability of a democratic country, 
but as events to be explored and explained. 
In War without Mercy, John W. Dower writes in greater detail about the racial 
influences upon the Second World War that he only briefly covered in his earlier 
mentioned article.  He argues that World War II was many things to many people.  To 
some it was a war with new technological innovations, while to others it was a war of 
ideologies.  To many, however, it was “a race war.”43  Apart from the studies done of the 
genocide of Europe’s Jewish population, Dower feels that racism remains one of the most 
neglected aspects of World War II.  He poses the question: “When and where did race 
play a significant role in the war?”44  The subject of race has such broad implications, 
that the thousands of books and articles written about the Second World War have only 
barely touched upon the surface of possible discussions. 
The idea of racial and ethnic superiority and protection allowed for a war where 
the acquisition of land or the allocation of power were all divided upon racial and cultural 
lines.  In his article, “Under Cover of War,” Jay Winter writes: “When industrialized 
nations, supported by imperial dominions, took the decision to go to war, and stayed at 
war over an extended period, they opened a Pandora’s box.  What they let free was a kind 
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of war unlike the world had ever seen before […] which I call ‘total war.’”45  Winter 
argues that modern warfare grew to encompass all aspects of a country.  The concept of 
nationalism made the protection of the nation (including its people, places, and 
mechanisms) a priority.  The mobilization for total war drew every day citizens into its 
maw.  The peasantry, which had remained neutral during older conflicts, now helped to 
produce the mechanisms of warfare: machines, soldiers, and propaganda.  The concept of 
total war influenced the need for the internment of the Japanese immigrants and Japanese 
Americans.  These individuals represented a possible threat to the American war machine 
(including military instillations, sensitive information, war production, and the general 
population).  Nativism by itself did not call for the internment of the Japanese living on 
the West Coast, or it would have happened some time before the attack on Pearl Harbor.  
After December 7th, however, nativism worked in unison with American nationalism and 
the country’s needs for total war to incite the creation of the internment camps. 
Naturally race and culture, which had for centuries divided countries, took on an 
added importance.  The race war discussed in Dower’s book illustrates the evolution of 
the ideology of war.  Since humanity uses race and culture to define individuals, a race 
war was not fought over land and power but for the domination of one race or culture 
over another with land and power no longer the object of war, but the spoils associated 
with victory.  The true object of war became the survival of an ideal—a belief in a certain 
culture’s prominence, support for a particular political system, or the presumed 
infallibility of a nation’s economic structure.  Whatever this ideal may be, its survival 
                                                            
45 Jay Winter, “Under Cover of War: The Armenian Genocide in the Context of Total War,” in The Specter 
of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, edited by Robert Gellately & Ben Kiernan, 189–213 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 189. 
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was dependant upon community support.  Each individual within the community played 
his/her part in the success of the nation.  Symbiotically, individual well-being was 
dependent upon the continuation, protection, and growth of the nation. 
Nativists fear that the intrusion of other groups into the home country signals the 
decline in prosperity for the dominant ethnic group either as competition or as a threat to 
their very racial and cultural survival—for the United States it is the survival of America 
as a concept that moves nativists to fight against the inclusion of minority groups.  If race 
and culture is now a battlefield, then even if one’s country is not at war (as was the case 
with the Japanese and the United States from 1885 to 1941), the influx of other ethnic 
groups still represents a possible threat to the cultural continuation of the dominant ethnic 
community.  The advancements in modern technology (i.e. radio and the movies), the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, and the war in the Pacific with Japan promoted the increase in 
nativism toward the Japanese to rise to national levels. 
A race war does not have to be defined in the same manner used by Dower and 
Winter.  Ronald Takaki in Double Victory takes a more positive approach to the inclusion 
of race into wartime thinking.  He argues that the race topics brought to the forefront 
during the war allowed for social growth and eventually the equality of civil liberties for 
minority groups here in the United States.  Takaki believes that his book offers a different 
memory of race and the Second World War.  He writes: 
Ordinary men and women from America’s minority communities are 
given special focus.  History is told from the bottom up, through the lives 
of everyday Americans—Joseph Kurihara as he angrily stared at the 
barbed-wire fence of an internment camp for Japanese Americans, Fred 
Smith as he joined the all-black Tuskegee squadron because he wanted to 
“fly and fight” for freedom, Mexican-American Alex Romandia as he 
enlisted with his Jewish friends in order to show that they were “more 
American than the Anglos,” Snohomish Indian Harriet Shelton Williams 
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as she worked on the assembly lines of Boeing Aircraft in Washington, 
and Jewish-American soldier Murray Shapiro as he wrote home from 
“somewhere in Germany” to say he was “knocking on Hitler’s 
doorstep.”46 
 
As these minorities fought for freedom in their various manners, they also dealt with 
nativism, racism, and discrimination here in the United States, which parallels the 
wartime cry for victory at home and abroad.  Minority groups dealing with discrimination 
in the U.S. believed that their show of loyalty and increased solidarity with the rest of the 
country during war times would compel the enactment of equality back in the States.   
Takaki also writes that the racisms of Nazi Germany forced the U.S. to put itself 
in opposition to German racial policy.  Takaki feels that these were the initial steps on the 
road to civil rights for all racial groups here in the U.S.  Although Dower might argue 
that this is simply an example of American hypocrisy at work, his writing does not refute 
the possibility that the wartime experiences of minority groups may have later influenced 
civil rights activists.  If anything the realization of this hypocrisy, related the need for 
change.  Takaki’s work is one of progress, while mine is one of decline.  He looks to the 
positive gains in civil rights in the decades to come and uses the Second World War as 
the beginning of those changes.  My work instead looks at the lack of civil rights and the 
hypocrisies from the decades prior.  I use World War II as the culmination of 
discriminatory legislation against anyone with Japanese ancestry living within the United 
States. 
 
 
                                                            
46 Ronald Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II (Boston, New York, 
& London: Little, Brown & Company, 2000), 4–5. 
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Methodology & Structure 
The majority of my thesis concentrates on the American political and legislative 
landscapes.  Within a democratic nation, discriminatory laws pass because they are 
supported by more than just politicians; they also have the backing of large numbers 
within the American populace as well.  The legal documents I use are supported by 
examples of public opinion, thereby revealing how nativist fears guided the passage of 
discriminatory legislation through the American legal system by democratic means. 
It is important to reveal the laws at the heart of my thesis.  In 1790, the U.S. 
government passed a Nationality Act that allowed citizenship to “all free whites.”47  In 
1870, the U.S. passed another Nationality Act that gave citizenship rights to “persons of 
African descent.”48  These two laws seem harmless in their basic essence, but became a 
central concept that allowed the U.S. government to create discriminatory policy against 
the Japanese.  Since neither of these two documents specifically mentions anyone of 
Asian ancestry, various legal entities like the Supreme Court were able to state that these 
individuals were not able to gain citizenship except through birth.  They labeled Asians 
as aliens ineligible for citizenship.   
None of the inequalities experienced by the Japanese immigrants and their 
children would have been possible, however, if there hadn’t existed an atmosphere of 
nativist aggression.  The articles, speeches, letters, and scholarly works I use throughout 
my writing will illustrate that the nativism present within the United States toward 
Japanese immigration was not the work of a few individuals but a perpetuating ideal that 
                                                            
47 Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (March 26, 1790). 
48 Naturalization Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 254 (July 14, 1870). 
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grew from the West Coast, predominantly in California, to eventually encompass national 
sentiment. 
As earlier stated, I saw the internment camps not as a result of the war in the 
Pacific, but as another discrimination following decades of inequalities.  My thesis is 
comprised of four chapters and a conclusion.  The four chapters encompass the exclusion 
of culture, the loss or exclusion of citizenship, the loss of social equality, and the loss of 
freedom.  The majority of the paper will move chronologically from 1885 (the point 
many historians attribute to the first full scale immigration by the Japanese to the U.S.) to 
1945 (the end of the Second World War). 
The first chapter of my thesis introduces the Japanese immigrants and Japanese 
Americans and examines the exclusion of culture.  At the heart of this chapter lies the 
question of and the nativist need for assimilation.  In the U.S. this is called 
Americanization of divergent ethnic groups.  Many within the United States felt that 
Americanization was necessary to protect a presumed American cultural heritage.  In the 
case of the Japanese, public opinion deemed them incapable of Americanization.  
The second chapter of my thesis explores the period from 1885 to 1907 and 
concentrates on the loss or exclusion of citizenship.  This section will deal with the 
beginnings of Japanese immigration, the initial cultural conflicts between white America 
and the Japanese, and laws that restricted Japanese American citizenship.  While the first 
chapter brings up the idea that some cultures threatened American national strength, the 
second chapter shows the influence of these fears upon the laws being created. 
The third chapter of my thesis covers the years 1906 to 1924 and uses the loss of 
civil liberties to discuss the laws that restricted equal rights for Japanese immigrants and 
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their children.  The California Alien Land Laws and the segregation of Japanese children 
from the California Public School System both play a large part in showing how the 
initial fears of a different ethnic community evolved into the need for separation of the 
two groups.  Like chapter two, the third chapter of my thesis shows how nativist fears 
encouraged the creation of laws dismissing equality of a select ethnic community. 
The fourth chapter of my thesis continues through the 1930’s and uses the loss of 
one’s freedom to show the evolution of nativist fears from regional concerns to national 
ones.  The advent of World War II took the idea of separateness even further.  It was no 
longer enough that threatening minority groups be kept at a distance; it was now 
imperative that these groups be taken away so as to negate any threat they may represent.  
The fourth chapter deals directly with the power of the government to rescind personal 
freedoms based on a person’s ethnicity and is illustrated by the creation of the War 
Relocation Authority and the internment camps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Chapter 1: Nativism and the Exclusion of Culture 
There are many who land here who really never get to America.  They 
become Americanized in everything but in heart.  To teach the foreigner 
English is a necessary step; but it is not an end in itself; it is merely one of 
the implements of Americanization.  This may hold diverse peoples 
together for a while, just as economic opportunity and financial reward 
may cover their isolation.  But unless, in their living—rather than in their 
livelihood—they daily exercise the principles on which the Republic rests, 
we have among us a shell of citizenship liable to explode at the least 
upsetting of economic balance, rather than the vital spirit which is at the 
basis of American life.1  
 
Calvin Coolidge, 1921 
 
The Initial Steps of Japanese Immigration 
In early summer of 1900, a mass meeting gathered at the Metropolitan Hall in San 
Francisco to discuss the threat of Japanese immigrants upon labor stability.  P.H. 
McCarthy, Chairman of the Sailors Union and Labor Council, was the main speaker and 
organizer of this event meant to enrage existing fears toward the Asian immigrants and 
their children.  San Francisco Mayor James D. Phelan, a strong advocate throughout his 
tenure in politics for the exclusion of Asian immigrants, spoke passionately about the 
very survival of America as a nation.  He mentioned Chinese immigration, which had 
originally grown in the mid-nineteenth century during the California gold rush, had been 
almost completely stopped with the induction of the Chinese Exclusion Law of 1882.   
The Chinese were brought in as cheep migrant labor to aid in the completion of 
the trans-continental railroad.  The completion of the railroad project left thousands of 
                                                            
1 Calvin Coolidge, “Whose Country is This?” in Good Housekeeping, 13–7 (February 1921), 15.  Coolidge 
wrote this article when he was the Vice President of the United States.  He felt that the country was 
originally meant to help those hard-working individuals in need of escape from religious persecution or un-
democratic governments, but had since become a dumping ground for anyone of any physical and 
emotional stature.  He believed that the creation of an immigration test could keep out undesirable 
immigrants. 
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Chinese immigrants without work and competing for other jobs with U.S. citizens.  
During the 1870’s western states began lobbying for the restriction of Chinese 
immigration.  In 1876, a Californian ballot revealed that 154,638 individuals supported 
Chinese exclusion while 883 people did not.  An 1879 ballot in Nevada voted 17,259 for 
exclusion with 183 individuals voting against such measures.  In 1880, outgoing 
President Rutherford B. Hayes enacted a treaty with China that allowed the U.S. to limit 
or suspend Chinese immigration.2  By 1882, the U.S. government created the Exclusion 
Law as a way of discouraging labor competition by barring the immigration of anyone of 
Chinese ancestry.  The law stipulated that the federal government would control 
immigration issues.  It also banned the migration of Chinese labor for 10 years.  The need 
for cheap labor did not dissipate though, and the exclusion of the Chinese only left a 
vacuum for other groups to fill.  Around 1885 a great influx of Japanese immigrants 
poured into the country’s western boarder as cheap labor for other projects and large 
farms.  The use of the Japanese as migrant laborers continued through 1908 when an 
agreement brokered by President Theodore Roosevelt with the Japanese government 
slowed the migration. 
Up until the mid-nineteenth century, Japan practiced national isolationism.  The 
Tokugawa Shogunate prohibited emigration from Japan and isolated the country from 
outside influence.  The Tokugawa period came after a period of war between several 
factions fighting for control before the country was ultimately united under Shogun 
Tokugawa Leyasu.  Although the Shogunate administered national decisions, the 
Emperor of Japan was still regarded as the legitimate ruler of the country.  The Japanese 
                                                            
2 Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press), 358. 
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social structure during this period followed a strict hierarchical ladder that consisted of 
the Samurai at the top of the system, followed by farmers, artisans, and finally traders. 
Not until 1854, when Admiral Matthew C. Perry’s U.S. warships arrived at Tokyo 
Bay, did the Japanese open its borders to outsiders.3  The Japanese government did not 
allow its citizens to emigrate to other countries until 1866.  Before that time, only a few 
individuals temporarily migrated for educational purposes to other countries.4  In 1867, 
the last Tokugawa Shogun returned administrative powers to the emperor, effectively 
ending this period in Japanese history.  The Emperor, however, maintained his more 
priestly duties, and gave administrative powers to the Mieji Oligarchy.  In effect, 
parliamentary control simply changed hands from the Shogunate to another group elected 
by the Emperor.  This period became known as the Meiji Restoration. 
The Restoration saw the opening of Japan to western influences and 
industrialization.  To support this rapid growth, the Japanese government increased land 
taxation.  Many farmers lost their land to support the industrial growth of the country.  In 
1884, Japan allowed their citizens to immigrate in the hopes of colonizing the Pacific 
region.  David O’Brien and Stephen Fugita contend that between 1883 and 1890, 367,000 
farmers were forced off their property because of over taxation.5  The opening of Japan 
to outside trade also created extreme economic competition within the country, forcin
many Japanese families, who could now travel abroad, to search for sources of income 
outside of Japan’s borders. 
g 
                                                            
3 This was actually Perry’s second visit.  His first came in 1853, when he presented a letter from President 
Millard Fillmore demanding the opening of trade.  At this point, Americans were only able to trade with 
Japan under the guise of the Dutch flag. Perry came with nine warships on his second visit to force a treaty. 
4 Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States, 3. 
5 David J. O’Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience (Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1991), 10.   
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In effect, Western influence and competition from other countries, like the United 
States, forced Japanese laborers to migrate to the U.S. and thereby exported the same 
economic competition feared by individuals like P.H. McCarthy, who was also at one 
time the head of the San Francisco Buildings Trade Council and the eventual Mayor of 
San Francisco.  McCarthy said at the earlier mentioned Labor meeting: “We urge the 
passage of an act of Congress, or the adoption of such other measures as may be 
necessary for the total exclusion of all classes of Japanese other than members of the 
diplomatic staff, such a law has become a necessity.”6  Marcus Braun, an Immigrant 
Inspector for the Department of Commerce and Labor, argued for the creation of an 
armed guard along the U.S. borders and for a registration law, requiring all immigrants 
“to register their residence either with the local police or with a special bureau to be 
created for that purpose.”7  McCarthy, Phelan, Braun, and others were elected officials 
and representatives of the people of California through their official positions and 
organizations.  I use them and others throughout my thesis as examples of nativist ideas 
toward the Japanese immigrants and their children.8 
The origins behind the discriminatory laws created by the federal and state 
governments meant to discourage Japanese immigration can be traced back to the nativist 
statements regarding the supposed dangers of Asian immigration.  Japan, more than any 
other Eastern Nation, tried to model itself on Western imperialist culture.  Just like its 
                                                            
6 P.H. McCarthy, “Would Exclude the Japanese,” in The San Francisco Chronicle, 5 (May 8, 1900), 5. 
7 Marcus Braun, “How Can we Enforce our Exclusion Laws?” in The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 34, no. 2, 140–2 (September 1909), 142. 
8 For contradictory arguments see Max J. Kohler, “Un-American Character of Race Legislation,” in The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 34, no. 2, 55–73 (September 1909).  
Kohler, a former Assistant U.S. District Attorney, warned about the dangers of race-discrimination, which 
he believed contradicted the very core of American doctrine and showed a complete disregard for the social 
well-being of these individuals. 
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European counterparts, the Empire of Japan began to spread its influence throughout the 
Pacific and Asian regions.  Wars with China in 1894 and Russia in 1904 over sections of 
Manchuria and Korea only solidified its power in the area.  These conquests also 
increased apprehension within the United States, which held interests in the Pacific 
arena—namely its territories in the Philippines and Hawaii, which were both recently 
acquired in 1898.  Roosevelt trusted neither Russia nor Japan, and his motives for 
creating a labor treaty with Japan stemmed from his desire for a peaceful resolution to the 
tensions between the United States and the island nation.  He viewed Japan as a growing 
threat to U.S. interests in the area, and expressed those concerns in a letter to Captain 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, where he stated: “We should build a dozen new battleships, half of 
them on the Pacific Coast; and these battleships should have a large coal capacity and a 
consequent increased radius of action.  I am fully alive to the danger from Japan, and I 
know that it is idle to rely on any sentimental good will towards us.”9  Seven years later 
after becoming President of the United States and two years before winning the Noble 
Peace Prize for helping to end the Russo-Japanese war, he wrote: 
I never anticipated in the least such a rise as this of Japan’s, but I have 
never been able to make myself afraid of Russia in the present. I like the 
Russian people and I believe in them. […]  But I see nothing of permanent 
good that can come to Russia, either for herself or for the rest of the world, 
until her people begin to tread the path of orderly freedom, of civil liberty, 
and of a measure of self-government.  […]  I was a firm believer in the 
Japanese people, and that I most earnestly hoped as well as believed that 
Japan would simply take her place from now on among the great civilized 
nations.10 
                                                            
9 Theodore Roosevelt to Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan (letter, May 3, 1897) in Theodore Roosevelt: Letters 
and Speeches, edited by Louis Auchincloss, 94–6 (New York: Harvard University Press, 1951), 94.  
Captain Mahan, a close-friend of Roosevelt’s, was an expert on naval history and tactics. 
10 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring-Rice (letter, June 13, 1904) in Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and 
Speeches, edited by Louis Auchincloss, 333–8 (New York: Harvard University Press, 1951), 333–4.  
Spring-Rice, a British diplomat and friend of Roosevelt’s, would later serve as the British Ambassador to 
the United States. 
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Roosevelt feared that instability in the Pacific region would only complicate U.S. 
interests in the region.  Peaceful coexistence with Japan was paramount to avoiding 
unnecessary conflict. 
Roosevelt, who was cognizant of Japan’s growing power in the Pacific, feared 
that any discriminatory laws against the Japanese immigrants might be seen as a hostile 
act toward the Japanese Empire and could spark a conflict between the two nations.  In 
1908, he brokered a mutually beneficial accord with Japan that limited labor competition 
by halting the temporary migration of Japanese laborers.  This treaty is known as the 
Gentleman’s Agreement and can be can be viewed as what Yuji Ichioka has described as 
the defining moment that separates two phases of Japanese immigration history.11  
Valerie J. Matsumoto states that the first phase of Japanese immigrant workers originally 
“intended to make their fortunes and then return to their homeland.  They considered 
themselves dekasegi workers, only going away temporarily.”12  No longer able to freely 
move between the two countries, many Japanese laborers accepted this new situation and 
sent for their families to join them in the United States.  Once they shifted from migrant 
workers to immigrants, they moved from this initial phase to another one.  Ichioka’s 
secondary phase consists of the period in which the Japanese immigrants established 
homes, businesses, and families within the U.S. 
To better understand the Japanese American experience, one must first learn some 
of the basic terms associated with this specific ethnic community.  The first generation, or 
rather, those immigrants who originally came as dekasegi workers (both male and 
female) are known as the Issei.  Ineligible for naturalization because of discriminatory 
                                                            
11 Yuji Ichioka, The Issei, 3–4. 
12 Valerie J. Matsumoto, Farming the Home Place, 22. 
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laws placed upon Asians, the Issei did not gain the right of naturalization until 1952.  
This initial generation tried to walk a fine line between the two cultures.  They held 
tightly to their ethnic heritage (so as to not forget where they came from), while at the 
same time they adopted American customs. 
The second generation of Japanese immigrants, or Nisei, gained U.S. citizenship 
by being born on U.S. soil.  Unlike their parents, they held dual citizenship with both the 
United States as well as with Japan.  They retained their parent’s Japanese citizenship, 
which required that they serve in the Japanese army.  As discussed during a House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization: 
Under Japan’s Nationality Law, it would appear, therefore, that every 
Japanese born in America, and an American citizen under our law, is 
liable to serve his time in the Japanese army, and to fight for Japan in time 
of war.  In order to enforce this allegiance, the Japanese government keeps 
a record of all Japanese born abroad.  Japanese subjects are required to 
register births with the local Japanese consulate.  A birth certificate is also 
forwarded to the district in Japan where the parents originally lived thus 
when the Japanese reach the age of seventeen, they are placed on the 
military register.13 
 
The dual citizenship of the Nisei was one of the major questions regarding the 
assimilability of the Japanese immigrants.  What many Americans of the time failed to 
realize was that most Issei did not register their children for this selective service draft 
instituted by the Japanese government, therefore remaining completely anonymous.  The 
Japanese government though, viewed the Japanese immigrants to the United States and 
                                                            
13 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Japanese Immigration: Hearings on Immigration 
and Naturalization on the Pacific Coast (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1921), 1189, 
quoted in Raymond Leslie Buell, “Some Legal Aspects of the Japanese Question,” in Asian Americans and 
the Law: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Charles McClain, 3–24 (Berkeley: Garland 
Press, 1994). 
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throughout the Pacific as colonial agents.14  In March 15, 1916, Japan instituted the 
Japanese Expatriation Law, to aid second generation Japanese immigrants in severing 
their ties to the nation.  The law was, however, best described as a farce.  It stipulated that 
only Japanese minors born abroad and under fifteen years of age, or between the ages of 
fifteen and seventeen with the written consent of a parent or guardian, or older than 
seventeen and who had served at least two years in the Japanese army could expatriate 
themselves from Japan.  These limitations made it difficult for the Nisei to actually 
separate themselves from Japan.  The Nisei hoped to establish themselves as American 
citizens not just legally but culturally as well.  They did this for multiple reasons 
depending entirely upon the individual.  Some assimilated as a response to the racist 
discrimination placed upon anyone deemed un-American, while others did so out of a 
sincere desire to assimilate.15 
 
Japanese Immigrant Assimilation 
At the time that the Japanese were emigrating to the United States, academics felt 
that one of three possibilities occurred: the acculturation of the dominant ethnic 
community with cultural aspects brought by the migrating subordinate community; the 
accommodation of the two groups after each adopts select ethnic characteristics from the 
other, thereby bringing the two groups into a close union and eventually merging two 
                                                            
14 See Mark I. Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Cambridge & London: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 222.  Choate’s book concentrates on Italian emigration, but frequently throughout 
his book, he compares Italian colonization and emigration with that of Japan’s. 
15 See Lon Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and 
Festival in Los Angeles, 1934–1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002) to learn more about  
how the second generation tried to adapt to American culture and how the older generation attempted to 
help them maintain cultural ties to their ancestry.  He believes that the celebration of Nisei week was a 
response by the Issei to ensure the survival of their ethnic heritage through the younger generation and a 
common thread with immigration studies regardless of the ethnic group. 
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separate ethnicities into one ethnic culture; and the assimilation of the subordinate culture 
into the dominate one.16   
This section of chapter one will deal with how the Issei and the Nisei assimilated 
many aspects of American culture.  O’Brien and Fugita state: 
The Meiji Restoration illustrates a typical Japanese way of dealing with 
new exigencies.  As in an earlier period when they adopted significant 
elements of Chinese culture, and during the post World War II period 
when they adopted Western ideas of government and fashion—some 
forcibly—the nineteenth century Japanese were able to incorporate ideas 
and practices from the outside without altering their basic forms of social 
organization.17 
 
O’Brien and Fugita call this Japanese cultural relativism, which they believe is based 
upon a group survival dynamic.  Because the Japanese believe that cultural ideas are not 
sacred, they do not consider outside customs bad simply because they are foreign.  
Instead, their cultural survival instinct looks to whether or not multiple cultural 
classifications can exist harmoniously with each community adopting important aspects 
of the other.  They write that “the incorporation of these ‘foreign’ elements into Japanese 
culture did not weaken the integrity of the Japanese social system.”18  Cultural relativism 
affirms that foreign cultural elements only weaken an ethnic group if the community 
assumes that any cultural aspects lost in the transition are essential to its very survival.  
The Japanese felt that the survival of the group was more important than preserving 
cultural traditions, styles, and pursuits.  Adapting to new cultural environments and 
                                                            
16 See Emory S. Bogardus, “A Race Relations Cycle,” The American Journal of Sociology 35, no. 4, 612–7 
(January 1930).  Bogardus, a prominent American sociologist, outlined a country’s acculturation, 
accommodation, and assimilation of an immigrant group.  He placed these three aspects as inevitable 
agents that take place over historical connections between the two divergent ethnicities. His study is 
important to understanding one possible cycle followed by immigrant groups, and is also helpful to 
learning important terminology related to immigration and cultural studies. 
17 David J. O’Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience, 10. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
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customs meant a better chance of group survival.  Mamoru Iga writes about the desire for 
growth within the Japanese community: “In a closed society, it strengthened the attitude 
of conformity to tradition, but in the process of cultural contact with ‘superior’ culture, it 
implied an eagerness to learn from ‘more advanced’ countries.”19 
Discriminations levied against the Japanese only encouraged the spread of 
Japanese culture in select regions of the West Coast.  O’Brien and Fugita write that: 
One additional ‘advantage’ the Issei had over most European immigrant 
groups in recreating traditional community life was that they were more 
insulated from mainstream society by virtue of the more intense 
discrimination against them in employment and housing.  The Japanese 
did not experience the kind of complete isolation enforced upon blacks, as 
illustrated by the fact that most Nisei children attended public schools with 
whites, but they did nonetheless live apart from white society in many 
significant ways.20 
 
Despite this segregation, the Nisei still adopted many American concepts and activities.  
They formed bowling leagues, formal dance classes, and basketball teams, which allowed 
them to participate in traditional American activities while still participating in the 
Japanese immigrant community.21  Nisei attempts at assimilation became known as the 
beika-movement.22  Harry Kitano writes that even though the Nisei were pushed to do 
well in their American schools they also attended Japanese language schools.  He claims 
that “most Nisei who attended these schools, some for as long as ten years, are still [in 
1969] unable to speak Japanese with any degree of fluency.”23  He does appreciate, 
however, the many friendships he made and the memories he gained from the experience. 
                                                            
19 Mamoru Iga, “The Japanese Social Structure and the Source of mental Strains of Japanese Immigrants in 
the United States,” in Social Forces 35, no. 3, 271–8 (March 1957), 275. 
20 David J. O’Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience, 34–5. 
21 Ibid., 36. 
22 Gary Okihiro, Whispered Silences, 145. 
23 Harry H.L. Kitano, Japanese Americans: the Evolution of a Subculture (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall 
Inc., 1969), 25. 
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In 1900 the Japanese Association of America (JAA) was formed to combat anti-
Asian activity in California.24  It began receiving support from Japan in 1908 and acted 
as a way of improving relations with the native masses in the United States.  It was onl
open to successful males since the Japanese government was trying to improve the image 
of its citizens that emigrated around the world.  Although Japan originally encouraged the 
emigration of basic laborers, as it Westernized and grew imperialistically, the Japanese 
government changed its stance and wanted to improve its national image.  “In 1900 the 
empire stopped the emigration of Japanese born laborers to the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico, and this ban was strengthened in 1908 with the diplomatically negotiated 
Gentlemen’s Agreements.”
y 
                                                           
25  Another group, the Japanese American Citizens League 
(JACL) formed much later in 1929.26  The JACL was originally comprised 
predominantly of Nisei and whose goals included improved relations between Japanese 
Americans and the rest of the country and the cessation of discriminatory policy against 
peoples of Japanese descent.  The JACL differed from the JAA in that it was not 
nationally backed by Japan and was open to all sexes and classes.  Although both groups 
desired the cessation of anti-Japanese rhetoric, the JAA was a political move meant to 
improve Japan’s image, while the JACL was an immigrant organization meant to create 
unity with the native population.  The JACL pushed for assimilation of the Japanese 
American community to help end nativist aggression and foster unity within the United 
States.   Their creed dictates that: 
 
24 Frank Van Nuys, Americanizing the West: Race, Immigrants, and Citizenship, 1890–1930 (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas, 2002), 13.  Van Nuys argues that Americanization was central to progressive 
opinions toward immigration and that Americanization attempts in the Western United States represented a 
desire to tame an uncultivated racial frontier. 
25 Mark I. Choate, Emigrant Nation, 222. 
26 Japanese American Citizens League, http://www.jacl.org/, accessed on October 9, 2009.  
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Although some individuals may discriminate against me, I shall never 
become bitter or lose faith, for I know that such persons are not 
representative of the majority of the American people. […] Because I 
believe in America, and I trust she believes in me, and because I have 
received innumerable benefits from her, I pledge myself to do honor to her 
at all times and all places; to support her constitution; to obey her laws; to 
respect her flag; to defend her against all enemies, foreign and domestic; 
to actively assume my duties and obligations as a citizen, cheerfully and 
without any reservations whatsoever, in the hope that I may become a 
better American in a greater America.27 
 
Research compiled by the JACL lists that fluency in Japanese by the Issei was 100%.  
This language ability declined to 19.3% with the Nisei.  Japanese Buddhist affiliation 
dropped from 62.6% with the first generation to 36.1% with the second generation.  And 
participation in Japanese American community activities such as reading a Japanese 
American newspaper and community help in securing employment both dropped from 
91.4% to 64% and 95.9% to 50.6% respectively.  Most of the statistics compiled by the 
JARP (Japanese American Research Project) show an even sharper decline with the third 
generation—only aspects dealing directly with the family unit seemed to rebound 
slightly.  The importance of family continuity, help securing employment, and parental 
marriage influence each showed slight increases from the Nisei to the third generation.28 
Although the Nisei viewed themselves as American citizens and wanted to 
participate in uniquely American activities, they also respected the cultural traditions of 
their parents.  David K. Yoo writes that the Nisei “formed Japanese clubs in high schools 
and colleges.”29  During World War I, anything that was deemed as un-American came 
under attack.  The Japanese Language schools were criticized, but most Japanese 
                                                            
27 David J. O’Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience, 40. 
28 Eric Woodrum, “An Assessment of Japanese American Assimilation, Pluralism, and Subordination,” in 
The American Journal of Sociology 87, no. 1, 157–69 (July 1981), 161. 
29 David K. Yoo, Growing up Nisei: Race, Generation, and Culture among Japanese Americans of 
California, 1924–49 (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 9–10. 
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Americans argued that the schools simply complemented their U.S. education and did not 
hinder their assimilation.  Yoo writes that textbooks and teachers at these schools 
“encouraged the Nisei to be good Americans and become fully conversant with life in the 
United States.  […]  The Japanese consulate thought of the schools as part of the larger 
Americanization effort.  In Contrast, Japanese associations, geared to immigrant 
concerns, viewed the schools in more nationalistic terms.”30  Some language teachers 
might have had sincere desires for their students to fully assimilate, but the second 
generation needed little reminder from their parents, teachers, or the rest of American 
society that they were American citizens of Japanese ancestry.31 
There are two sides to the scholarly debate regarding the assimilation of the Nisei.  
On one side of the issue lies the Assimilationist camp, who argue that the second 
generation rejected their parental heritage and assimilated because they truly desired to 
adopt presumed American cultural norms.  On the other side of the debate, the 
Revisionists contend that the Nisei assimilated as a response to the racisms and fears 
present within American society during this time period.32 
The truth probably lies somewhere in between these two arguments.  Some Nisei 
assimilated to American culture because they knew that greater separation from their 
parent’s cultural beliefs would aid in their acceptance within the United States.  The 
desire for social acceptance can be a strong attraction for people, but sometimes it has 
absolutely nothing to do with the avoidance of the social outcast label.  Other individuals, 
however, want to act a certain way simply because that is how they choose to be.  Many 
                                                            
30 Ibid., 29. 
31 Ibid., 29. 
32 Lon Kurashige, Japanese American, 3–4. 
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people react to negative social constructs by accepting those who shun them in an attempt 
to avoid being cast as the social “other.”  Only this argument puts the entire decision 
making process as a reactionary result of outside influences and neglects the idea of 
agency held by the Nisei.  It assumes that this younger generation had no control over 
their own future—that they were simply reacting to aspects already present within the 
social fabric of the time.  One has to consider that many Nisei assimilated of their own 
free will and not as a reaction to the nativism present in Californian society.  To project a 
single expectation upon an entire minority group with individuals from different family 
backgrounds with variant life experiences, opinions, and personalities together remains 
just as neglectful as the nativist stance that casted all Asians into one large group. 
 
Nativism and Americanization 
At a 1916 convention regarding citizenship, Woodrow Wilson stated that 
Americanization should come naturally to immigrants.  He compares it to an “infection” 
and calls it “a process of self-examination, [and] a process of purification.”33  The 
concept of Americanization is similar to assimilation; only it expresses an even stronger 
connotation where the immigrant is not simply required to assimilate to the political and 
economic structure of the dominant ethnicity, but to acquiesce to every single aspect of a 
believed cultural heritage.   
Assimilation expresses the adoption of the existing political system, the economic 
structure, outward cultural attributes (i.e. language, styles of dress, and activities), and 
                                                            
33 Woodrow Wilson, “On Citizenship,” (address, Citizenship Convention, Washington, DC, July 13, 1916) 
in The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, edited by Albert Shaw, 290–4 (New York: The Review 
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other inward cultural concepts (i.e. behavior).  It does not expect the complete dissolution 
of the immigrant’s culture.  Instead assimilation is an aspect of culture that may happen 
naturally.  Richard Alba and Victor Nee discuss a race relations cycle presented by 
Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess in 1921.  Park and Burgess discussed the fusion of 
the immigrant group with the dominant ethnic community.  They believed that the 
minority community would eventually share the historical memories, sentiments, and 
attitudes of the majority, thereby being incorporated into the cultural community.34  Alba 
and Nee believe that “this definition does not appear to require what many critics assume 
assimilation must—namely, the erasure of all signs of ethnic origins.  Instead, it equates 
assimilation with the social processes that bring ethnic minorities into the mainstream of 
American life.”35  The specification of Americanization, rather, reveals the expectations 
of the dominant cultural community to be the complete submission by the immigrant 
population in the adoption of social and cultural standards.  Milton M. Gordon supports 
that: “Social assimilation does not require the complete identification of all the units, but 
such modifications as eliminate the characteristics of foreign origin, and enable them all 
to fit smoothly into the typical structure and functioning of the new cultural unit.”36  Alba 
and Nee agree with Gordon’s view that assimilation does not require complete 
submission, but they do have a problem with the lack of regard for a multi-ethnic 
society.37  Gordon’s race relations cycle presents the concept that a minority group will, 
after a time, naturally and completely assimilate to the dominant cultural standard.  This 
                                                            
34 Robert E. Park & Ernest W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1921), 735. 
35 Richard Alba & Victor Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” in 
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 64. 
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differs from Alba and Nee, who feel that assimilation does not require a complete 
transformation. 
In his book on assimilation, Nathan Glazer discusses the “decline in the positive 
attitude toward the term ‘assimilation.’”38  He cites the First World War as the catalyst 
for the negative transformation of academic opinion toward assimilation.  Glazer’s work 
was published before the September 11th terrorist attack, and because of this, he believes 
that assimilationist numbers are relatively small.  His goal is not to support 
assimilationism but instead to reveal that even during relative times of peace, assimilation 
is still a powerful force affecting racial and immigration discussions within the United 
States.39   Author Noah Pickus also believes that assimilation only became viewed as a 
bad concept after World War I.  He differs from Glazer, however, in that he argues for 
what he believes are the positive effects of assimilation.  He contends that cultural 
monoism supports nationalism, which “makes both liberty and justice possible” in the 
United States.40  What Pickus calls assimilation bears resemblance to Americanization.  
Assimilation is something that may occur naturally, while Americanization is the 
expected outcome for immigrants, or what Pickus would describe as a necessity for a 
successful America. 
Americanization can also be a governmental policy, while assimilation is 
something that may occur over time.  Progressives felt that Americanization was central 
to the civilizing of the American west, which at the onset of the twentieth century was 
                                                            
38 See Nathan Glazer, “Is Assimilation Dead?” in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 530, 122–36 (November 1993), 122. 
39 Ibid., 123. 
40 Noah Pickus, True Faith and Allegiance: Immigration and American Civic Nationalism (Princeton & 
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still a frontier land.  The formation of educational groups like the Bureau of Education 
aided in the federal government’s attempts at Americanizing immigrants.  Frank Van 
Nuys writes that the “federal bureaucrats’ endorsement of education for Americanization 
reflected the progressives’ faith in the power of education as well as education reformers’ 
recognition of environmental forces in shaping individuals.”41  Van Nuys quotes the 
Federal Commissioner of Education, Philander P. Claxton, who likens Americanization 
to a form of enlightenment.42  To further encourage Americanizing education, the federal 
government formed a National Americanization Day Committee tasked with the job of 
planning and implementing an Americanization Day celebration on July 4, 1915.43 
In reality, a one true American culture has never existed.  America is a 
combination of separate ethnic and racial groups that have come together under the flag 
of support for democratic and capitalistic opportunities.  This is why democracy and the 
importance of its survival are central to American nationalism.  Democracy becomes the 
shared origin for these disparate groups.  No true American culture exists for immigrants 
to assimilate to, but a large majority of the American populace has created a single 
imaginary American culture from democratic expectations and unified cultural desires of 
the dominant white Anglicized majority, whose cultural beliefs, in actuality, are derived 
from various customs through cultural accommodation.  Americanization has the 
expectation of cultural genocide toward any cultural differences or ethnic groups it does 
not openly bring into its amebic structure. 
                                                            
41 Frank Van Nuys, Americanizing the West, 42. 
42 Ibid., 42. 
43 Ibid., 44. 
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Around the turn of the twentieth century, Americanization required some 
immigrant groups to completely conform to presumed cultural norms, while others it 
coldly deemed incapable of any true or lasting alterations.  Ethnic communities like the 
Japanese immigrants and their children fall into this second category and act as 
opposition unifiers of the general population by having the mantle of “other” placed upon 
them. 
The melting pot concept championed by many within the U.S. connotes the idea 
that America is a nation of many nations where many immigrant groups have come 
together—each adding their own ethnic distinctiveness to society as a whole, thereby 
changing and being changed into a vast indistinguishable mass of people.  The melting 
pot theory does not accurately describe American cultural society though.  John Highman 
writes: “In some degree a multi-ethnic melting pot indubitably has worked—but so 
imperfectly, so inconsistently, so incompletely!  It worked, but it did not prevail.  
Whereas virtually all of the local or tribal identities that the people of this country 
brought with them from other lands have been obliterated, every one of the racial and 
national groupings that was created in America has stubbornly persisted.”44  The melting 
pot view does not truly express the intentions of Americanization.  Nor does it truly 
describe an American community with hundreds of subcultures divided by regional and 
ancestral customs all maintaining their own insular identity, while prescribing to the basic 
economic and political constructs of the United States. 
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In his book on second generation Japanese immigrants, David K. Yoo discusses 
the cultural experiences of the Nisei and how they dealt with American racisms toward 
inclusion and assimilation of Asians.  He mentions the acculturation of select parts of 
European immigrant heritages upon the American social conscience: 
European Americans, by virtue of their ‘whiteness,’ occupy an unmarked 
category that privileges it as normative.  […]  In a subtle turn, ‘cult of 
ethnicity’ proponents have reasserted the virtue of Anglo-American 
assimilation as the American way, reinscribing the past to reflect one 
nation, indivisible.  In this schema, St. Patrick’s Day, Columbus Day, and 
Oktoberfest are really celebrations of ethnicity more than they are about 
being Irish, Italian, or German American.  Hence all Americans can 
become ‘ethnic’ and embrace these festivals.45 
 
The participation in ethnic festivals and holidays by completely divergent groups within 
the country also acts as an example of how European immigrants influenced the body 
politic.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, the country viewed the acculturation of 
Japanese customs with extreme fear and resistance.  The Japanese, like their European 
counterparts, were expected to Americanize, and although Calvin Coolidge, in the earlier 
mentioned quote, wrote about the need for all immigrant groups to Americanize, he 
ignored how the general populace had adopted at least some aspects of European 
immigrant ethnicities. 
The early part of the century saw the creation of the Asian Exclusion League in 
California as a response to the immigration of the Japanese into the area.  Quoted within 
a 1911 proceeding, the Exclusion League outlined the importance of their existence and 
the necessity of separating ethnic communities incapable of Americanization from the 
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rest of the country.46  It stated that individuals from certain racial groups (in this case 
Asians) held physical and mental characteristics passed down through generations that 
would mark “them as separate and distinct people with us but not of us, they become a 
source of trouble and of possible danger.  […]  Therefore it is of the utmost importance 
for a nation, and especially in case of a republic, to have a homogeneous population.”47 
Americanization is a representation of the nativist concern that a non-homogenous 
society is vulnerable to outside cultural threats.  A single cultural community within a 
nation dissipates loyalty questions.  As shown in the Exclusion league quote, many 
within the United States, especially those with political power and public influence, felt 
the Japanese incapable of Americanization.  It is useful to mention that some felt 
anglicized white America also incapable of any form of cultural assimilation.  John P. 
Young, a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle, argued that white America and the 
Japanese were polar opposites, who would always be reticent of cultural and ethnic 
submission.  He called them both “unassimilable races” and believed that it was 
dangerous to bring them into close contact.48  Nevada Senator, Francis G. Newlands, also 
agreed that the survival of the two groups depended on complete separation, thereby 
avoiding a social Darwinist clash for ethnic supremacy.  He wrote: “Race tolerance […] 
means race amalgamation, and this is undesirable.  Race intolerance means, ultimately, 
race war and mutual destruction or the reduction of one race to servitude.”49  Newlands 
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felt that contact between two unassimilable ethnic groups would eventually lead to race 
conflict and the inevitable conquest of one over the other. 
Mae M. Ngai discusses the paradoxical effect of the separation of immigrants into 
segregated communities and the use of the term unassimilable alien.  She argues that 
immigrants inhabit homogenous communities as a response to forced separation.  These 
areas are then labeled high crime regions consisting of ethnic groups who refuse to 
Americanize.  She writes: “Indeed, the association of these minority groups as 
unassimilable foreigners has led to the creation of ‘alien citizens’—persons who are 
American citizens by virtue of their birth in the United States but who are presumed to be 
foreign by the mainstream of American culture and, at times, by the state.”50  By 
separating immigrant communities, American society works against greater inclusion of 
the minority group and reinforces the status of non-assimilation. 
 U.S. nativism thrives upon the belief that some minority groups pose a threat to 
national stability.  Theodore Roosevelt wrote about the importance of Americanism in a 
letter to Stanwood Menken, the Executive Director of National Security League.51  He 
stated that “unless we are Americans and nothing else, we are not a nation at all—and 
thoroughgoing preparedness in time of peace against war—for if we are not thus 
prepared, we shall remain a nation only until some more virile nation finds it worthwhile 
to conquer us.”52  Within the Industrial Commission’s Report on Immigration in 1901, 
Cleveland L. Dam, an attorney at law for the city and county of San Francisco, stated: 
“The Japanese stop at nothing, evidently imbued with the idea that he represents a 
                                                            
50 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 2. 
51 A non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to higher military budgets. 
52 Theodore Roosevelt to Stanwood Menken (letter, January 10, 1917) in Theodore Roosevelt: Letters and 
Speeches, edited by Louis Auchincloss, 710–7 (New York: Harvard University Press, 1951), 710–11. 
  52
   
superior civilization.”53  The fear expressed by Cleveland Dam that the Japanese viewed 
themselves as a superior race stems not from anything done by the Japanese immigrants, 
but from the nationalist argument that the United States is superior to other nations and 
the nativist fear of being supplanted or proved incorrect. The rise of Japan as a national 
power and rival in the Pacific region fed the nativism expressed by Dam.  Racial and 
cultural connections of native born white Americans to white Europeans allowed for 
greater inclusion.  The differences in national heritage, cultural traditions, and race 
created a divide that separated white America from those individuals with Japanese 
ancestry and fed nativist fears of Japan as a national rival. 
In my introduction I used a speech by San Francisco Mayor James D. Phelan.  In 
the latter part of this speech, he discussed the fall of the Roman Empire and how outside 
immigration brought about its decline and eventual downfall.  “This is not a labor 
question,” he said.54  Just like Rome, the immigration question is central to the survival 
of America, its government, its ideals, its people, and its Anglicized cultural and ethni
identity.  Chester H. Rowell, editor for the Fresno Republican Paper, stated that: 
c 
                                                           
Against Asiatic immigration we could not survive.  The numbers who 
would come would be greater than we could encyst, and the races who 
would come are those which we could never absorb.  The permanence not 
merely of American civilization, but of the white race on this continent, 
depends on our not doing, on the Pacific side, what we have done on the 
Atlantic side. […]  There is no other possible national menace at all to be 
compared with this.”55 
 
Nativists feared that the Japanese only partially adopted American cultural values 
for financial gain and not out of a sincere desire to Americanize.  At the earlier 
 
53 Cleveland L. Dam, “Affidavit of Mr. Cleveland L. Dam,” in Reports of the Industrial Commission on 
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mentioned labor meeting, McCarthy also stated “that the assumed virtue of the Japanese, 
i.e., their partial adoption of American customs, makes them more dangerous as 
competitors.”56  Coolidge, the eventual President of the United States, articulated that the 
refusal of an immigrant to completely adopt American cultural norms would leave the 
individual as “shell of a citizen” and a problem for the entire nation.57  He also felt that 
all immigrant groups needed to be restricted and tested to make sure that they were “not 
inconsistent with American institutions.”58  The cultural relativism practiced by the 
Japanese differed from its American counterpart, which labeled the survival and 
protection of ideological principles, such as democracy, as the defining characteristic of 
its cultural strength.  Both groups and individuals remain subordinate to these ideologies 
and are meant to service the continuation of these cultural tropes. 
The Americanism described by Theodore Roosevelt is based on the protection of 
concepts and our loyalty to the institutions that support them.  He felt that it was the 
responsibility of everyone within the country: every man, women, and child to aid in the 
Americanization of immigrants.  Gayle Gullett in her article on women progressives and 
Americanization in the early part of the twentieth century argues that women actively 
participated in the Americanization process of immigrant groups. The California chapter 
of the Daughters of the American Revolution, the California Federation of Women’s 
Clubs, and the National General Federation of Women’s Clubs took up the 
Americanization campaign.  Gullet states:  “The ultimate goal of Americanization was to 
transform rural peasants of dubious national loyalties into contented and reasonably 
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rewarded American workers who accepted the elite leadership of American society.”59  
Progressive Americanizers wanted to mold workers into loyal employees and citizens.60  
In 1907, the North American Civic League for Immigrants (NACL) formed in New York 
City.  Just like the women’s organization mentioned earlier, the NACL harbored the 
progressive idea that education in the home and in the work place would cultivate good 
behavior by laborers.61  The group became so popular that it spread across the country 
and eventually had an immigrant aid center in Los Angeles. 
Roosevelt believed that it was the responsibility of the general American 
population to provide immigrants with American cultural values, therefore protecting the 
nation by forcing the immigrant to dismiss their original national allegiance and shed 
their old traditions.  The immigrant does this by adopting the shared historical narrative 
of the dominant group and makes it their own: Italians no longer consider themselves 
Italian or even Italian Americans but instead Americans with a prideful connection to the 
nation’s democratic origins and concerns for its ultimate future.  The migrant group also 
takes pride in the influence they bring to the shared American historical narrative which 
continues to evolve by adding other immigrant group narratives and incorporating them 
into its over-arching discourse.  The immigrant experience eventually becomes a part of 
the shared national heritage and contributes to the entire national origin.  The historic 
significance of Ellis Island and the increase of European immigration to the U.S. during 
the early twentieth century is no longer a concern but now an important aspect of 
American history.  Connecting immigrant groups in this manner to the dominant ethnic 
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community can dissolve nativism associated with a particular ethnic group.  This concept 
works for nativism when it is driven by economic, national, and cultural concerns. When 
nativism is supported by racial reasons, however, it creates a wall between the immigrant 
group and social acceptance.  So while some nativists will accept the immigrant group 
once they feel the community has sufficiently assimilated, has adopted a new national 
allegiance, or does not pose a real economic threat, others may still denounce 
immigration of this particular ethnic group, based purely on racial differences. 
In the 1930’s when Japan was again at war with China, many Japanese 
communities here in the United States became very active in fund raising projects to help 
Japan.  Jonathan Dresner writes in his review of a posthumously and only partially 
completed book by Yuji Ichioka that this created a great deal of tension between the Issei 
and the Nisei.  The patriotic support of their homeland was mainly supported by the older 
generation, while the Nisei, “organized under groups like the JACL, were largely 
uninvolved or actively hostile to Issei efforts to engage them in Japan-orientated 
activities, and American authorities were suspicious of this unassimilated minority.”62 
Although the Japanese faced great hurdles in their attempts at social acceptance 
because of national, cultural, and economic reasons, racial differences remained a 
problem for the Japanese who immigrated to the United States.  Nativists who held racial 
views toward the Japanese were always going to see them as a threat to national stability, 
cultural dominance, and economic strength.  These race-based nativist fears influenced 
the creation of discriminatory naturalization laws in the United States.  Just as the 
Japanese immigrants faced an up-hill battle to prove themselves culturally to the rest of 
                                                            
62 Jonathan Dresner, Review of Yuji Ichioka, Before Internment: Essays in Prewar Japanese-American 
History, H-Net Reviews, http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=13517 (August 2007), 4. 
  56
  
 
57
the country, they also had to fight for citizenship status—a subject I will explore in my 
next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Chapter 2: Nativism and the Exclusion of Citizenship 
The time has come, in my judgment, when the United States, as a matter 
of self-protection and self-preservation, must declare by statutory 
enactment that it will not tolerate further race complications upon our soil.  
Our country, by law to take effect upon the expiration of existing treaties, 
should prevent the immigration of all peoples other than those of the white 
race, except under restricted conditions relating to international commerce, 
travel, and education.1 
 
Francis G. Newlands, 1909 
 
Race Competition and the Fear of Increased Japanese Immigration 
In September 1909, Senator Francis G. Newlands from Nevada stated the above 
quote in an essay he wrote regarding immigration issues.  He argued for race segregation, 
not within the United States alone, but throughout the entire world.  He thought that it 
was unfair for the U.S. to ask Japan to restrict its peoples from coming to the United 
States since the U.S. government would never enact such a restrictive law against its own 
people.  He believed, however, that it was the responsibility of each nation to stipulate 
what immigration into their respective countries they would allow, thereby avoiding race 
competition all-together.  Newlands did not argue that the Japanese were incapable of 
Americanization, but he did contend that “two such powerful races, of such differing 
views” should refrain from living in the same territory.2  Pragmatically, he felt as if it 
was in the best interest of the entire world if national borders were racially divided so a
to avoid ethnic conflict.
s 
   
                                                           
The headline for the February 23rd issue of the San Francisco Chronicle stated in 
extremely large bold letters: “JAPANESE INVASION: THE PROBLEM OF THE 
 
1 Francis G. Newlands, “A Western View of the Race Question,” 51. 
2 Ibid., 50. 
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HOUR FOR THE UNITED STATES.”3  This headline was atop the 1905 issue of the 
Chronicle, and was meant to garner public support and encourage awareness to the 
growing Japanese immigrant population in California.  Mae M. Ngai writes that by 
giving the government the power to regulate immigration, in essence it presumes that 
immigrants represent potential agents of a foreign country.4  She contends that in truth 
immigrants have traditionally come to the U.S. not as troops in an eventual conflict, but 
as individuals seeking personal and familial improvement or to escape persecution.  
Early twentieth century nativists feared the ramifications of increased 
immigration and a decline in native born numbers.  Some nativists did not view the 
Japanese immigrants as direct competition, but rather, as an inferior race, which would 
ultimately dilute American strength and eventually lead to the failure of the American 
nation.  Declining birth rates within the white American community exacerbated fears of 
“race suicide.”5  General Francis Amasa Walker, President of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, looked at population statistics and forecast racial doom for Anglicized 
white America.  Walker, a follower of Social Darwinist theory and an active nativist, had 
also served as the President of the American Statistical Association in 1882 and the 
Superintendent of the 1870 and 1880 censuses.  Although Walker’s nativist fears focused 
on the immigration of individuals from Eastern and Southern Europe, his arguments and 
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statistical calculations were aligned with those made by the Japanese Exclusion League.  
In an article for The Atlantic Monthly journal, he wrote: “Only a short time ago, the 
immigrants from southern Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Russia together made up hardly 
more than one percent of our immigration.  Today the proportion has risen to something 
like forty percent, and threatens soon to become fifty or sixty percent, or even more.”6  
Walker labeled these individuals as “beaten men from beaten races” who he felt 
represented the worst societal failures.7  Paradoxically, it is these same societal failures 
that he feared would overrun the United States, therefore succeeding in the U.S. because 
of increased numbers and declining birth rates of Anglicized white American citizens.  
The transcripts from a 1911 Asiatic Exclusion League meeting stated: 
Don’t be deceived by any delusive hope that the yellow race can possibly 
become amalgamated with the white race in this country through 
intermarriage.  The very thought is preposterous and revolting in view of 
their physical, mental and moral differences. […] We must, as a nation, 
take immediate and vigorous measures to stop further Asiatic immigration, 
for what will be the fate of the nation when the white race is 
outnumbered.8 
 
Three years later, Francis A. Walker, wrote a book on economics and statistics.  His book 
explored in great detail population statistics, industrial and agricultural numbers, gender 
and political calculations, and many other statistical influences upon and within the 
United States.  He even dedicated entire chapters to immigration and the degradation that 
it caused within the U.S.  He cautioned that the decline in native born white Americans 
was due to the increase in immigration.9  Walker felt that Americans pulled away from 
                                                            
6 Francis A. Walker, “Restriction of Immigration,” in The Atlantic Monthly 77, no. 464, 822–9 (June 1896), 
828. 
7 Ibid., 828. 
8 Asiatic Exclusion League, “Asians Cannot Be Assimilated,” 279. 
9 Francis A. Walker, Discussions in Economics and Statistics (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1899), 
423. 
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the competition for industrial jobs, but also refused to do the lowest forms of day labor.  
Native born white families shrank as parents refused to bare sons and daughters in a 
society they disagreed with.10  In 1912, Russian born statistician, Isaac A. Hourwich, 
published his book on immigration.  In his chapter titled Race Suicide, he attacked 
Walker’s theory of declining birthrates and the increase of immigration.  He argued that 
the decline in native born births should be attributed to the switch within the U.S. from an 
agrarian lifestyle to that of an industrial one. 
Walker used census data from 1820 to 1890 and theories regarding population 
increases to support his ideas toward declining birth rates.  Hourwich wrote that Walker’s 
“conclusion illustrates in a striking manner the effect of a preconceived idea upon the 
reasoning ability of a scientific writer.”11  Hourwich referred to a point in Walker’s book 
where he had discussed the 1870 census results.  Walker had written about the social 
changes happening in the United States as American society industrialized and had 
claimed that it was absurd for statisticians to continue applying former birth rate 
calculations to projected population numbers in lieu of societal changes.12  He had argued 
that native birth rates would continue to decline each decade because families no longer 
required many children to run personal farms.  Hourwich agreed with Walker’s idea, but 
he felt that Walker let his nativist leanings subjugate his scientific conclusions regarding 
immigration issues.  To disprove Walker’s claim that immigration had caused native birth 
rates to decline, Hourwich wrote that “the number of children under five years of age to 
one hundred women of the child-bearing age decreased in 1810–1830 by 9.9, and in 
                                                            
10 Ibid., 424. 
11 Isaac A. Hourwich, Immigration and Labor, 223. 
12 Francis A. Walker, Discussions in Economics and Statistics, 42–3. 
  61
   
1880–1900 by 9.4.  Thus the twenty-year period of recent immigration did not 
substantially differ in this respect from the time when, according to General Walker 
himself, immigration had not affected the birth-rate among native Americans.”13  Even if 
native birth rates were not slowing as a result of increased immigration as Walker had 
claimed, his writing still illustrates nativism toward the implications represented by 
immigration. 
The fear that the Japanese immigrant population was reproducing at a quicker rate 
than the native population created a stir among nativists.14  It was feared that the Asian 
countries would consume America with their vast populations.  One has to keep in mind, 
that during the first part of the century, very little distinction had been drawn between the 
Chinese and the Japanese.  The separation of the two groups into the good and the bad 
did not occur until the years preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor and throughout the 
Second World War. 
In his writings on the evils of immigration, Doctor Samuel C. Busey discussed the 
prospect that if native birth rates failed to grow, then the nation could be overwhelmed by 
new immigrant cultures.  He wrote that: 
The rapid propagation of the immigrant races tends, in a great measure, to 
prevent the assimilation of those races with the American people.  […]  
Another effect of this rapid propagation among the foreign, is to preserve 
and perpetuate the habits, customs, peculiarities, and distinctive 
characteristics of the immigrants.  It has been shown in another part of this 
treatise, that two distinct nationalities cannot exist together harmoniously 
under the same jurisdiction.15 
 
                                                            
13 Isaac A, Hourwich, Immigration and Labor, 224. 
14 See Chester H. Rowell, “Chinese and Japanese Immigrants: A Comparison,” 10. 
15 Samuel C. Busey, Immigration: Its Evils and Consequences, 88.  See Madison Grant, Passing of the 
Great Race (New York: Charles Schribner Sons, 1918; New York: Arno Press, 1970) for more on the 
threat that immigrants placed upon white society and the social Darwinist competition between different 
races for supremacy and survival.   
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Although Busey wrote his monograph fifty years before the years depicted within this 
thesis, this concept still retains its national importance and echoed the same concerns 
listed by General Walker.  Busey believed that immigrant groups who grew quickly 
without proper assimilation threatened national security.  It also showcased public fears 
of cultural dissemination, national longevity, and the increase in race-based economic 
competition. 
 
Citizenship and Race 
Alexander M. Bickel writes that “the relationship between the individual and the 
state is largely defined by the concept of citizenship.  It is by virtue of his citizenship that 
the individual is a member of the political community, and by virtue of it that he has 
rights.”16  By the end of the nineteenth century, fear of the Japanese centered mainly on 
the West Coast, but as the twentieth century continued, race-based fears would influence 
naturalization laws and the definition of citizenship for Japanese immigrants and their 
children.  Less than a hundred years ago, the idea of race-based thinking aided the 
creation of laws that limited and restricted Asian immigration to the United States.  In 
1876, the Democratic Party ran on a platform calling for the exclusion of anyone with 
Asian ancestry.  The focus was directed at the Chinese immigrants.  Rogers M. Smith 
writes that in 1876, a Californian referendum called for exclusion of Chinese 
immigration.  154,638 ballots voted against Chinese immigration with 883 voting in 
favor.  In 1892, the suspension of Chinese immigration was extended for another 10 
                                                            
16 Alexander M. Bickel, “Citizenship in the American Constitution,” in Arizona Law Review 15, 369–88 
(1973), 369. 
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years.17  As shown earlier, the lack of a cheap labor force opened the door for increased 
Japanese migration as labor contractors sought inexpensive workers from other countries.   
As Ngai mentions, immigrants have traditionally come for social improvement 
and freedom.  Americans feel a duty to help immigrants escape communist and 
totalitarian regimes, but at the same time, many Americans feel angered with the prospect 
of sharing the opportunities and privileges awarded to citizens.  Americans take 
nationalistic pride in their democratic ideals and generous immigration policy that saves 
many individuals and families from destitution and subjugation in their native countries.  
Paradoxically many Americans take pride in their generosity toward immigrants, while at 
the same time lamenting the responsibilities that come with a more liberal immigration 
policy.  Mae M. Ngai argues that Americans want to believe that immigration proves the 
universal nature of America as a nation and its liberal democratic principles.18  She 
writes: “We like to believe that our immigration policy is generous, but we also resent the 
demands made upon us by others and we think we owe outsiders nothing.”19  Rogers M. 
Smith calls this the “divided heart of American civic identity.”20  Americans question 
what responsibilities they have, if any, to immigrants.  Smith contends that after 1885 the 
U.S. went through extreme social, economic, and political changes.  The country had 
been largely agrarian in nature before the onset of industrialization toward the end of the 
nineteen century.  Industrial growth did away with small family farms in favor of large 
business-like farms and increased urbanization around large factories, which employed 
massive work forces.  Immigration grew as new labor was needed for this 
                                                            
17 Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals, 358–59. 
18 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 11. 
19 Ibid., 11. 
20 Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals, 4. 
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industrialization.  Smith looks at industrialization of the U.S. as one of the driving forces 
behind civil inequalities and increased nativism.  Before the onset of factories and large 
farms, only people in urban areas were readily affected by immigration.  Alexander M. 
Bickel states that “the original Constitution, prior to Reconstruction, contained no 
definition of citizenship, and precious few references to the concept altogether.”21  The 
framers of the Constitution wished to attract immigrants to increase the country’s 
population.  The industrial age put various ethnic groups into direct contact with each 
other.  From 1870 to 1890, the U.S. accepted nearly 10 million immigrants, before the 
number dropped during the recessionary 1890’s.  By 1900, immigration numbers began 
to increase again to the highest levels on record in terms of percentage of foreign born 
total population. 
As the Coolidge quote from the beginning of Chapter One shows, many 
Americans feared that immigrants came to the United States, learned the language, and 
followed capitalist doctrine in the search of a better life, but at the same time failed to 
truly become American in spirit and not just actions.  He used the word “heart,” which 
connotes a strong national tie to the adopted country.  To gain admission to a nation, one 
cannot simple act as everyone else but has to be like everyone else in a scientifically 
immeasurable way.  Unseen ties that cannot be measured by deeds lie underneath the 
surface.  This concept helps unify a country and creates a sense of pride, but at the same 
time creates requirements that cannot be calculated in a normal manner, placing 
admission on a pedestal only reachable by those individuals deemed worthy by existing 
members of this fraternity.  Exclusionary in its very essence, the Americanization 
                                                            
21 Alexander M. Bickel, “Citizenship in the American Constitution,” 1. 
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discourse helps single out anyone that the dominant cultural group feels unworthy of 
acceptance. 
Coolidge argued for the creation of a national immigration test that would allow 
the country to attempt to calculate the worth of various individuals.  He does not 
expressly connect his idea with any single immigrant group, but the creation of this test 
would very likely be used in a racially driven manner to exclude or in the very least 
excessively scrutinize select racial and ethnic groups.  In 1900, the Industrial 
Commission on Immigration in a special report stressed the importance of the change to 
racial classification.  It stated that “the most important improvement since 1893 in the 
method of compiling statistics of immigration was introduced in 1899, when, instead of 
the preceding classification of immigrants according to the countries or political divisions 
from which they came, they were classified according to the races to which they 
belonged.”22  This use of racial categorization would eventually lead to the enactment of 
the Immigration Act of 1924, which would halt all Japanese immigration to the United 
States. 
Race statistics continued to play an integral part of immigration debates, 
especially when deciding naturalization laws.  In his monograph on race, Jacques Barzun 
describes how a society inexorably links the ideas of race separation and peace.  He 
writes that “to consolidate political unity, certain national cultures seek to exclude one 
another on the ground of the racial incompatibility of minds.  The idea of race makes 
                                                            
22 Industrial Commission, Reports of the Industrial Commission on Immigration 15 (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1901), ix.  This report covers immigrant groups of all races and cultural 
backgrounds and their effect on industrial labor around the country.  There is a special section, however, 
entirely devoted to the Chinese and Japanese with exhibits by individuals ranging from P.H. McCarthy (at 
this time, McCarthy was the President of the Federated Trades of the Pacific Coast), Frank Schuyler (a 
Chinese labor importer), William Price (Lieutenant in the San Francisco Police Department), John P. 
Jackson (San Francisco Customs Office), and many others. 
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easy the transition from cultural to political ill-feeling, and when we want to condemn 
some course of national action in our neighbors, race provides the universal joint that 
holds together the aliens’ ignorable traditions, their present shameful course, and their 
innate perversity.”23   
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the only way anyone of Asian ancestry 
could gain citizenship was through birthright citizenship.  A clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment grants full citizenship to anyone born on U.S. soil.  Author Robin Jacobson 
discusses the importance of birthright citizenship in an article for Political Research 
Quarterly.  Restrictionist groups have been challenging the citizenship clause included in 
the fourteenth amendment for a century.  She concedes that “consensual citizenship is not 
raced based and may seem emancipatory,” but she also feels that it can be dangerous.24  
Birthright citizenship is unchangeable and is also not race based.  She writes: 
“Consensual citizenship employed by political forces on the ground is imbued with racial 
meaning.  When race is a salient category for understanding immigration and national 
identity, choice as the core of citizenship policy leads to racial exclusion.”25  As the 
Coolidge article illustrates, citizenship not based on birth would be based on a chosen 
loyalty, something that cannot be truly measured.  Because of this immeasurability the 
process would inevitably adopt racial categorization as its means of structure. 
                                                            
23 Jacques Barzun, Race: A Study in Superstition (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 3.  Originally 
published as Race: A Study in Modern Superstition (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1937).  
Citations are to the 1965 edition. 
24 Robin Jacobson, “Characterizing Consent: Race, Citizenship, and the New Restrictionists,” in Political 
Research Quarterly 59, no. 4, 645–54 (December 2006), 645.  For more on the influence of nativism on 
restrictionist arguments see Maxine S. Seller, “Historical Perspectives on American Immigration Policy: 
Case Studies and Current Implications,” in Law and Contemporary Problems 45, no. 2, 137–62 (Spring 
1982).  Seller discusses many of the reasons behind restrictionist arguments and uses facts to denounce 
their viability. 
25 Ibid., 645. 
  67
   
Citizenship and the Legal System 
In Bessho vs. the United States, Namayo Bessho, a Japanese immigrant who had 
served in the U.S. military had hoped to gain citizenship through a Congressional Act in 
1894 that stipulated that “any alien of the age of twenty-one years and upward who has 
enlisted or may enlist in the Unites States Navy or Marine Corps, and has served or may 
hereafter serve five consecutive years in the United States Navy or Marine Corps, and has 
been or may hereafter be honorably discharged, shall be admitted to become a citizen of 
the United States upon his petition.”26  Mr. Bessho had made the petition to the Circuit 
Court of appeals in 1910, but was subsequently denied upon the argument that he was 
neither white nor black, and thus could not become a U.S. citizen.  The court transcript 
stated: “They [Asians] are not free white persons, or of African nativity, then such aliens, 
even though they so enlisted and were thereafter honorably discharged, are not entitled to 
naturalization.”27  
When Japanese immigrants tried to become U.S. citizens, the federal government 
denied such requests.  The Japanese fell into a crack within the political system.  The 
Nationality Act of 1790 gave permission for naturalization to any immigrant “being a 
free white person,” but fails to mention blacks, Asians, and anyone not labeled as 
European and white.28  Although this Act was not written in a manner meant to 
discriminate against Asians, it was still used to keep them from gaining naturalized 
status.  In 1870 another Nationality Act stated that freed slaves were U.S. citizens and 
                                                            
26 Act of Congress 1894, 28 Stat. 124 (July 24, 1894), 124. 
27 Bessho vs. United States, 178 Fed. 245 (4th Circuit 1910), 247–48. 
28 Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (March 26, 1790), 103. 
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that persons of African descent had the ability to become naturalized U.S. citizens.29  
This amendment to the existing naturalization law left a void for anyone who did not fall 
into these two categories.  The U.S. government labeled Asians as neither “free whites” 
nor of “African nativity,” and left first generation immigrants without the ability to 
become naturalized citizens, while their children were able to gain U.S. citizenship via 
the birthright clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Linda Bosniak writes that “the idea of citizenship is commonly invoked to convey 
a state of democratic belonging or inclusion, yet this inclusion is usually premised on a 
conception of a community that is bounded and exclusive.  Citizenship as an ideal is 
understood to embody a commitment against subordination, but citizenship can also 
represent an axis of subordination itself.”30  Bosniak continues to explain that liberal 
democratic states have both universal and exclusionary citizenship commitments.  Those 
immigrant groups who are socially accepted and those that are not can be citizens.  While 
one community is accepted by the larger native population, the other is relegated to the 
edges of society.  This second group is still allowed citizenship and given a status, albeit 
on the fringes of American society.  In the case of the Japanese immigrants, this fringe 
status marked the Japanese as unassimilable aliens at the same time that it allowed the 
Issei to live in the United States and enjoy many (but not all) of its privileges and allowed 
the Nisei to gain citizenship.  While their children were born citizens, the Issei had the 
possibility of citizenship status for them relegated to the threshold of possibility.  They 
were allowed to live in American society but, at the same time, could not be American.  
                                                            
29 Naturalization Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 254 (July 14, 1870), 254. 
30 Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton & 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 1. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment protected their civil liberties, but they were still denied many 
of the social freedoms granted white immigrants.  Mae M. Ngai calls this an “impossible 
subject.”31 
Japanese immigrants found themselves stuck in a void.  Even though nothing in 
any of the congressional naturalization laws directly stipulated that individuals of Asian 
ancestry should be marked as aliens ineligible for citizenship, nothing specifically 
mentions that they could gain citizenship either.  The 1894 Congressional Act 
contradicted this void.  Because of racial categorization and nativism, it was ignored, 
however, in favor of continued exclusion.  Even the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution states: “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person in its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”32  The Fourteenth Amendment, which Mr. Bessho tried to use to support his 
case for naturalization, does not deal with questions of citizenship only the protection of 
freedoms.  The Supreme Court stated that Mr. Bessho’s freedoms were not infringed 
upon by the lower court’s decision to deny citizenship since citizenship was not believed 
to be an inalienable right.  Constitutionally all alien groups were protected by the 
Fourteenth amendment.  Mr. Bessho’s freedom and ability to have his day in court were 
protected, while his request for naturalization was denied because people of his nativity 
were not strictly mentioned in any of the naturalization laws of that time. 
Mr. Bessho was not the only individual with Asian ancestry who was denied 
citizenship.  In 1894, Shebata Saito was denied citizenship on the grounds “that when 
Congress, in designating the class of persons who would be naturalized, inserted the 
                                                            
31 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 5. 
32 United States Constitution, Amendment 14, section 1. 
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qualifying word ‘white,’ it intended to exclude from the privilege of citizenship all alien 
races except the Caucasian.”33  Nearly thirty years later in 1922, Takao Ozawa was also 
denied citizenship.34  Ozawa, who had lived in Hawaii for most of his life, had attended 
high School in Southern California, had children who were U.S. citizens, and according 
to his testimony only spoke English in his household.  None of this convinced the judge, 
however, who came to the conclusion “that the words ‘white person’ are synonymous 
with the words ‘a white person of the Caucasian race’” and thus denied Ozawa’s petition 
for naturalization.35 
The loophole denying naturalization to Japanese immigrants was not supported by 
everyone within the government though.  Theodore Roosevelt did not believe that the 
right of citizenship should be based on race.  In 1906, he wrote a message to Congress, in 
which he stated: “I ask for fair treatment of the Japanese as I would ask fair treatment for 
Germans or Englishmen, Frenchmen, Russians, or Italians.  […]  I recommend to 
Congress that an act be passed specifically providing for the naturalization of Japanese 
who come here intending to become American citizens.”36 
A cartoon strip written and drawn by Henry “Yoshitaki” Kiyama, an immigrant to 
San Francisco, satirized the plight of the Japanese in America.  Lost for fifty years, 
Kiyama’s work was found in 1980 by Frederik L. Schodt while researching Japanese 
comics at the University of California Library.  Although the work was bilingual, much 
of it still had to be translated by Schodt.  The episodes reprinted in this collection reveal 
                                                            
33 Saito vs. United States, 62 Fed. 126 (June 27, 1894). 
34 Ozawa vs. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (November 13, 1922). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Theodore Roosevelt to Congress (message, December 3, 1906) in Resident Orientals on the American 
Pacific Coast, edited by Eliot Grinnell Mears, 438–42 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928; New 
York: Arno Press, 1978), 441, citations are to the 1978 edition. 
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the hardship of four immigrant men as they try to assimilate and to adapt to American 
life.  They struggle for the American dream of financial and emotional success within a 
world that discriminated against their very attempts to accomplish what many in society 
felt Asians were incapable of obtaining.  Kiyama satirizes the sorrowful plight of the 
Japanese immigrants as they maneuvered through the daily hypocrisies of early twentieth 
century American society. 
One strip shows a young Japanese man named Charlie, who is eager to gain U.S. 
citizenship and excited about defending his adopted country (see Photo B.1).  He 
participates in the First World War by fighting for the United States.  He hopes that he 
will be able to use this as leverage to obtain naturalization just as Mr. Bessho attempted.  
Unfortunately, once he returns from war, the strip shows him standing before a judge, 
who states: “Um!  Not for Orientals yet.”37  A moment later he is standing with his friend 
outside the House of Congress with his arms folded tightly and a distraught look upon his 
face.  He says: “After that, I feel like a real idiot…”38  Kiyama’s work pokes fun at the 
discriminatory environment present at the time of Mr. Bessho’s failed naturalization 
attempt.  Charlie’s upset expression mirrors the down-trodden attitude of a group of 
people who wanted recognition and fair treatment. 
In another episode, Frank—also one of Kiyama’s characters, muses about the 
difficulty of finding a Japanese bride.  In the early part of the twentieth century, a huge 
gender discrepancy existed within the United States between the numbers of Japanese 
                                                            
37 Henry “Yoshitaka” Kiyama, The Four Immigrants Manga: A Japanese Experience in San Francisco, 
1904–1924 translation and notes by Frederik L. Schodt (Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1999), 119, 
originally published as Manga Yonin Shosei (San Francisco: Yoshitaka Kiyama Studio, 1931). 
38 Ibid., 119. 
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males and females.39  The Gentleman’s Agreement decreased temporary migrant 
numbers while increasing immigrant numbers.  After a few slow years, 1911 saw an 
increase again in Japanese immigration due to the many wives and children who joined 
their husbands and fathers on the west coast.  As the early twentieth century continued, 
the ratio between male and female immigration began to shrink.  In 1900, around 2,369 
males for every 100 females, while in 1910, 694 males for every 100 females 
immigrated.  In 1920, the ratio between males and females had shrunk to a 189 males for 
every 100 females.40 
Another episode of Kiyama’s comic depicts Frank dreaming of wealth and 
women.  Panel seven shows him with a woman on each arm, one of which happens to be 
white.  In this episode, he dreams of owning his own business, dating various women, 
and driving a fancy car.  The dream ends with him and the young women in the car going 
over a cliff (see Photo B.2).  In reality, the next box shows him knocking a large potted 
plant onto his head, soaking himself and the bed in the process with the water from the 
vase.  He exclaims: “Drat!!  It was all a dream!!”41  This final caption captures the plight 
of a male Japanese immigrant in all his down-trodden glory.  With water and flowers 
soaking his head, Frank comes to the uneasy realization that all male Japanese 
immigrants had to come to: the American dream depicted while he slept was nothing 
more than a pipe dream.  At the time, Frank would find it very difficult to own his own 
store because of the California land laws.  Outside of Frank’s imaginary shoe store, 
people of all races line up to make their purchases, when in reality white people would 
                                                            
39 Ibid., 145. 
40 David J. O’Brien & Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience, 32. 
41 Henry “Yoshitaka” Kiyama, The Four Immigrants Manga, 67. 
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not have frequented a Japanese immigrant store let alone in such vast numbers, and the 
prospect of dating a white woman was extremely frowned upon, and marriage between an 
Asian male and a white woman was nearly illegal because of the Cable Act of 1922.  This 
Act stated that: “any woman citizen who marries an alien ineligible to citizenship shall 
cease to be a citizen of the United States.”42  Although the law does not explicitly 
mention Japanese males, it was ultimately created and used to discriminate against the 
Japanese and other Asians who were the only racial group not eligible for naturalization. 
Kiyama’s cartoon shows that Japanese immigrants were aware of the futility of 
their desire for a better life in the United States because of the federal laws attempting to 
keep them from migrating here in the first place.  His comics also reveal the strong desire 
of the Japanese immigrants to Americanize.  Just like many other immigrants who had 
traveled to this country, they had dreamed of a better life.  The Federal government 
denied them this reality, and no matter how much they assimilated, white America 
viewed them as unassimilable aliens.  Because of their racial, ethnic, and citizenship ties 
to Japan, many felt that those individuals of Japanese ancestry could never truly become 
Americans, and thus rejected their requests for citizenship until 1952 when the country 
changed its naturalization laws to allow first generation Japanese immigrants to obtain 
naturalized status. 
It would take nearly fifty years from the signing of the Gentleman’s Agreement 
before Japanese immigrants could become citizens.  In that time, the Issei and Nisei 
already within the United States experienced many social inequalities and discriminatory 
tactics by the state of California and its white population.  The next chapter will deal 
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directly with these policies and their affects upon the Japanese immigrants and their 
children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Chapter 3: Nativism and the Exclusion of Social Equality 
On the shores of the Pacific the white man, at first curiously noticing the 
incoming advance-guard of the Asiatic races, soon took genuine alarm at 
the thought that untold millions of these people might domicile themselves 
with us, introducing to our people dangerous forms of vice and creating a 
labor situation which it was feared would banish the white laborer from 
the coast.1 
 
Albert G. Burnett, 1909 
 
Educational Segregation and Labor Contracts 
Albert G. Burnett, Associate Justice of the Third District Court of Appeals of 
Sacramento, California, like many other white Californians feared that Japanese culture 
might negatively influence American culture and that the Japanese immigrants 
represented the creation of labor competition within their state.  These factors along with 
the racial reasons mentioned earlier in this thesis drove California’s state government to 
seek social exclusionary policy very similar at times to the racial inequality experienced 
by blacks in the American south.  This chapter covers inequalities in land ownership, 
segregation of the California school system, and exclusion in the workplace. 
In 1918, Madison Grant, the Chairman of the New York Zoological Society; 
Trustee of the American Museum of Natural History; and Councilor of the American 
Geographical Society, wrote about racial threats to the white European race—or what he 
calls “the Great Race.”  Grant, a eugenicist, was a member of a group called the 
Internationalists.  Comprised of businessmen, educational theorists, publishers, and 
government officials, this group worked to maintain world peace with democratic and 
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capitalistic schemes.  The group’s belief in the genetic differences of the world’s races 
supported many of their goals.  Grant, also a lawyer and core member of this group, felt 
that the human race was divided into smaller subcategories that could be distinguished by 
studying physical characteristics (i.e. craniology) and cultural attributes.  He contended 
that cultural and geographic locations influenced one’s racial characteristics.  In his 
writing, he used the report of an anthropological expert from the Congressional 
Immigration Commission that had discussed instances that he felt confirmed his 
argument: 
That a round skull Jew on his way across the Atlantic might and did have 
a round skull child but a few years later, in response to the subtle elixir of 
American institutions as exemplified in an East Side tenement, might and 
did have a child whose skull was appreciably longer; and that a long skull 
south Italian, breeding freely, would have precisely the same experience in 
the reverse direction.  In other words the Melting Pot was acting instantly 
under the influence of a changed environment.2 
 
Grant also mentioned that during colonial times, having a large family was an asset to 
immigrants as they struggled with the burdens of social establishment.  He said that after 
time and material prosperity, large families became a burden instead of an aid to the 
familial structure.  Larger families meant more to support, more to educate, and more to 
prepare for the future.  When new immigrants come to the United States, they harbor the 
old concept of maintaining large family units.  Rogers M. Smith writes that at the end of 
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, American society “crossed the 
watershed between a largely agrarian society of small family farms and a new 
manufacturing society of large corporations and masses of workers.”3  He believes that 
the industrial growth of this time strengthened America’s enlightenment faith in scientific 
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growth with new technologies and scientific understanding of the natural world.  The 
study of eugenics fit perfectly into America’s interest in race and the social sciences.  
Smith claims that America’s industrialization also created severe social inequalities.  As 
the industrial growth spawned huge urban areas with powerful corporations, immigration 
to these areas increased heavily and threatened the cultural homogeneity of the country, 
thereby influencing nativism and eventually civic inequalities.  Racial and cultural groups 
with little to no previous contact now lived and worked together in small, but ever 
increasing urban areas or as labor on large corporate farms.  Competition between racial 
groups, which had never been of a high concern for small self-sustaining family owned 
farms, now influenced public opinion. 
Grant warns that as one racial group surpasses another in population numbers as a 
result of immigration and reproduction the process of replacement begins to occur.4  He 
considers this not in cultural adaptive terms but instead as a Social Darwinist struggle 
where the group with lower birth rates is slowly replaced by the new majority.  In 
California, the fear existed that the increase of Japanese immigrant families was changing 
the demographic composition within the state.  Some Americans feared that immigrant 
children would negatively influence the culture and attitude of white American children.  
Denis Kearney, a leader in the Populist Party of California, stated that, “We are paying 
out money for the purpose of allowing fully developed men who know no morals but vice 
to sit beside our sons and daughters in our public schools that they may help to debauch, 
                                                            
4 Ibid., 46–7. 
  78
   
demoralize, and teach them the vices which are the customs of the country whence they 
came.”5  Kearney is referring to older Japanese who attended public schools.6 
Pushed by the Asiatic Exclusion League and other interest groups, in May 1905, 
the San Francisco School Board announced a policy of segregation of all Japanese 
American school children from all white schools.  These children were then congregated 
into a single Oriental school.  It was hoped that separating the children would stop the 
negative influence the Asian children might have had on their white counterparts.  
Yamato Ichihashi writes that many white Californians feared that “the presence of young 
Japanese boys in school would inevitably result in importing immorality to young 
American girls.”7  At the time, 93 students of Japanese descent were enrolled in 23 public 
schools in the San Francisco area, and 25 of these students were American citizens.8  E. 
A. Hayes, a California member of the House of Representatives, stated in March of 1906 
that “the Japanese people do not understand the meaning of the word ‘morality.’”9  
Nativists feared that the Japanese youth with their presumed lack of morals and negative 
cultural influences would affect white school children.  By December of 1906, the San 
Francisco School Board began barring Japanese children from public schools.  Enraged 
over the unfair treatment of the Japanese immigrants, the Japanese citizenry requested 
that their nation’s government request that the United States end this discriminatory 
                                                            
5 Denis Kearney, Sacramento Records Union (July 7, 1892) quoted in California Nativism: Organized 
Opposition to the Japanese 1890–1913 (San Francisco: R&E Research Associates, 1973), 2. 
6 See “Japanese Barred from Schools Are Men,” in The New York Times (October 29, 1906), young 
uneducated Japanese men attended San Francisco schools to learn English and get an education.  Not all 
Japanese attending public schools were young adults, though, many were school age children. 
7 Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States, 239. 
8 Ibid., 238. 
9 E. A. Hayes, “Japanese Traits,” (speech, House of Representatives, March 13, 1906) in Japanese in the 
United States: A Critical Study of the Problems of the Japanese Immigrants and their Children, Yamato 
Ichihashi, 239 (New York: Arno Press, 1969.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), citations are to 
the 1969 edition. 
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policy.  The Japanese government began to pressure President Roosevelt, who sent 
Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf to access the situation in San Francisco.  Metcalf 
reported that there was support for reintegrating the school system.  Roosevelt then met 
with San Francisco municipal officers and convinced them to reintegrate the city’s public 
school system.  He assured them that he could come to a compromise with Japan 
regarding labor issues if they began the reintegration process.10  By March 13, 1907, San 
Francisco had rescinded the segregation of Japanese school children, and Roosevelt 
began the talks with Japan that would directly lead to the creation of the Gentleman’s 
Agreement of 1908. 
H.A. Millis, a Professor of Economics at the University of Kansas, was hired to 
investigate the so-called “Japanese Problem” for the Federal Council of Churches of 
Christ in American.  He found that the labor and ethnic competition, or at least the 
perception of these things, led to a great deal of Japanese discrimination.  He believed 
that Americans took pride in their capitalistic ambitions, but when other races showed 
this same characteristic, they grew angry and found it to be an undesirable quality.11  
Millis also believed that naturalization laws should be changed to include all races, and 
he concluded that much of the concerns for the assimilation of Japanese immigrants to be 
inconclusive, depending entirely on the individual immigrant. 
For decades labor contractors had traveled to Asia in search of inexpensive 
laborers.  As stated earlier, the Chinese Exclusion Act stopped the use of Chinese labor 
and left an opening for Japanese workers.  As outlined by the 1901 Industrial 
Commission on Immigration, these organizations maintained contacts with labor 
                                                            
10 Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States, 239–44. 
11 H.A. Millis, The Japanese Problem in the United States, 246. 
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companies in Japan and openly recruited workers to the U.S.  The Commission reports 
that 80% of all Japanese who migrated to the U.S. listed themselves as farmers.  The 
wages of a farm hand in Japan was 3 to 4 yen per month (the equivalent of $1.50 USD) 
and did not include room or board or perks provided by the labor companies.12  The 
recruited individuals were required to take care of all the necessary paperwork and 
expenditures as well as the $30 landing fee required by Immigration.  It was reported that 
every one of the migrants had exactly this amount in his pocket.  The Commission 
speculated later in the report that these funds must have been provided by the 
contractors.13  Although this violated various labor regulations, the commission was not 
able to find proof of these underhanded tactics.  To avoid immigration laws, some 
companies even resorted to smuggling workers into the U.S. through Canada and 
Mexico. 
Most labor contracts expired after three year periods, which allowed workers to 
return to Japan.  After analyzing pay scales for various labor companies, the Commission 
found that the average worker made around $0.60 to $0.70 a day—quite a bit more than 
the $1.50 a month they earned in Japan but still less than white laborers, who were 
represented by unions.14  The Commission also mentions the increase in white arrests in 
the areas where high amounts of Japanese labor resided.  Apparently, it was felt that 
white drunkenness, vagrancy, and burglary were a response to joblessness and to their 
“hopeless defeat in the unequal struggle with their Asiatic competitors.”15  P.H. 
McCarthy stated in the same report that he felt that labor contractors were content to 
                                                            
12 Industrial Commission, Reports of the Industrial Commission Immigration 15, 756. 
13 Ibid., 758. 
14 Ibid., 757. 
15 Ibid., 758. 
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direct “their white help in the same manner, placing them on a level with coolie labor.  
[…]  I have known some of the most honest and best citizens of the United States who, in 
order to accept the labor offered them, were compelled to live on a level with Chinamen 
and Japanese.  They are thus driven to be tramps and hoboes.”16  His statement referred 
to an earlier comment mentioned in the report, where the committee discussed the fact 
that whenever Japanese migrants worked in an area, white laborers chose to leave their 
jobs rather than work side by side with and receive comparable wages to Asian 
laborers.17  Chester Rowell mentions that whenever Japanese immigrants moved in
housing districts, white Americans vacated the area, thereby allowing an increase of 
Japanese immigrants into white neighborhoods.  They feared that the flood of Japanese 
immigrants into an area had forced white Americans out of their homes.
to 
ite 
ur state.”19 
                                                           
18  Cleveland L. 
Dam stated in the Industrial Commission’s Report on Immigration that “the influx of 
Japanese cannot be considered otherwise than a serious menace to the welfare of wh
labor in o
President Theodore Roosevelt was aware of the regional concern over coolie 
labor replacing white workers.  Once he got San Francisco to agree to the reintegration of 
their school system, he set out to create a compromise with Japan that would include 
restriction of labor migration of Japanese citizens.  Even though Japan had restricted 
laborers from migrating, contractors still brought workers to the U.S.  Roosevelt did not 
want a law that completely restricted Japanese immigration to the United States similar to 
 
16 P.H. McCarthy, “Affidavit of Mr. P.H. McCarthy,” in Reports of the Industrial Commission on 
Immigration 15, 801–2 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 801. 
17 Ibid., 801. 
18 Chester H. Rowell, “Chinese and Japanese Immigrants,” 8. 
19 Cleveland L. Dam, “Affidavit of Mr. Cleveland L. Dam,” 768. 
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the Chinese Exclusion Act.  Japan’s growing imperialist power in the Pacific made them 
a possible threat to U.S. growth in the area.  By 1900, the U.S. had annexed Hawaii and 
colonized Guam and the Philippines.  Roosevelt believed that it was in the best interest of 
both countries to come to a compromise that would allow the U.S. to stop contractors 
from using Japanese workers without insulting the Japanese government.  In 1908, 
Roosevelt drafted the Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan, which only halted the 
migration of male Japanese laborers, and established a peaceful resolution for both 
countries.  The agreement, as discussed in a report by the Commissioner General of 
Immigration, stated: “This understanding contemplates that the Japanese government 
shall issue passports to continental United States only to such of it subjects as are non-
laborers or are laborers who, in coming to the continent, seek to resume a formerly 
acquired domicile, to join a parent, wife, or children residing there.”20  The law still 
allowed for the immigration of families to the United States, and in the end only 
temporarily appeased the Californian populace, who eventually realized that the treaty 
unknowingly encouraged increased Japanese immigration to their state.  The Japanese 
immigrant community had originally consisted predominantly of male laborers—many of 
whom had originally intended to return to Japan.  Contract workers already present in the 
United States were not forced to leave the country, and since they could no longer travel 
freely between the two nations, many sent for their families back in Japan to join them in 
the U.S. 
                                                            
20 Immigration Commission, Commissioner-General of Immigration, Annual Report of the Commissioner-
General of Immigration: Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1908, report compiled by A. Warner Parker 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908), 125. 
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The Gentleman’s Agreement did slow migration numbers into the United States.  
In 1908 before the Agreement went into affect, 9,544 Japanese came to the United States, 
while 4,796 traveled back to Japan.  The following year only 2,432 Japanese came to this 
country, while 5,004 returned to Japan.21  Each subsequent year, smaller numbers 
migrated to the U.S.  These numbers were either equivalent to or less than the number of 
Japanese citizens returning to Japan.22  By 1913, the numbers had once again reversed as 
more Japanese immigrated to the U.S. (6,771) than returned to Japan (5,647).  The six 
year totals after the Agreement, reveal that the Gentleman’s Agreement curbed Japanese 
migration to the country.  Although Japanese citizens still immigrate to the United States, 
statics show that a difference of only 792 more individuals returned to Japan than entered 
the U.S., revealing that as the labor contracts expired these individuals were replaced by 
individuals who intended to establish residence in the U.S. 
 
Japanese Immigrants in the Work Place 
The Gentleman’s Agreement did not completely stop Japanese immigration to 
California, and although it reduced migration caused by contract labor, it still did not 
protect white workers and farmers from labor competition with the Japanese immigrants 
in the way that many Californians would have preferred.  Because of the Agreement, 
labor and economic competition, which had originally been concentrated in the area of 
manual labor, spread to other job markets. 
                                                            
21 H.A. Millis, The Japanese Problem in the United States, 18. 
22 See Masao Suzuki, “Success Story? Japanese Immigrants Economic Achievement and Return Migration, 
1920–1930,” in The Journal of Economic History 55, no. 4, 889–901 (December 1995) for a discussion of 
Japanese repatriation to Japan. 
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Yuji Ichioka writes that Abiko Kyutaro, a Japanese immigrant leader and 
publisher of the Japanese paper Nichibei Shimbun felt that the dekasegi ideal acted as an 
obstacle to the establishment of a stable Japanese community in the United States, and 
that it lay at the heart of the many unsavory features attributed to Japanese migrant life.  
“During the anti-Japanese exclusion movement, he exhorted his countrymen to abandon 
the dekasegi ideal.  As his solution to the exclusion question, he formulated an ideal of 
permanent settlement and persuaded many immigrants to adopt it, thereby laying the real 
foundations of Japanese immigrant society.”23  Abiko reasoned that racial and economic 
competitions helped aid the creation of exclusionary policy, but he argued that the 
underlying problem was that Americans were ignorant of Japan and Japanese immigrants.  
By fostering respect toward cherished American customs, Japanese immigrants would be 
participating in America’s growth as a nation.24  Japanese immigrants were encouraged 
to create permanent and stable family units.  As the number of immigrant families 
increased and communities were created, many Japanese purchased farmland or started 
their own businesses. 
                                                           
While most Japanese men originally migrated for labor jobs predominantly in 
rural areas, large numbers of workers began to move to Californian cities in search of 
urban occupations.  Contrary to popular opinion, not all Japanese immigrants wanted 
labor or farm work.  For those who sought urban and industrial work, the completion of 
their labor contracts allowed them to follow their own calling.  It is true that the largest 
majority of Japanese immigrants did agricultural work.  In 1910, only 38.7% of the 
Japanese in California lived in urban areas.  This number actually went down slightly by 
 
23 Yuji Ichioka, The Issei, 146. 
24 Ibid., 147. 
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1920, when 37.8% lived in Californian cities.  In 1930, the percentage of Japanese 
immigrants living in urban locations increased to 43.8%.25 
Farming was a job highly regarded in Japan, and even the implementation of the 
Gentleman’s Agreement did not quickly equalize the number of Japanese immigrants 
living in rural versus urban areas.  The Industrial Commission estimated in 1909 that 
39,000 Japanese were employed in some form of agricultural occupation (farmers, 
gardeners, poultry and cattle raisers, and other types of farm labor), while in 1920, the 
census reported that 25,657 were engaged in agricultural work.26  Japanese immigrant 
involvement in agriculture fell, and equalization slowly occurred between rural and urban 
work as Japanese immigrant involvement in city trades saw an increase over a twenty 
year period from the advent of the Gentleman’s agreement to the end of the 1920’s.  In 
1909, it was reported by the Immigration Commission that there were 315 Japanese 
owned stores, selling a wide range of goods from food products to flowers and from 
florists to shoe stores.  Twenty years later in 1929, that number slightly increased to 328.  
In 1909, there were 203 Japanese owned personal service shops such as barbers, 
laundries, and hotels.  By 1929, that number grew to 250.27   
Contract labor acted as an opportunity for obtaining the funds they would later 
use to help their families back home, bring their families to the U.S., to begin their own 
businesses, or to purchase the land necessary to start their own farms.  Another option for 
Japanese immigrants seeking to purchase farmland or start businesses was an 
                                                            
25 Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States, 100. 
26 Ibid., 164. 
27 Ibid., 131. 
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organizational system of rotating credit called tanomoshi.28  A group of individuals and 
families regularly contributed to a community savings account.  Every individual who 
had contributed to the pot would, at one time, have a chance to use the money to fund 
these projects.  The tanomoshi required a great deal of individual trust in one’s 
community and family honor.29 
As O’Brien and Fugita describe: “The Japanese were quite well educated for 
immigrants and thus often recognized when they were being exploited.  When they felt 
they were being mistreated, they frequently struck or left for other work.”30 The Japanese 
even helped to organize other ethnic communities against unfair work practices and 
wages.  In 1936, the Japanese immigrant community found themselves on both sides of 
the fair labor issue.  Japanese, Mexican, and Filipino celery pickers fought against the 
celery growers in the Venice, California area (many of which were actually Japanese 
farmers).  The Southern California Farm Federation, a group started by Japanese 
immigrant growers, rejected the wage demands of the strikers.  As the strike rapidly 
spread through the area, the Japanese growers received support from the Japanese 
consulate and even the L.A. County Sheriff’s department and Immigration Services.  The 
JACL endorsed the growers, because the strike was felt to be a detriment to the 
community.31 
 
 
 
                                                            
28 David J. Obrien & Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience, 27. 
29 Ibid., 28. 
30 Ibid., 19. 
31 Ibid., 31. 
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The California Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920 
The fear of economic competition with the Japanese immigrants focused a great 
deal on a presumed agricultural competition between farmers of Japanese ancestry and 
native white farmers.  In 1914, author Charles Wallace Collins stated in the Yale Law 
Journal that, “Californians feel very strongly that there can be no efficient cooperation 
between Japanese and Americans.  And seeing the possibility of a greater increase of 
Japanese immigration, they have fears for the future.”32  Although Collins discussed the 
Alien Land Laws, he asserted that in the eyes of many Californians, the heart of the 
competition did not lie with economics but with race.  The “cooperation” that he referred 
to was between the two races not just those who owned farms. 
In 1915, H.A. Millis reported that the Japanese owned a very small amount of the 
good land in California, except in the case of various types of berries and potatoes.33  
Japanese immigrant farmers produced 7,875, 905 quarts of strawberries on 2,223 acres of 
land and produced 1,966,690 potatoes on 10,227 acres of land.  In the Vaca Valley, they 
either leased or owned nearly half the land devoted to fruits.  According to the 1910 
Immigration Commission there were 531 Japanese leased or owned farms for a total of 
6,173 acres of land in the Los Angeles area.  There were 79 large farms in the San 
Joaquin area with nearly 12,730 acres of total land.34  Millis also deduced that although 
there were some large owned and leased properties, most Japanese immigrant farms were 
no more than 9 acres.35 
                                                            
32 Charles Wallace Collins, “Will the California Alien Land Law Stand the Test of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?” in The Yale Law Journal 23, no. 4, 330–8 (February 1914), 331. 
33 H.A. Millis, Japanese Problem in the United States, 134. 
34 Ibid., 135. 
35 Ibid., 136. 
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In their article about the California Alien Land Laws, Brian J. Gaines and Wendy 
K. Tam Cho discuss how the Gentleman’s Agreement, which “merely slowed the rate of 
new Japanese arrivals, was not sufficient to remedy the ‘Japanese problem’ in the eyes of 
the many Californians who were keen, not only to discourage new immigration, but also 
to drive away the Japanese problem already in the state.”36  The competition for farmland 
and markets led to the creation of various discriminatory bills meant to keep the Japanese 
from agricultural pursuits.  In 1907, the first law meant to restrict farmland ownership by 
Asians was eventually defeated in the California State Assembly.  A bill to once again 
segregate the California school system was the only law to make it through the system in 
1909, but after renewed pressures from President Roosevelt, the Assembly stopped the 
law when it went up for reconsideration.  Republican Presidential support aided the 
defeat of discriminatory laws against the Japanese immigrants and their children, but in 
1912 a shift in the political distribution of power within California shifted the majority 
control from the Republicans to the Democrats.  The Californian Democrats had obtained 
power by utilizing a platform arguing for Japanese exclusion and segregation.37 
White farmers with limited land ownership supported this legislation in the hopes 
of destroying even the possibility of economic competition, while owners of large 
farmland areas actually fought against the creation of land restrictions for Japanese 
immigrants.  They had found that it was more profitable to lease their land or sell it at a 
higher rate to immigrants than to cultivate it themselves.  The change in the political 
party majority in California, however, provided supporters of land regulation the opening 
they needed.  In 1913 California passed the Alien Land Law, or as it is also known, the 
                                                            
36 Brian J. Gaines & Wendy K. Tam Cho, “On California’s 1920 Alien Land Law,” 277.  
37 Ibid., 275. 
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Webb-Haney Bill.  This law stipulated that only aliens eligible for citizenship could own, 
purchase, or inherit property and that those immigrants not eligible for citizenship could 
only lease lands for three-year increments and only for agricultural purposes.38  The law 
did not specifically mention Asian immigrants, but was created with the intent to deny 
land ownership to the Japanese immigrants, who were the largest immigrant group not 
eligible for citizenship in the state of California.  During the California Supreme Court 
trial over the estate and guardianship of Tetsubumi Yano, the Judges concluded: 
This law [referring to the California Alien Land Law of 1913 and its 1920 
amendment] is general in terms.  It is not confined to citizens in its 
application, but purports to confer the right upon all residents regardless of 
citizenship.  […]  This restriction is not put upon a citizen of any country 
whose citizens are eligible to citizenship here, nor upon any other class of 
residents of this state who are not citizens thereof.  It is clearly a 
discrimination against citizens of Japan residing in this state.39 
 
It is true that the Japanese could lease land for three year periods, thereby 
allowing them to still work, but the reality remained that they could not own the land they 
farmed.  Those individuals who did own property were forced to sell their land, or give it 
to their American-born children. 
Gaines and Tam Cho argue that the 1913 Alien Land Law turned out to be 
toothless.40  The Issei farmers found a loop-hole within the land law’s stipulations that 
had been neglected.  They could not own the land, but their children, who had gained 
citizenship by being born on U.S. soil, could.  The Issei simply signed over ownership of 
their property to their Nisei children.  This circumvention of the law only agitated racial 
                                                            
38 California Alien Land Law of 1913, 40 Cal. Stat. 206 (May 19, 1913), 207. 
39 Yano vs. State of California, 188 Cal. Stat. 645 (Supreme Court of California 1922). 
40 Brian J. Gaines & Wendy K. Tam Cho, “On California’s 1920 Alien Land Law,” 275. 
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animosity toward the Japanese and encouraged the pre-existing racial profile of the 
Japanese as underhanded and untruthful.41 
Seven years later, in 1920, the state of California attempted to solve the 
agricultural competition problem for the final time.  An amendment to the 1913 Land 
Law passed through the state government.  Section four of this amendment stated that 
immigrants not eligible for citizenship or companies ran by individuals not eligible for 
citizenship could not be appointed the guardian of land owned by a citizen of the United 
States (i.e. their American born children) nor could they enjoy any of the profits 
attributed to the property.42  The law also stipulated that a public administrator in the 
appropriate county would be appointed guardian of any land owned by a minor citizen 
whose parents were ineligible for naturalization.”43  The courts had the right to remove 
the parents as legal guardians of the child’s land, while section six of the amendment 
allowed the state government to seize the child’s property in case of death and sell it. 
In May of 1922, the estate guardianship of Tetsubumi Yano, a minor, went to 
trial.  Yano, a fourteen year old girl, had held the ownership of her family’s farm land 
since the age of two.  The case of Yano’s ownership of the land went to the California 
Supreme Court, where her parents petitioned the right to guardianship of their daughter 
and the land under her name by arguing that their removal went against the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the American Constitution. 
                                                            
41 See statement by the Collector of Customs for San Francisco, California, J.P. Jackson, “Affidavit of J.P. 
Jackson,” in Reports of the Industrial Commission on Immigration 15, 795–7 (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1901) for his description of why the Japanese could not be trusted. 
42 California Alien Land Law of 1913, Amendment (November 2, 1920), section 4. 
43 Ibid., section 4. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment, however, did not take away or supersede state 
powers.  Each individual state still retained the right to make decisions according to their 
own discretion.44  This allowed the state of California to enact restrictive laws against 
Japanese immigrants.  It was argued in Terrace vs. Thompson that the rights of aliens 
differed from that of citizens, thus allowing for exceptions to be made in regards to the 
protections guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment.45 
The court agreed that the code of Civil Procedures (section 197) supported Hayao 
Yano’s (Tetsubumi’s father) parental guardianship rights of his biological daughter, and 
that the court could find no evidence of “incompetency.”46  The court concluded, 
however, that Japanese immigrants were the only group who had attempted to evade the 
1913 Land Law, and that the only reason for Yano’s daughter to hold the title to the land, 
was “to evade the laws of the state of California.”47  Hayao admitted “that he had the 
land deeded to his infant daughter because he was Japanese and could not take the 
himself; that his baby was a citizen of the United States and that he had the land 
conveyed to her for that reason alone.”
title 
                                                           
48  The court upheld Hayao’s request for 
guardianship of his daughter, but they argued that his right to guardianship did not 
transfer to the land under Tetsubumi’s name since it is property.  It stated that his 
eligibility for guardianship of his child did not guarantee “a right of property.”49  It 
pertained exclusively to the person.  The court contended that individuals ineligible for 
citizenship had grown to proportions constituting a class within the state of California, 
 
44 Eliot Grinnell Mears, Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1928; New York: Arno Press, 1978), citations are to the 1978 edition, 86. 
45 Ibid., 87. 
46 Yano vs. State of California. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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allowing the state to “to enact peculiar legislation depriving them of rights or privileges 
which are accorded to others not of that class,” therefore nullifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s decree.50  The Yano family retained guardianship of the land under 
Tetsubumi’s name, but with the stipulation that, although Tetsubumi's parents were 
allowed to work the land, they would not be considered its true guardian, and therefore 
made them ineligible to enjoy any of its profits.  They had to provide receipts from the 
farming operation to verify that all profits went to the child and the child alone.  It was 
also stated that if Tetsubumi should pass away, upon her death, the land would be sold 
with the profits from the sale going elsewhere. 
Woodrow Wilson and his Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan supported 
state rights to govern themselves and enact laws for their own well-being.  Wilson 
though, did not agree with the California Land Laws and dispatched Bryan to the area to 
report back to him with any recommendations for the situation.  Bryan recommended to 
President Wilson that forcibly removing the Japanese immigrants from the West Coast 
might alleviate the tensions in the area.  In a conversation with Wilson about the forced 
disbursement of the Japanese, the President rejected Bryan’s proposal, fearing that his 
solution would only spread the problem throughout the country.51 
The land laws did not cause a sharp decrease in Japanese land ownership as the 
Japanese found ways around the land laws.  Yuji Ichioka shows in his article on how the 
Japanese responded to the California Alien Land Laws that land ownership actually 
increased from 26,707 acres in 1913 to 74,769 acres in 1920 and did not decrease until 
                                                            
50 Ibid. 
51 Paolo E. Coletta, “The Most Thankless Task: Bryan and the California Alien Land Legislation,” in Asian 
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thereafter.  By 1925, the amount of acres owned decreased to 41,898 but still remained 
above the amount owned in 1913, when the first California Land Law was passed.  Even 
though land ownership did decrease, the amount of land share-leased increased from 
50,495 in 1913 to 76,397 acres.  1925 also saw a sharp decrease in the total number of 
acres farmed by individuals of Japanese ancestry as many left agriculture for more urban 
occupations.52 
The Immigration Act of 1924 stopped a great deal of the nativist concerns toward 
Japanese immigration to the United States.  Originally legislated in 1921, it took nearly 
ten years “before permanent immigration quotas were implemented.  The intervening 
years were filled with contention and difficulty as Congress debated the design of a new 
system, [which] would codify certain values and judgments about the sources of 
immigration, the desired makeup of the nation, and the requirements of citizenship.”53  
The 1924 Act set limits based on an immigrant’s national origin and assumed ability to 
Americanize.  It limited immigration into the U.S. to 155,000 a year and excluded all 
persons not eligible for citizenship.54  It stipulated that only white people living in Japan 
could immigrate to the U.S. and only a 100 individuals each year.  By not allowing the 
Japanese to immigrate it preserved white population statistics.  Mae M. Ngai argues that 
“the national origins quota system proceeded from the conviction that the American 
nation was, and should remain, a white nation descended from Europe.  If Congress did 
not go so far as to sponsor race breeding, it did seek to transform immigration law into an 
                                                            
52 See Yuji Ichioka, “Japanese Immigrant Response to the 1920 California Alien Land Law,” Agricultural 
History 58, no. 2, 157–78 (April 1984) for data. 
53 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 21. 
54 Ibid., 23. 
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instrument of mass racial engineering.”55  Nativists were keenly aware of Japan’s power 
in the Pacific, and many did not argue that the Japanese were racially inferior like they 
did with the Chinese.56  Japan’s imperialist growth throughout Asia and in the Pacific 
caused political, national, and imperialist conflicts with the United States during the 
1930’s culminating in the entrance of the U.S. into the Second World War.  The fourth 
chapter will cover the conflicts between the two countries during the 1930’s.  It will also 
explore the loss of freedom for the Japanese immigrants and their children as they dealt 
with the increase in nativist doctrine, which eventually grew to encompass not just the 
West Coast but the entire American nation, providing support for nationalist ideals during 
the Second World War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 Ibid., 27. 
56 Ibid., 40. 
   
Chapter 4: Nativism and the Exclusion of Freedom 
The facts of yesterday speak for themselves.  The people of the United 
States have already formed their opinions and well understand the 
implications to the very life and safety of our nation.  […]  I believe I 
interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we 
will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain 
that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again.  Hostilities exist.  
There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our 
interests are in grave danger.  With confidence in our armed forces—with 
the unbounded determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable 
triumph—so help us God.1 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941 
 
In the Decade Prior to the Attack on Pearl Harbor 
In the early twentieth century, the Empire of Japan was isolated to its original 
island chain and had to look beyond its national borders to supplement its limited natural 
resources.  Japan’s imperialist goals made the acquisition of outside territories and the 
occupation of other less-established countries a necessity.  Just like the United States and 
many European nations, Japan chose to spread further into the Pacific area and into 
China, thereby attaining natural resources such as oil and metals not readily available 
within their home country.  Western powers viewed China, its large population, and its 
many natural resources as a center for commercial growth.  Because of this, the United 
States and Europe instituted an open-door policy, which allowed countries the freedom to 
pursue their own interests in the country without fighting over the territory or the spoils 
like they had in Africa.  It also provided the Chinese people with protection from an 
invasion which would threaten the economic interests of the other countries doing 
business in China. 
                                                            
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Infamy Speech,” (speech, Capital Building, joint session of Congress, 
Washington, DC, December 8, 1941). 
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With the world economies left stagnant during the 1930’s nothing could be done 
about Japan’s further conquest of the Chinese mainland.  While the rest of the world, felt 
the constraints of the global depression, Japan’s unemployment numbered 500,000, one-
tenth that of Germany and one-twentieth that of the United States.  By 1935, the Japanese 
national income had climbed to historic levels.2  Although Japanese exports had grown to 
record highs, the country’s imports still out-weighed the number of exports.  Japanese 
expansion evened out the discrepancy between the imports and exports and gained social 
support for the country’s imperialistic aims.  This horrified other countries—mainly the 
U.S.—which had become a power in the Pacific with its military bases in the Philippines 
and Hawaii and its imports to China.  By 1937, Japan had conquered much of Manchuria 
and had begun a full-scale invasion of China, causing Secretary of State Henry Stimson 
to decree that the United States would not recognize further Japanese expansion.3 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not want a war with Japan, but many within 
the United States government began to see it as an extreme probability.  The two nations 
had been in talks for years to try to resolve the disputes over rights to trade and territory 
in China.  By 1941, Japan had become allied with Germany and Italy, and all attempts at 
a peaceful resolution to the problems in the Pacific had failed.  In July 1941, Roosevelt 
decided to freeze Japanese assets in the U.S. and to discontinue the export of high-grade 
aviation gasoline important to the Japanese air force.  Misinterpreting this act by 
Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson cut off all oil exports to Japan and 
virtually set in motion the events leading to the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. 
                                                            
2 Ibid., 174. 
3 Raymond F. Wylie & Paul Gordon Lauren, “U.S.-Japanese Relations: From the Past to the Present,” in 
Destinies Shared: U.S- Japanese Relations, edited by Raymond F. Wylie & Paul Gordon Lauren, 17–26 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 21. 
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On December 8, 1941, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke to a confused American people who were 
saddened, angry, and curious as to how an attack of that magnitude could have ever 
happened.  Fear and frustration ran rampant through a country that usually wished to 
avoid international conflict.  Only twenty years had passed since the end of the First 
World War, and the Congressional denial of President Wilson’s request to join the 
League of Nations.  In a June 1941 survey, seventy-nine percent of Americans stated that 
they wanted the country to stay out of the war in Europe.  Less than a day after the attack 
on Pearl Harbor though, the majority of isolationist support had completely disappeared.  
Congress took only thirty-three minutes to vote on whether or not the country should go 
to war with Japan.  The vote was 82-0 in the Senate and 388-1 in the House.4  Ronald 
Tataki writes: 
For years, Roosevelt had been struggling against the isolationist tide in 
order to prepare the United States for what he considered an unavoidable 
war against Nazi Germany […] Later Roosevelt admitted to Winston 
Churchill that if it had not been for Pearl Harbor, he would have had a 
‘great difficulty in getting the American people into the war.’  The 
President told his aid Harry Hopkins that the issue had been taken ‘entirely 
out of his hands, because the Japanese had made the decision for him.’  
Hopkins recalled Roosevelt’s great relief: ‘In spite of the disaster at Pearl 
Harbor…it completely solidified the American people and made the war 
upon Japan inevitable.5 
 
Roosevelt accused Japan of hypocritically planning to attack the United States 
while working for peace.  In his address to the American people the day after the attack, 
he stated: “It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious 
that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago.  During the 
                                                            
4 Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein & Katherine V. Dillon, December 7, 1941: The Day the 
Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988), 393. 
5 Ronald Takaki, Double Victory, 14. 
  98
   
intervening time the Japanese government has deliberately sought to deceive the United 
States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.”6  While many 
individuals within the U.S. government worked tirelessly for peace, many high ranking 
political and military figures within the U.S. were also planning for war.  A topic of 
concern was the formulation of a strategy to combat any internal conflicts perpetrated by 
anyone with Japanese ancestry. 
 
Defining the “Other” 
The attack on Pearl Harbor encouraged the advancement of nativist concern from 
regional fears concentrated on the West Coast of the United States and upped them to 
national levels.  Like nativists, nationalists fear for the survival of the country.  As fear 
and frustration spread throughout the country after Pearl Harbor, nationalist zeal 
incorporated the nativist concerns toward the Japanese immigrants and the Japanese 
Americans.  During the Second World War, nativists became less concerned with the 
economic and cultural implications of the Japanese on the coast, and instead concentrated 
on the national and racial significance of their presence within the country during a time 
of war. 
To a nationalist, the nation in its entirety is a perfect representation of the racial, 
ethnic, cultural, political, economic, and social fabric of the insular community spirit.  
For a nation state to survive, nationalism requires complete and utter support from the 
general population.  By the time it has grown beyond just the government, it becomes 
                                                            
6 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Infamy Speech.” 
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what Ernest Gellner calls “nationalist sentiment.”7  Nationalism views its existence “as a 
natural and universal ordering of the political life of mankind.”8  One can see hints of this 
belief in the blind support of the federal and state laws enacted during the first forty years 
of the twentieth century meant to segregate anyone of Japanese ancestry or to restrict 
Japanese immigration to the U.S. 
American nationalism does not recognize a separation of politics and the nation 
(signified by American democracy) from the desire for cultural monism (represented by 
the myth of a shared origin and concern for future stability) (see Photo C.1).   In his 
monograph about nationalism, Anthony W. Marx argues that states are often faced with 
competing or antagonistic groups.9  To keep these groups in check and to build a 
nationalistic ideology that will unify a society, the elites target a minority community for 
exclusion.  In the case of the United States and the state of California, nativism had 
already segregated the Japanese from the ethnic majority and formed them into the 
“other.”  Whether knowingly or not, government elites then used anger directed at the 
Japanese to unify the country on the idea of war.  Anthony D. Smith warns in his book on 
nations and identity that national unity along racial lines encourages public fears toward 
national survival.10  He argues that nationalism is used as a stabilizing factor within a 
country by drawing solidarity from a shared background and similar goals.  The 
separation of one group, the “other,” provides a unifying antagonist and creates a sense of 
solidarity amongst the general population.  Those individuals living in the United States 
                                                            
7 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca & New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 
8 Ibid., 48. 
9 Anthony W. Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 22. 
10 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 76. 
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with Japanese ancestry had already existed as the “other” since the end of the nineteen 
century, but national awareness of the so-called dangers presented by the “yellow peril” 
only became evident throughout the country after the attack on Pearl Harbor.  The 
Japanese then became one of the motivating factors used to mobilize the American 
people for war and to protect American democracy from imperialistic aggression, 
fascism, and Nazism. 
It was the belief of many within the United States that no difference existed 
between the Japanese immigrant community and Japan the nation.  This ethnic link 
directly influenced the U.S. government’s decision to intern the Japanese immigrants and 
the Japanese Americans for the duration of the war.  Greg Robinson writes that by 
labeling Issei and Nisei “as enemy aliens and foreigners, Roosevelt and the army had 
tacitly encouraged the wide spread public identification of Japanese Americans with 
Japan, a problem anti-Japanese propaganda only intensified.”11  Anthony D. Smith writes 
that ethnic communities, or “ethnies,” are quite often misinterpreted as separate race 
groups; thereby creating a singular conglomerate view of many groups who, in actuality, 
have separate and distinct cultural qualities.12  At the time, many with the United States 
viewed the Japanese and the Japanese Americans not as separate ethnic communities but 
as one race whose loyalty would always be to the Emperor and Japan.  Los Angeles times 
columnist W.H. Anderson stated in a February issue that a “Viper is nonetheless a viper 
wherever the egg is hatched—so a Japanese-American.  Born of Japanese parents—
grows up to be a Japanese.  Not an American [see photo C.2].”13 
                                                            
11 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 131. 
12 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, 21. 
13 W.H. Anderson “The Question of Japanese Americans,” Los Angeles Times (February 2, 1942). 
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Former Californian District Attorney and three time California State Governor, 
Attorney General Earl Warren questioned whether or not individuals of Japanese descent 
could have their loyalty tested.  He felt that it was possible to measure the loyalty of a 
Caucasian person but not the loyalty of a person with Japanese heritage.  He argued: 
“When we deal with the Japanese we are in an entirely different field and we cannot form 
any opinion.”14  Those individuals of Japanese origin are placed on a completely 
different scientific table than that of the white ethnicities.  Prior to December 7, 1941, 
government officials felt that the country had made headway in pacifying the Pacific 
tensions with Japan.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor the fear that individuals with 
Japanese ancestry were untrustworthy only intensified.  They felt that while the U.S. had 
been working for a peaceful resolution to the Pacific conflicts, the Japanese had been 
preparing their fleet for a devastating preemptive attack, and therefore confirmed this 
racial stereotype. 
Total W
lete 
e 
onslaught against us.  No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated 
                                                           
 
ar and its Influence on Society 
FDR knew that for the war effort to succeed, the United States had to be united as 
never before.  During his address to Congress, Roosevelt discussed the need for comp
support from the American people to ensure the protection of the United States.  H
stated:  “As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all 
measures be taken for our defense.  Always will we remember the character of the 
 
14 Reed Ueda, “The Changing Path to Citizenship,” in The War in American Culture: Society and 
Consciousness during World War II, edited by Lewis A. Erenberg & Susan E. Hirsch, 202–16 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1996), 207–8. 
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invasion, the American people in their righteousness might well win through to absolute 
victory.”15 
The United States had never before mobilized for total war in the modern era.  
American involvement in the First World War lasted for only eighteen months, and 
popular opinion was mixed on whether or not the U.S. should have even gotten involved.  
In his article on the influence of total war on genocidal activities, Jay Winter argues that 
the advent of total warfare dissolved the line separating innocent civilians from the 
exploits and horrors brought by war.  He states: “Civilians had always been trampled on 
by invading armies.  What was more disturbing now was not only the scale of the disaster 
but the implication visible for all to see that such acts were not unfortunate by-products 
of war but were built in to the nature of the conflict itself.  The boundaries between 
civilian and military targets were fading fast.”16  To secure the nation, all enemy nations 
had to be defeated through absolute victory.  This did not center solely on the military 
might of a nation but the public machine that gave birth and raised soldiers, published 
propaganda, created the mechanisms of war, and fought subversively from within enemy 
territory as well.  After Pearl Harbor the U.S. war machine mobilized for this idea of total 
war.  The government reinstated the draft (though many young men were happy to go to 
war without being sequestered), women flooded the workplace to keep production of war 
materials in process, and people limited their use of certain products so that they could be 
saved for the war effort (see Photo C.3).  The entire country mobilized under the national 
cry of victory at home and abroad.  Victory became the responsibility of all citizens (see 
Photos C.4 & C.5).  This idea of civilians working for the war effort exemplifies Winter’s 
                                                            
15 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Infamy Speech.” 
16 Jay Winter, “Under Cover of War,” 192–93. 
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argument that with total war, the entire nation worked to pursue victory.  To an enemy 
nation, the entire population had to be brought to its knees.  “Total war is never literally 
total.  It is ‘totalizing’ in the sense that the longer it lasts, the more human and material 
resources are drawn inexorably into its vortex.”17  No one was safe from this concept, 
and eventually, in some form or another, everyone either becomes a victim or a 
victimi
s lack of concern for 
individ
g 
 of 
ay 
an 
al proportions and unprecedented destructiveness.  The 
rights of American citizens, especially those of Japanese ancestry, paled in 
 
t other American 
citizens
erous 
                                                           
zer. 
When describing the President’s order to have the Japanese Americans sent to the 
internment camps, Historian Greg Robinson illustrates the President’
ual well-being when it lay in opposition to national interests: 
FDR’s pattern of conduct toward Japanese Americans highlights the 
negative face of such pragmatism.  The President’s attitude toward the 
Japanese Americans was marked by what John Hersey termed a ‘grand 
offhandedness.’  Unlike Stimson, who was tortured by doubts over the 
morality and constitutionality of making racial distinctions and removin
American citizens, the President displayed no worry or hesitation over 
evacuation and its consequences […] Roosevelt’s failure was a lack
compassion, or, more precisely, of empathy.  Although the President m
have seen the evacuation as entirely a matter of military judgment, 
underlying his approval of that plan was carelessness toward innocent 
people that was born of prejudice.  Although he had genuine humanitari
instincts, his paramount concern was leading the country to victory in a 
conflict of glob
comparison.18 
The freedom of Japanese immigrants and the Japanese Americans was deliberately 
suspended to maintain stability on the home front as well as protec
 and the American war effort from insurgent activities. 
Anti-Japanese sentiment increased after Pearl Harbor as a growing number of 
people within the United States adopted the opinion that the Japanese were a treach
 
17 Ibid., 190. 
18 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 123–24. 
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people.  The attack on the Pacific Fleet remained in the forefront of the American 
consciousness.  Historian John W. Dower believes that the attack on Pearl Harbor 
aroused a vengeful spirit in Americans toward the Japanese.  The Japanese, who felt that
a devastating preemptive attack would crush American spirit, failed to predict this r
inspired response.  He states that this anger bordered on genocidal feelings before 
mentioning Admiral William Halsey (the eventual Commander of the South Pacific 
Force), who asserted that by the war’s end Japanese would only be spoken in hell.  He 
also used the slogan “Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs.”
 
ace-
.S. 
n 
e 
thing subhuman and 
repulsiv
of 
                                                           
19  To inspire themselves, U
Marines used a variation of Halsey’s motto, in which they stated: “Remember Pearl 
Harbor—keep ‘em dying.”20  This anti-Japanese rhetoric was not exclusively centered o
the Japanese military, the country of Japan, nor Japan’s Emperor.  Anyone of Japanese 
descent was seen as part of an evil race nation bent on the destruction of the United States 
and democracy.  After traveling to the Pacific War, Ernie Pyle wrote in 1945: “In Europ
we felt that our enemies, were horrible and deadly as they were, were still people.  But 
out here I soon gathered that the Japanese were looked upon as some
e, the way some people feel about cockroaches or mice.”21   
War propaganda is another aspect of total war and can reveal the nativism 
directed at anyone of Japanese descent.  Propaganda works as either a representation 
nativist aggression toward a specific racial group or acts as an influence upon public 
opinion.  The last three chapters have illustrated that government employees both state 
 
19 John W. Dower, War without Mercy, 36. 
20 Ibid., 36. 
21 John W. Dower, “Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures,” in The War in American Culture: Society 
and Consciousness during World War II, edited by Lewis A. Erenberg & Susan E. Hirsch, 169–201 
(Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 169–70. 
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and federal along with everyday citizens had harbored nativist aggression toward any
with Japanese ancestry.  These individuals feared the cultural, racial, and economic 
implications of Japanese incursion onto U.S. soil.  The attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
declaration of war against the United States only strengthened earlier made claims m
one 
ade 
by nati n. 
en 
se 
ship.  
nd 
te 
individuals who did not have an already existing knowledge base of the Japanese 
                                                           
vists.  War propaganda was simply the next evolution of nativist aggressio
A group called the Remember Pearl Harbor League was formed after the 
December attack.  The group pushed for the deportation of all Japanese immigrants and 
Japanese Americans once the war with Japan ended.  A 1945 pamphlet stated that “Ali
Japanese within our borders are a menace and of course must be excluded.  These are 
now ‘enemy aliens’ and can now be and should be promptly deported at the termination 
of the war.”22  The pamphlet continued to explain that the group had found the Japane
Americans to be disloyal.  They claimed that their findings were not based on race or 
industrial competition, but on the fact that the Japanese Americans held dual citizen
They also warned of the Japanese language schools and of travel between the two 
countries, which they felt “impregnated” the Nisei with Japanese nationalism.23  While 
the pamphlet basically covered many of the same nativist fears explained in the earlier 
chapters of this thesis, it illustrates the growth of nativism to nationalism.  The pamphlet 
explained these various topics of concern as if they were newly discovered material a
not information that had been circulating around the state of California for over fifty 
years.  The matter in which the material is expressed also reveals a desire to educa
 
22 Remember Pearl Harbor League, Evidence of Disloyalty of American-born Japanese (Auburn: 
Remember Pearl Harbor League, Inc., 1945), 3. 
23 Ibid., 5. 
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immigrants and the Japanese Americans.  The pamphlet acted as a merging of nativist 
concerns and national propaganda. 
Flyers, posters, and political cartoons had been around long before the First World 
War, but technological growth after the turn of the century, only increased the extents to 
which nations advertised their righteousness and dehumanized their enemies.  Greater 
connectivity throughout the country allowed for the wider circulation of propaganda, and 
the radio allowed for even the most remote listener to keep apprised of current events.  
Politically-minded movies (see Photo C.6) and pre-movie newsreels impressed a constant 
warlike influence upon the general populace.  Propaganda portrayed the Japanese as little 
psychotic monkey men.  The cover of Time magazine from January 26, 1942 shows a 
scowling monkey with a helmet and a gun meant to represent a Japanese soldier hanging 
from a tree behind the Dutch Commander of the Netherlands territory in the East Indies 
(see Photo C.7).  Social scientists argued that the Japanese were a primitive race.  A 
photo from the May 1944 issue of Life magazine shows a young woman writing a thank-
you letter to her boyfriend fighting in the Pacific while next to her pad of paper lies the 
skull of a Japanese soldier sent to her as a gift (see Photo C.8).  The skull is treated as a 
trophy and displayed in that manner. 
War propaganda also illustrates the American view that all Japanese were linked 
as a single race while those with Caucasian ancestry retained their individuality and could 
not be blamed for the conflicts started by their leaders (see Photos C.9 and C.10).  Dower 
explains that Americans grouped all Japanese into one larger race thereby labeling and 
dehumanizing them as inferior: 
Hollywood formulaically introduced good Germans as well as Nazis but 
almost never showed a ‘good Japanese.’  In depicting the Axis 
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Triumvirate, political cartoonists routinely gave the German enemy 
Hitler’s face and the Italian enemy Mussolini’s, but they rendered the 
Japanese as plain, homogeneous ‘Japanese’ caricatures: short, round-
faced, bucktoothed, slant-eyed, frequently myopic behind horn-rimmed 
glasses […] The German enemy was conflated to bad Germans (Nazis), 
the Japanese enemy was inflated to a supra-Japanese foe.24 
 
Although caricatures of Tojo and Hirohito were sometimes used in U.S. propaganda and 
generic images of Nazi German soldiers at times substituted for Hitler, neither was used 
to the extent of their already mentioned counterparts and neither left a lasting impression. 
Ensuring the continuation of the American dream was not just the responsibility 
of those fighting overseas but the entire American populace as well.  The concept of 
victory at home and abroad used by U.S. war propaganda exemplifies the ideas behind 
total warfare.  War propaganda used the concept of the “other” established by U.S. 
nativism toward the Japanese.  The same nativistic fears with a nationalist lean grew from 
its West Coast origins to engulf the entire nation. 
The right amount of societal pressure can cause nationalism to incorporate 
nativism and its desire for a homogenous society.  The concern over racial and/or cultural 
death resonates almost as strongly to some individuals as their fears of physical death.  
Cultural death can represent severing of a cultural community’s ties to its past.  Physical 
death may mean the end of the individual, but the end of an entire ethnic or cultural 
community means that knowledge will no longer be passed down by generation.  Most 
cultures take pride in the fact that their customs and accomplishments will live on after 
the death of the individual.  The fear that one’s race and culture could be lost forever 
supports the nativist vision of a homogenous nation.  The need for total war is felt 
necessary to ensure the continuation of one’s race and/or culture and the end of the 
                                                            
24 John W. Dower, “Race, Language, and War in Two Cultures,” 170. 
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“other” race and/or culture that threatens this longevity.  Anthony D. Smith states: 
“Nationalism offers a narrow, conflict-laden legitimation for political community, which 
inevitably pits culture-communities against each other.”25  In the case of the United 
States, the conglomerate of ethnicities and cultures strove for the protection of the 
nation’s democratic ideals and the history that forged its creation up to that point. 
 
The Question of What to Do with the “Enemy Alien” 
The idea of total war provided nativism with the means to place regional social 
concerns on a national pedestal, thereby making the entire country, not just Californians, 
fear the Japanese immigrants and the Japanese Americans.  Even though, those 
individuals living in the U.S. with Japanese ancestry were not Japanese soldiers on the 
battlefield, many feared that they still represented a possible threat to national stability.  
The wants, desires, and civil rights of the individual take second place to the survival of 
the nation.  Nationalism dictates that the survival of the people is dependant on popular 
support of the nation and its governing bodies, thereby justifying the belief that when 
trying to protect the public, the nation becomes an infallible entity.  Anatol Lieven 
describes this as “innate innocence.”26  He believes that this is a key component to 
American nationalism and argues that a myth exists in the American creed “that the 
United States is exceptional in its allegiance to democracy and freedom and is therefore 
exceptionally good.”27 
                                                            
25 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, 18. 
26 Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 49. 
27 Ibid., 49. 
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The question of what to do with enemy aliens during wartime had circulated 
around Washington more than a year before the United States officially entered World 
War II.  The government feared that immigrants with ancestry native to the country at 
war with the United States may conduct fifth column activities (subversive actions meant 
to undermine or cripple the American war effort), or harbor individuals meant to create 
problems around the country or leak vital information to the enemy.  The Japanese 
citizenship retained by the Issei and the dual citizenship held by the Nisei was a national 
concern.  In the summer of 1941, a memorandum from Acting Assistant Chief of Staff 
C.H. Mason to Chief of Staff George Marshall contains a document outlining the 
problem of dual citizenship and expresses the need for a resolution to this situation.  In 
this document, Mason stated that “anything that can be done to break the ties—consular 
and governmental as well as traditional and ancestral—between Americans of Japanese 
ancestry and Japan will assist the people involved and be in the interest of our national 
defense.”28 
Many Nisei felt that being an American citizen and following American cultural 
standards showed their loyalty to the United States.  This fear of being considered an 
“enemy alien” divided the Japanese American community.  The Nisei saw the older 
generation as old-fashioned examples of their Japanese past—something that many Nisei 
desperately wanted to move away from.  Any problems that existed between white 
America and the Japanese were placed on the doorstep of the older generation.  They 
respected and cherished their Japanese heritage, but they also felt that their parents 
                                                            
28 C.H. Mason to George Marshall (memorandum, June 17, 1941) in American Concentration Camps: A 
Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945, edited by 
Roger Daniels (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989).  
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represented a hindrance to their continued assimilation and eventual acceptance into 
American society.  Gary Okihiro recounts a statement by Takie Okumura, a Christian 
minister, and leader in the Japanese Americanization movement, in which he states that 
the Nisei should “ignore the parents and adult Japanese and lead the young people in 
removing all forces which retard their development as American citizens, and prove that 
they are good and loyal American citizens.”29  Even though a growing number of Nisei 
attempted to prove their adoption of American cultural norms by separating themselves 
from their parents, nativists still questioned their loyalty.  The Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor clouded all the Japanese attempts at Americanization.  Although the Japanese 
Americans took oaths of allegiance to the Unites States (see Photo C.11), the fear of 
disloyalty still permeated American society.  Even before the start of the Pacific War in 
early 1941, the FBI had already compiled a list of over two thousand Japanese Americans 
living on the western coast who were designated as possible threats.  The FBI then 
categorized them into levels of supposed danger.30 
Roosevelt believed, as did many others, that the Japanese were incapable of true 
Americanization.  He viewed them as a treacherous people and “referred to them as 
‘unassimilable aliens.”31  In 1935, Roosevelt stated: “that aggression ‘was in the blood’ 
of Japanese leaders.”32  In early 1941, Roosevelt, created a small intelligence gatherin
group with the goal to investigate the Japanese immigrant communities on the West 
Coast.
g 
                                                           
33  Heading this group was journalist John Franklin Carter, who, in November 
 
29 Gary Okihiro, Whispered Silences, 142. 
30 Ibid., 160 
31 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 121. 
32 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 120. 
33 Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front (New York 
& Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 85. 
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1941, forwarded a report written by his subordinate and fellow journalist, C.B. Munson, 
regarding the so-called “Japanese problem.”  Munson felt that it was impossible to 
explore Japanese American loyalty amongst such a large population spread over 
thousands of miles of coastline.  He likened the possibility of fully exploring these people 
to taking a shovel full of sand and forgetting the complexities of the individual within the 
group.34  He also mentioned that, to a person of Japanese ancestry, personal ties trumped 
those of a legal nature.35  Although Munson spoke in high esteem of the Japanese 
Americans, Carter still marked specific quotes for President Roosevelt’s consideration.36  
He ignored passages where Munson had stated: “The Japanese are the greatest joiner in 
the world” and “Many [Issei] would take out American citizenship if allowed to do so.”37  
He instead mentioned statements like: “There are still Japanese in the United States who 
will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves.”  Carter 
did not draw attention to the entire passage regarding suicide bombers, however; he left 
out Munson’s statement that only a few individuals (Munson refers to them as 
“crackpots.”) would actually conduct a terrorist activity.38  Munson makes it clear that 
this is not characteristic of Japanese immigrants or the Japanese Americans as a whole.  
Munson also comes to the conclusion that there is no Japanese problem on the coast and 
that he does not believe that there would be an armed uprising.39  Contained within 
                                                            
34 C.B. Munson, “Japanese on the West Coast” (November 1941), 1 in American Concentration Camps: A 
Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945, edited by 
Roger Daniels (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989).  
35 Ibid., 8. 
36 See John Franklin Carter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (memorandum, November 7, 1941) in American 
Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese 
Americans, 1942–1945, edited by Roger Daniels (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989). 
37 C.B. Munson, “Japanese on the West Coast,” 8. 
38 Ibid., 11. 
39 Ibid., 13. 
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Munson’s report were supplemental sections about other regions with high concentrations 
of Japanese immigrants.  Munson came to the same conclusion in all of these sections as 
well.  Roosevelt agreed with Carter’s worries and not Munson’s reassurances regarding 
insurgency by the Issei and Nisei and forwarded the materials to Secretary of War 
Stimson. 
Roosevelt had considered relocating the Japanese Americans population to 
confinement areas as far back as 1936.  In discussing the possibility of espionage by 
Japanese naval and merchant vessels docked in Hawaiian ports, FDR asked the Acting 
Navy Secretary: “What arrangements and plans have been made relative to concentration 
camps in the Hawaiian Islands for dangerous or undesirable aliens or citizens in the event 
of national emergency.”40  In 1940, secret memorandums and documents began 
circulating between government officials regarding the possible relocation, internment, 
and seizure of individuals with ancestry native to the nation at war with the United States 
as well as who would be in charge of enacting such policies.41 
A memorandum from Judge Advocate General Allen Gullion to Assistant Chief 
of Staff William Shedd outlines the problems created by the U.S. Bill of Rights in respect 
to government seizure of property, the forced relocation, and the prolonged internment of 
American citizens.42  He quotes the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixths Amendments to the 
American Constitution.  The Fourth Amendment disallows the government from taking 
the property of Japanese American citizens by stating that the people have the right “to be 
                                                            
40 Gary Y. Okihiro, Whispered Silences, 153. 
41 Roger Daniels, American Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and 
Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945 (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989). 
42 Allen W. Gullion to William Shedd (memorandum, August 12, 1940) in American Concentration 
Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945, 
edited by Roger Daniels (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989). 
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secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”43  The Fifth Amendment made it illegal for non-military Japanese American 
citizens to be “held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentation or indictment of a Grand Jury.”44  And the Sixth Amendment prohibited the 
government from confining the Japanese American citizens in relocation camps since 
they were guaranteed by law to “enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”45  
The relocation of non-U.S. citizens offered a simple solution: The Act Respecting Enemy 
Aliens, created in 1798, gave the President the wartime power to make proclamations 
concerning the removal of any non-naturalized immigrant and any American citizen that 
still retained citizenship with another country.  This 150-year-old document provided the 
President with the power to create laws giving the federal government and the military 
the right to apprehend, restrain, secure, remove, and to create any other regulation 
necessary for the protection of the country during a time of war.46  Many officials felt 
that in time of war that the Executive and Congressional branches would grant greater 
powers to the Army and Navy, allowing the military to take a prominent role in dealin
with civili
g 
ans. 
                                                           
 On December 7, 1941, the same day as the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt 
gave Proclamation 2525, which labeled the Japanese as enemy aliens and gave the 
 
43 United States Constitution, Amendment 4. 
44 United States Constitution, Amendment 5. 
45 United States Constitution, Amendment 6. 
46 An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 1 Stat. 577 (July 6, 1798). 
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Attorney General and the Secretary of War the power to regulate them.47  Since the Issei 
could not be naturalized and the Nisei held dual citizenship, the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of War had the right to restrain or remove them.  The proclamation also 
detailed illegal items that the Issei and Nisei could not posses such as firearms, 
ammunition, bombs, radios, transmitters, cameras, or signal devices.  It also forbids their 
use of aircraft and disallows their travel in or out of the United States.  On December 8, 
1941, President Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2526 and Proclamation 2527—both of 
which labeled anyone with German or Italian citizenship an “enemy alien.” 
On January 29, 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle, on recommendation by 
the War Department, issued a press release detailing the creation of restricted zones for 
anyone with Japanese, German, or Italian citizenship.48  A few days later, another press 
release was issued outlining 69 restricted zones in California.49  Two days later another 
release announced 15 more zones bringing the California total to 86.50  By mid February 
“the exclusion area included all of California, the western half of Washington and 
Oregon, and southern Arizona.”51  Even though German and Italian citizens were also 
restricted from these areas, they had the right to naturalization, which would have made 
them exempt from the restriction.  During World War II, more immigrants became 
                                                            
47 Franklin D. Roosevelt, proclamation, “Proclamation 2525,” (December 7, 1941) in American 
Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese 
Americans, 1942–1945, edited by Roger Daniels (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989). 
48 Department of Justice, press release (January 29, 1942) in American Concentration Camps: A 
Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945, edited by 
Roger Daniels (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989). 
49 Department of Justice, press release (January 31, 1942) in American Concentration Camps: A 
Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945, edited by 
Roger Daniels (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989). 
50 Department of Justice, press release (February 2, 1942) in American Concentration Camps: A 
Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945, edited by 
Roger Daniels (New York & London: Garland Press, 1989). 
51 War Relocations Authority, Community Government in War Relocation Centers (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1946), 2. 
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naturalized citizens than in any previous five-year period from 1907 to 1945.52  German 
and Italian population numbers were also not extremely high in these areas either.  The 
restricted zones did however, have high concentrations of Japanese immigrants and 
Japanese Americans.  These individuals and families were told to evacuate these areas.  
On February 19, 1942, the President issued Executive Order 9066.53  This order 
authorized the Secretary of War to create military zones (see Photo C.12 for a map of the 
military areas within the state of California).  In March, the Western Defense Command 
began stipulating that not just alien Japanese were to vacate the military areas, but that 
everyone with Japanese ancestry should leave these zones.54  The Secretary of War had 
the responsibility of finding accommodations for the aliens forcibly removed from their 
homes.55  The military was tasked with relocating these individuals.  In March of 1941, 
the President created the War Relocation Authority to aid in the evacuation process.56 
Many Japanese families had already begun to sell their property and businesses 
after the President’s earlier proclamations (see Photo C.13), but as Greg Robinson 
observes: 
The practical difficulties of such voluntary evacuation soon became 
apparent.  The evacuees were generally reluctant to liquidate their 
                                                            
52 Reed Ueda, “The Changing Path to Citizenship,” 202. 
53 Executive Order 9066, Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas (February 19, 
1942), in American Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of 
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54 Western Defense Command, Public Proclamation 1 (March 2, 1942), in American Concentration 
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Functions and Duties (March 11, 1942), in American Concentration Camps: A Documentary History of the 
Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945, edited by Roger Daniels (New York & 
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possessions and leave before they were forced to, and most did not have 
friends or family living in other parts of the country to sponsor them.  
Most Japanese Americans lacked the resources to afford moving and 
resettlement expenses, especially when Issei bank withdrawals were still 
limited to $100 per month by the Treasury Department, and the 
government did not step in and offer aid for resettlement.57 
 
Most Japanese Americans had no means to relocate of their own accord because of 
government restrictions and lack of protection against an agitated American populace.  
The Japanese who did try to relocate had to complete and submit a “Change of Residence 
Notice” one to five days before moving.58 
When the voluntary relocation didn’t move as quickly as planned, it was stopped.  
By the end of March, the military broke up the prohibited areas into sections and began 
removing civilians from these areas to 10 internment camps created by the War 
Relocation Authority.  Usually signs or newspaper articles notified citizens that they 
needed to show up to pre-selected processing centers on certain dates (see Photo C.14).  
Those awaiting relocation were subject to stringent curfews, racism, and exclusionary 
business tactics (see Photo C.15).  The government created the War Relocation Authority 
to help aid the process (see Photos C.16, C.17, and C.18) but when the removal of the 
Japanese Americans did not proceed as quickly as Roosevelt had anticipated, he became 
angry at the lack of progress.  Henry Morganthau went to the President with a plan to 
utilize the Federal Reserve in the liquidation of Japanese American property.  Roosevelt 
stated that he wasn’t interested in what happened to their property only that they were 
                                                            
57 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 128. 
58 See Western Defense Command, Public Proclamation 1 (March 2, 1942), in American Concentration 
Camps: A Documentary History of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese Americans, 1942–1945, 
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moved and what happened after they were moved.  He also couldn’t understand why the 
process was taking so long.59 
By November of 1942, the military completed the process of moving over 
110,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry, of which 77,000 were American citizens, to 10 
internment camps located in the Western half of the United States (see Photo C.19).  
Most Issei and Nisei remained at the camps until the end of the war in the Pacific.  While 
some interned individuals were able to get daily passes to leave the compounds for work 
purposes, they always had to report back to the camps that evening. 
 
Loyalty and the Draft Resistance 
Nativism is a discourse supported by many individuals with many different 
motivations.  To protect the nation from the perceived threat within American borders, 
U.S. nationalism eventually incorporated nativistic fears of the Japanese immigrants and 
the Japanese Americans.  By democratically justifying racially exclusionary policy, 
nativism can produce degradation within the social fabric of a democratic society or 
within an ethnic community.  This has already been shown to a small degree with varying 
opinions toward assimilation by the Issei and Nisei. 
Within a country consumed by a nationalist spirit and supported by nativist 
concerns, loyalty becomes of extreme importance.  Kiyoshi Okamoto, the head of the 
Japanese American resistance to the wartime draft of internees, wrote in a statement of 
purpose for the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee: 
Loyalty towards a country or a nation is a matter of sentiment.  It is 
nurtured from a knowledge of justice received.  It is a covenant of faith 
                                                            
59 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 142. 
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between the party of the people on the one hand and, the party of the 
government on the other.  Under this understanding, the people are 
obligated to maintain the inviolability of our instruments of government 
and the various institutions.  For this service, the government assumes the 
responsibility of justice, freedom, security and liberty to its inhabitants.60 
 
In his purpose statement Okamoto discussed the role that loyalty should play between the 
people and their governing body.  Nationalists argue that loyalty can be demonstrated 
through unwavering national support.  This divergent belief in what it means to be loyal 
to one’s country or nation split the Japanese American community and can best be 
described with the contrasting opinion toward the military draft of male Nisei. 
Although many Japanese Americans were already serving in some form of the 
U.S. military in Hawaii, after the events of December 7, 1941, all soldiers of Japanese 
descent were segregated into one unit called the Provisional Battalion.  In June of 1942, 
1,432 men sailed for the European mainland, while around six thousand Nisei served as 
translators for Military Intelligence in the Pacific War.  The military integrated these 
soldiers amongst the rest of the troops and assigned them bodyguards who kept watch 
over them.  This was done to both ensure that they did not join with the Japanese military 
and to protect them from average soldiers, who in the heat of battle, it was felt, might not 
be able to tell the difference between a Japanese American soldier and an enemy 
soldier.61 
In 1944, the country declared that the Japanese Americans would be eligible for 
the draft.  A group of internees protested the decision made by Secretary of State Stimson 
regarding this decision.  They did not agree with the policy that they had the 
                                                            
60 Kiyoshi Okamoto, We Should Know (February 25, 1944), 1, available at National Archives and Records 
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61 Home of Heroes, War in the Pacific: MIS and the Nisei, 
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responsibility to fight and die for a country where they were denied the same inalienable 
rights of every other citizen.  Jack Tono, a member of the Heart Mountain draft resistance 
was ready to join the army before the evacuation process, but mentions that his opinion 
quickly changed once he was forcibly removed from his home and moved to an 
internment camp.  He did not agree with the idea that he had to fight to preserve 
democracy for the same government that had confined him at Heart Mountain.  “Tono 
mused: ‘You start thinking, where the hell is the democracy we learned in school?  Hey, 
wait a minute now.  When I have to give my life up for democracy, I want to see the 
goddamn thing first…We weren’t completely against defending the country,’ he 
explained, ‘but we wanted what we had before first, and then we’d go and fight.”62 
The draft resistance by the Japanese Americans illustrates how nativist 
segregation can severely divide a minority ethnic community, many times creating an 
“other” group within the larger minority community.  This split occurs as one segment of 
a minority group responds to nativist fears and attempts to create a bond with the 
dominant ethnic majority by segregating and forming a sub-“other” group.  The minority 
community hopes that this show of loyalty and solidarity with the dominant ethnic group 
will help them to gain cultural acceptance. 
Draft resistance by the Japanese Americans existed within all ten of the relocation 
centers.  Although over three hundred individuals resisted the draft, the largest resistance 
formed at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center, where the sixty-three resisters maintain 
the distinction of being a part of the largest mass trial in Wyoming history (see Photos 
C.20 and C.21).  Of the sixty-three young men, fifty-six were sentenced on June 26, 1944 
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to three years in a federal penitentiary for violating the Selective Service Act.  The 
remaining seven were sentenced a month later to four years in Fort Leavenworth Federal 
Penitentiary for also violating the Selective Service Act and for conspiring to council 
other draft-age Nisei to resist the military draft.  These resisters argued that their refusal 
to participate in the draft did not signify disloyalty or a fear of war, but instead a 
concentrated effort to support the Constitution and the rights that it guaranteed to all 
American citizens.  Those of Japanese ancestry who supported the drafting of the Nisei 
believed that any resistance to the American governmental policy hurt their chances of 
regaining their pre-war lives.  They argued that by resisting the draft, these sixty three 
individuals exacerbated existing fears of Japanese American disloyalty and that it was in 
the Japanese American community’s best interest if the Nisei showed their loyalty and 
entered the war.63 
One of the seven Heart Mountain draft resistance leaders sent to Leavenworth was 
Frank Emi (see Photo C.22), who remembers his attempt with fellow internees, Minoru 
Tamesa and Isamu Horino, to test the boundaries of their confinement:  
We went by the sentry, and we started to walk through, and he stopped us 
and said, “You can’t go out.”  And we answered that we had a perfect 
right to go in and out, we’re American citizens, we didn’t do anything 
wrong.  And he still refused to let us go, so we said, “Well, what’s going 
to happen if we insist on going out and keep walking?”  He says, “I’ll have 
to shoot you.” So there was no point in getting shot, so we let him take us 
into the guardhouse.64 
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All three men were angry at the loss of their civil freedoms and organized against many 
of the smaller injustices around the camp.  In a 1998 interview, Emi mentions trying to 
stop police harassment of the internees as well as improving the food situation in the 
camp.65  It was not until 1943, when these men met fifty-year old Kiyoshi Okamoto, that 
an organized movement started.  Okamoto, a soil test engineer originally from Hawaii 
was a member of the American Civil Liberties Union (see Photo C.23).  At the time, 
Okamoto was calling himself the Fair Play Committee of One.  In a 1998 interview, Emi 
remembered that Okamoto was a good speaker who knew how to express his feelings: 
[Okamoto] spoke about the, all the unconstitutional acts that were 
perpetrated on us.  So some of us felt that, here’s a fellow that has the 
same feelings that we did and knew what he was talking about.  So that’s 
when we got together with him and found out that he was very familiar, he 
was very knowledgeable about the law and about the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights, which most of us weren’t. And after a couple, two or three 
meetings with him we formed the Fair Play Committee as an organization 
in 1943.66 
 
Emi, whose family owned a grocery store before the war, found himself at the 
center of a movement that to this day still divides much of the Japanese American 
community.  He mentions that his family got completely cleaned out in the relocation 
process.  The short amount of time they had to sell all of their property before being 
forcibly removed from their home caused Emi’s family to lose close to $25,000 worth of 
investments in the family owned store.  On September 10, 1942, the entire Emi family, 
including Frank’s wife and nine-month-old daughter, were sent to Heart Mountain. 
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Emi’s initial involvement in camp resistance came in February 1943 when the 
government issued loyalty oaths and questionnaires to all interned Japanese men and 
women over the age of seventeen.  A month earlier on January 28, 1943, secretary of War 
Stimson announced that the War Department would create an all Nisei combat team 
comprised of volunteer Japanese-Americans seventeen years and older housed in the 
relocation centers.  To conduct this informal call for volunteers, a loyalty questionnaire 
was issued to all internees.67  However, the War Relocation Authority’s attempts to 
secretly conduct this eligibility test for the military draft did not go unnoticed by the 
interned male Nisei.  For the most part, the questionnaire was harmless except for two 
questions: numbers 27 and 28 of the thirty point questionnaire.  Number 27 asked male 
Nisei if they were willing to serve in the United States armed forces.  Question 28 asked: 
“Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully 
defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and 
forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other 
foreign government, power, or organization?”68  Emi challenged the fairness of this 
question.  He had no problem with the first part of the question, but he found himself 
unable to comply with the second part where he was asked to denounce his allegiance to 
the Japanese Emperor and any foreign government.  He felt that the question was 
demeaning to him and his fellow citizens and refused to answer.  If he answered ‘yes’ 
then it seemed as though at one point he had not been loyal, if he had said “no,” then he 
would currently be disloyal to the United States, so he chose to put that he was unable to 
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answer the question at that time.  A little while later the camp had a hearing about Emi’s 
answer.  In a 1994 interview, he recalled: 
They asked me if I wanted to keep question 28 under the same thing.  In 
that case they were figuring on sending me to Tule Lake.  So at that 
second hearing, I think I told them that question 28—I will answer ‘yes’ 
without qualifications except that I want them to understand that I had 
never pledged allegiance to the Emperor of Japan.  […]  And they asked 
me about question 27, and I said ‘no,’ that I won’t change that because I 
can’t answer that under these conditions.  I said, ‘Before I go into combat 
duty, I would like to know what my citizenship status is.’69 
 
In 1943, Secretary of War Stimson announced that all relocation centers, with the 
exception of the Tule Lake Center in Northern California, which housed individuals 
believed by the WRA to be disruptive, would allow male citizens to leave the camps to 
join the military.  According to the War Relocation Authority, those individuals, 1,208 in 
all, who answered “yes” to number 27 and deemed fit for military service, were to be 
counted as military volunteers and enlisted into the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (an 
entirely Japanese American combat team). 
The loyalty questionnaire compelled the first wartime increase in Japanese 
Americans into the military.  The second increase came in 1944 when the country 
declared that the Nisei would be eligible for the draft.  The newly united Fair Play 
Committee (FPC) headed by Kiyoshi Okamoto protested the decision made by Secretary 
of State Stimson.  Although draft resisters could be found at all ten of the relocation 
centers, Heart Mountain boasted the only organized resistance.  The group did not agree 
with the policy that they had the responsibility to fight and die for a country that had 
denied them the same inalienable rights of every other American citizen.  Frank Emi and 
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the other leaders of the FPC found themselves at the epicenter of this resistance 
movement, arguing that they would oppose Japanese American involvement in the war 
effort until the U.S. government restored their constitutional freedoms. 
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese Americans of draft-age were listed 4-
C, or not acceptable for service because of ancestry.  When this was changed in 1943 to 
increase the number of American soldiers, the FPC members felt that this was a terrible 
travesty.  They were denied the right to move freely wherever they chose, they’d been 
stripped of the majority of their belongings, and now the government wanted them to go 
to war for constitutional freedoms they’d been denied for the past two years. 
The Heart Mountain Center split as two opposing groups formed.  On one side 
stood the Fair Play Committee, who opposed the draft, while on the other side stood the 
Japanese American Citizens League and the Japanese American newspaper, The Heart 
Mountain Sentinel.  The JACL believed that the best way to show loyalty to the United 
States was to accept relocation, work within the system to regain their lost liberties, and 
to go to war if called upon to do so.  The FPC believed that the best means to regain 
constitutional freedoms for Japanese Americans and Japanese immigrants was to resist 
unconstitutional laws.  A month after Okamoto wrote the Fair Play Committee’s purpose 
statement, his support for constitutional liberties got him labeled a troublemaker and sent 
to Tule Lake.  Guy Robertson, Project Director of the Heart Mountain Center had been 
trying to get rid of Okamoto for some time, but was unable to do so since Okamoto was 
much too old to be sentenced for draft resistance.  By sending him to Tule Lake, 
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Robertson separated the outspoken man from his younger compatriots, who were of draft 
age.70 
Fred Hirasuna, a supporter of the JACL and their methods, offers a different 
opinion than Okamoto: 
In wartime, you have constitutional rights, but sometimes you have to 
forget constitutional rights.  There’s a time and a place for those things, 
and that wasn’t the time, and that wasn’t the place because if JACL and 
the Japanese American group as a whole had told everybody in camp, 
‘We’re supporting the Heart Mountain resisters, we want all of you not to, 
to go into the army, not to accept the draft, not volunteer,” and they didn’t 
go, what would have happened?  The American public, if they saw the 
Japanese Americans who were not cooperating […] they would have 
deported us.71 
 
Hirasuna was born in Lodi, California where he remained until just after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor.  There he worked in his family’s business shipping fruits and vegetables.  
After a few years in the shipping business though, Hirasuna grew tired of this life and 
began working for his brother’s chicken hatchery as a sexer.  When the President offered 
Proclamations 2525 and 2526, Hirasuna left his brother’s business and moved his family 
to Minnesota, where he stayed for the duration of the war.  Because Hirasuna had vacated 
the restricted zone where he had originally lived before the onset of Executive Order 
9066, he avoided being sent to an internment camp.  Unlike Emi, he did not own his own 
business, therefore making it much easier for him to escape the relocation process.  
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Between 1940 and 1970, the concentration of individuals with Japanese ancestry living in 
the western states dropped from over 95% to 81%.72 
Supporters of the JACL viewed the draft resisters as cowards who opposed the 
draft not on constitutional grounds, but for fear of going to war.73  They also accused the 
FPC of meeting secretly in the dark and conspiring to cause civil unrest within the 
camp.74  By slandering the opposing group, the JACL and the Sentinel played to existing 
nativist and nationalist fears of secret groups who plotted social unrest.  By forming the 
FPC into a sub-“other” group within the Japanese immigrant community, the JACL 
attempted to combat these nativist concerns. 
By late March 1944, forty-four draft resisters had been arrested and were being 
held in various jails around the state of Wyoming.  In May 10, 1944, seven of the draft 
resistance leaders were indicted for “unlawfully, willfully and knowingly combined, 
conspired, confederated, and agreed together and with each other […] to evade the 
requirements of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.”75  In the end, sixty-
three individuals were sent to prison for resisting the draft at Heart Mountain.  On 
Christmas Eve 1947, President Truman, as a public relations move, granted a presidential 
pardon to all draft resisters, including the sixty-three Heart Mountain resisters who, by 
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March 19, 1944) available at National Archives and Records Administration, www.archives.gov, accessed 
on July 17, 2007.  Emi denounces all the charges labeled against the FPC in an earlier editorial.  He 
attempts to tell the public that the members of the FPC are law abiding citizens who support the U.S., but 
who feel that mistakes have been made as to the freedoms of anyone of Japanese heritage. 
75 United States vs. Okamoto et al (May 10, 1944) available at National Archives & Records 
Administration, www.archives.gov, accessed on July 17, 2007. 
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that time, had already served their sentence.  A year earlier, five of the seven leaders, who 
had been sentenced to Leavenworth, left prison having already served the majority of 
their term in prison by that point. 
                                                           
Kiyoshi Okamoto declared in an proclamation that he sent to President Roosevelt, 
Secretary of State Stimson, the War Relocation Authority, and others: “The very same 
unconstitutional infringements and un-American practices will be visited upon the other 
minorities of this nation at some future date unless the present dictatorial and tyrannical 
assumption of willful disposition of human destinies is made to stop and rectification 
made of those breaches in the Constitution now in existence.”76 
 
The Loss 
Images of the Japanese relocation camps showcased hardworking people sowing 
the field (see Photo C.24) and enjoying the company of other native Japanese.  The media 
painted them as happy to contribute to the safety of the nation.  Marita Sturken discusses 
the absent images of the Japanese American internment in her article about remembering 
the relocation camps: 
The internment continues to be narrativized as a regrettable step that 
appeared necessary in its time—not as bad as what other countries did.  
Even though the term “concentration camps” was used by government 
officials and Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, the image of prison camps 
where people were peaceably assembled screens out the image of prison 
camps where people became ill and died and where resisters were shot.77 
 
 
76 Kiyoshi Okamoto, Proclamation and Notice of Dissatisfaction and Demand (December 31, 1943), 2, 
available at National Archives and Records Administration, www.archives.gov, accessed on July 17, 2007. 
77 Marita Sturken, “Absent Images of Memory: Remembering and Reenacting the Japanese Internment,” in 
Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), edited by T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White & Lisa Yoneyama, 
33–49 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 36. 
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Looking past the propaganda, one finds an ethnic community confined in camps because 
of their cultural and racial heritage.  They couldn’t leave the compound without special 
order, their lives were structured and routine to maintain security, and they were allowed 
little to no property, most of which had been forcibly sold during the relocation process.  
The War Relocation Authority banned cameras from the camps, so that they could 
control the images viewed by the general public and which might have been counter-
productive to continued confinement of the Japanese living in America.  Author David 
Palumbo-Liu describes the internment camps as the nation’s way of turning history “back 
in order to erase the presence of Japanese Americans and restore a pristine image of the 
nation.”78  He explains that the logic of exclusion, in this case the internment of the 
Japanese, is to preserve a pristine national space.  He calls it “absolute racial 
separateness,” and it acts as a reminder of the state’s revisionist power over the people.  
The Japanese people were culturally and ancestrally linked to the Empire of Japan, which 
had caused great devastation upon the United States, by erasing them from public view, 
the government could redefine American territory in the name of national defense. 
The separation of the “other” helped silence public fears regarding security within 
the country.  The nativist fears of economic competition held by white farmers quieted 
when the trains shuttled the Japanese away to the various relocation centers.  In March of 
1942, over six thousand Japanese farms had their ownership transferred to non-Japanese 
operators.79  Researchers have estimated that the entire Japanese American community, 
                                                            
78 David Palumbo-Liu, Asian/American, 222. 
79 Ibid., 224. 
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not just farmers, lost around $67 million to $116 million by 1945 standards—that statistic 
is inflated to around $500 million by 2001 standards.80 
Nativist fears of the Japanese immigrants and the Japanese Americans did not 
subside with the end of the war.  As earlier shown, the Remember Pearl Harbor League 
called for the deportation of anyone with Japanese ancestry at the war’s end.  1944 issues 
of the Seattle Star and the Seattle Times ran pieces about the release of the Japanese from 
the internment camps.  Each of these articles had sections, where public comments were 
published.  Although a few voices had no problem with their release and reintegration 
into the country, most were fairly negative and echoed the sentiments made by the 
Remember Pearl Harbor League.  Betty Lou Hufty told the Seattle Star that she felt the 
Japanese should never be allowed to return, though she neglected to go into any details as 
to why she felt the way she did.  She simply explained that she did not have time to give 
all of her reasons.81  In the Seattle Times, a Marjorie Hines and a Bertha Saltie both 
expressed their distrust of the Japanese and did not want to see them walking around their 
neighborhoods.82  Although the war in the Pacific was coming to a close, nativist and 
nationalist fears of anyone with Japanese ancestry and anger toward the attack on Pearl 
Harbor still remained strong in the public consciousness.  The War Relocation Authority 
reported that many internees feared reintegration into society because of attacks 
stemming from aggression over their racial heritage.83 
In 1988, President Ronald Reagan allotted $20 thousand to each interned citizen.  
Immediately following the end of the war, the War Relocation Authority reported that the 
                                                            
80 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President, 144. 
81  “What Do You Say?” Seattle Star (December 18, 1944). 
82 “Seattleites Tell Views on Japs,” Seattle Times (December 18, 1944). 
83 War Relocation Authority, Community Government in War Relocation Centers, 94. 
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confined Japanese feared the financial constraints caused by the destruction of their 
financial foundations.  Many of the internees no longer had homes to return to once 
released from the camps.84 
Eventually these families did leave the relocation centers and began new lives 
elsewhere in the United States.  All that remains now of their temporary imprisonment 
are a few broken down buildings, concrete foundations, cracked bricks, rusted tools, 
forgotten toys, and other household items left in their absence.  Some of the centers have 
small memorials in place like what I found at Heart Mountain, but no large scale 
preservation has been undertaken to memorialize this part of our country’s past.  Most 
centers remain ghost towns eerily reminiscent of the nativism toward the Japanese 
immigrants and their children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 War Relocation Authority, Community Government in War Relocation Centers, 94-6. 
   
Conclusion 
Similarly disturbing to overseas soldiers—especially those who are liberal 
and tolerant—are the growing race hatreds at home.  […]  I read in 
American magazines and newspapers letters condemning all Japanese, 
regardless of birth, in the most bitter, intolerant and un-American manner.  
Japanese Americans were the target of the most vile attacks and 
discrimination.  […]  You can well imagine what we thought of this 
bigoted group in the United States which was seeking to make life 
unbearable for the parents and families of these men [the all-Japanese 
American 100th Battalion].1 
  
 Joe Fromm, 1944 
  
Opinions of American Servicemen 
Nativism directed at a specific “other” group has the ability to aid in the creation 
of discriminatory legislation and cause the suspension of civil liberties for an entire 
ethnic community.  The experiences of the Japanese immigrants and the Japanese 
Americans from the end of the nineteenth century through the beginning of the twentieth 
century illustrates how nativism given governmental support prevented equality for 
anyone with Japanese ancestry.  
Not all Americans supported the internment of the Japanese immigrants and the 
Japanese Americans, however.  Many Americans, especially those on the East Coast, 
were not as aware of what was happening in California, Oregon, Washington, and 
Arizona.  As earlier discussed, the American public was also shown pictures that 
weakened the impact of the internment camps on public opinion.  One also has to 
consider that initially the government drew American attention away from the Pacific and 
directed it toward the war in Europe.  Roosevelt decided that, although public support for 
                                                            
1 Joe Fromm to Chicago Sun (letter, September 10, 1944) in What We’re Fighting For, edited by the War 
Relocation Authority, 5–6 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1945), 5. 
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the war was originally directed toward Japan, the best strategy was to concentrate on 
Europe first.  He felt that Nazi Germany posed a greater and more imminent threat than 
Japan, whose strategy was to invade as much territory and as quickly as possible, hoping 
that the U.S. would come at them with all their power before succumbing to military and 
public fatigue.  By concentrating on Germany first, the U.S. led small strikes against the 
Japanese, all the while building experience and increasing military strength. 
Although the image of the young woman with the skull of the Japanese soldier 
and the comments by Ernie Pyle illustrate the lack of ethnic respect many Americans held 
for anyone of Japanese ancestry, some American soldiers did not agree with the 
internment of the Japanese Americans.  A March 1945 pamphlet collected statements 
made by American soldiers.  This pamphlet shows that not everyone harbored nativist 
ideals.  In 1943, 22-year old veteran of Guadalcanal, Marine Pfc. Robert E. Borchers, of 
Chicago, while recovering from malaria wrote to the American Legion in California: 
I am one of the fortunate Marines who have recently returned to this 
country after serving in the offensive against the Japanese on Guadalcanal 
[…] We find […] a condition behind our backs that stuns us.  We find that 
our American citizens, those of Japanese ancestry, are being persecuted, 
yes, persecuted as though Adolph Hitler himself were in charge. […] We 
shall fight this injustice, intolerance and un-Americanism at home!  We 
will not break faith with those who died. […]  We have fought the 
Japanese and are recuperating to fight again.  We can endure the hell of 
battle, but we are resolved not to be sold out at home.2 
 
Sections of the letter were used for an article in the December 20, 1943 issue of 
Time Magazine.  In a response to Pfc. Borchers’ comments, Sergeant Wadsworth 
Likely wrote:  
                                                            
2 Robert E. Borchers to the California Chapter of the American Legion (letter, December 20 1943) in What 
We’re Fighting For, edited by the War Relocation Authority, 1 (Washington DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1945), 1.  See “Inquisition in Los Angeles,” in Time Magazine (December 20, 1943) for the reasons 
behind Pfc. Borcher’s letter. 
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I think I have the right to expect that the fundamental human rights which 
are held up as a banner for us now are still in existence when I get back.  
The emotional, hateful racial prejudice shown by certain Californians 
against anyone with yellow skin who can be called ‘Jap’ certainly helps 
tear down the Constitution of our country not only for loyal Americans of 
Japanese descent, but for all loyal Americans.  If California succeeds in 
passing a law excluding all persons of Japanese descent, there is nothing 
which would stop any state from passing a law excluding all New Yorkers 
who wear glasses (like me) or all Baptists with Swedish names.  They say 
many of us don’t know what we’re fighting for now; you keep up the good 
work and we’ll know right well what we have to fight for, and against 
when we get back.3 
 
I feel that these letters best reveal that although I’ve written about American 
nativism for this project, readers must keep in mind that not everyone in the 
country agreed with the measures taken by the U.S. government.  Of all people, 
one would expect soldiers—instruments of war—to harbor aggression toward 
individuals of a similar native heritage to their wartime enemy.  This was the case 
with some, but it was not indicative of all servicemen nor all American citizens. 
 
Final Thoughts 
Despite fifty years of discrimination, social segregation, and finally internment, 
the Japanese immigrants and the Japanese Americans persevered through these injustices.  
One might think that the withholding of naturalization might have discouraged 
immigration, but it did not.  Immigration from Japan increased steadily through 1924, and 
did not completely cease even at that point.  One might conclude that the Gentleman’s 
Agreement would have stopped the hiring of and migration of Japanese workers and their 
families, but in truth, it only encouraged the increase in family immigration.  Many 
                                                            
3 Wadsworth Likely to Time Magazine (letter, January 10, 1944) in What We’re Fighting For, edited by 
War Relocation Authority, 1–2 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1945), 1–2. 
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migrant workers were still smuggled into the country via Canada and Mexico.4  One 
might conclude that the land laws caused a sharp decrease in Japanese land ownership, 
but instead the Japanese found ways around the land laws, and as the end of the third 
chapter shows, the number of acres owned by peoples of Japanese descent actually 
increased.  One might conclude that the internment of the Japanese immigrants and the 
Japanese Americans might have shown an increase in the number of deaths due to stress, 
forced labor, and other harsh conditions associated with imprisonment.  This did not 
happen though.  112,985 individuals of Japanese descent lived in the states of Arizona, 
California, Oregon, and Washington in 1940.5  The number of deaths compiled by the 
U.S. Bureau of Census showed that 737 or .6% died that year.  By 1944, there were a 
little over 110,000 individuals living in the relocation centers.  The War Relocation 
Authority lists that 607 or .5% died that year—a one tenth of a percentage point 
decrease.6 
Ultimately nativism failed to keep many Japanese immigrants and their children 
from being successful.7  But the segregation, discrimination, hatred, and fear caused by 
American nativism during the first part of the twentieth century still took its mental toll 
and still stands as a testament to the evils of nativism.  The laws, although democratically 
enacted, were racially discriminatory in nature.  The Japanese immigrants should not 
have had to endure laws that limited their constitutionally protected civil rights. 
                                                            
4 Industrial Commission on Immigration, Reports of the Industrial Commission on Immigration, 755. 
5 U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1940.htm, February 9, 2009. 
6 War Relocation Authority, The Evacuated People: A Quantitative Description, 145. 
7 See Robert M. Jiobu, “Ethnic Hegemony and the Japanese of California,” in American Sociological 
Review 53, no. 3, 353–67 (June 1988) and David J. Obrien & Stephen S. Fugita, “Middleman Minority 
Concept: Its Explanatory Value in the Case of the Japanese in California Agriculture,” in The Pacific 
Sociological Review 25, no. 2, 185–204 (April 1982) for discussions of how the Japanese were able to 
overcome discriminations and carve their own niche in American society by providing goods in neglected 
areas. 
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Whenever minority groups immigrate to another country, nativism may 
eventually rear its head.  Whether or not this nativism will be based on racial or cultural 
prejudices, economic or national concerns, or some other reason, will depend entirely 
upon the individual, the region, and the events (historical and current).  Jacques Barzun 
wrote: “Old habits and tolerances will break down, friction and resentment will arise.  
Soon each group will tend to ascribe unpleasant characteristics to all the members of the 
other group.  It will be a more or less open conflict of ‘We’ and ‘They.’”8  The idea of 
race differences grows more prevalent within a nativist society both from within one 
nation as well as between separate nations: “The idea of race makes easy the transition 
from cultural to political ill-feeling, and when we want to condemn some course of 
national action in our neighbors, race provides the universal joint that holds together the 
aliens’ ignoble traditions, their present shameful course, and the innate perversity.”9 
Nativism toward a particular immigrant group will vary its focus depending on 
upon the region.  With the right amount of pressure, nativism can engulf an entire country 
as it did the United States during the Second World War.  Once a regional nativism 
begins to focus on national pride, productivity, and protection, it is incorporated into the 
sphere of nationalism and unites ethnic communities against one of the “other,” smaller 
ethnic minority groups. 
Whenever, nativism invades a regional or national consciousness, discriminatory 
laws will eventually permeate the political landscape.  These laws act as a social response 
to nativist fears for racial purity, cultural continuity, economic success, and national 
survival—whether it be from miscegenation of the existing populace through inter-racial 
                                                            
8 Jacques Barzun, Race a Study in Superstition, ix. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
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breeding, hybridization of ethnicity (thereby losing cultural traditions), competition over 
labor and cultural supremacy, or from illegal activities meant to harm the nation. 
U.S. nativism defined the Japanese immigrants as the “other,” and for over fifty 
years, the Japanese experienced nativism because of unsubstantiated fears by the 
American public and the U.S. government.  Roger Daniels writes: 
Most of the charges against the Japanese—their nonassimilation, their low 
standard of living, their high birth rate, their vile habits—were made also 
against European immigrants.  But only against Orientals was it seriously 
charged that the peaceful immigrants were but a vanguard of an invading 
horde to come.  Throughout the years under discussion, and beyond, there 
was a consistent fear, expressed and believed in many quarters, that some 
named or unnamed Oriental power—usually, but not always, Japan—was 
on the verge of invading all or part of the continental United States.10 
 
I hope that my thesis has shown how nativism prays upon basic human 
differences, increases social tensions, and destabilizes social freedoms within a 
democratic society.  As already shown, the majority of discriminatory laws and public 
discomfort with Japanese immigration was focused in California.  Other states such as 
Oregon and Washington also created discriminatory laws aimed at the Japanese 
immigrants and the Japanese Americans, but I found California the best example to show 
how nativism can cause a decline in the protection of civil liberties. 
It is sadly ironic that to protect democracy and the freedoms included therein, 
many individuals were willing to suspend certain constitutionally protected freedoms, be 
it their own or that of others, and thereby completed a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
 
 
10 Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle 
for Japanese Exclusion, 68. 
   
Epilogue 
We will never forget as long as the haunting memories of lonely desert 
gravesites pursue us still.  We will never forget as long as the wind blows 
cold and hot and the dark gives way to light.  We will never forget as long 
as the grass grows green and the splashing raindrops on the stone find 
their way to the sea.  For with commemoration, we define ourselves as 
human, and with the inscriptions of the pas, we reconfigure our destiny.  
And we will never forget, because this story is about us all.1 
  
Gary Y. Okihiro, 1996 
 
Revisiting the Past 
Summer 2009—as we carefully searched the map and the side of the road for the 
unmarked turn-off, I felt a rush of fear that we might not be able to locate the site.  I’d 
had a difficult time searching for the location and directions to the Heart Mountain 
Relocation Center back in 2007, but in the end we’d found the center quite easily.  Roads 
were properly marked and signs directed the curious to the makeshift memorial.  
Stephanie and I had a much more difficult time, however locating the Moab Isolation 
Center.  Finding directions and its location on a map had been much easier than finding 
Heart Mountain, but when actually driving on Highway 191 near Arches National Park, 
we could not find any mention of the Isolation Center.  We knew that the site was marked 
by two stone pillars.  Finally, after carefully driving both ways down the road, I saw two 
stone stumps—not pillars—and we turned off the road (see Photo 4.1). 
I had first heard about the Moab Isolation Center in passing while reading one of 
the many books used for this thesis.  Stephanie and I had planned to visit some of the 
National Parks in Utah and Colorado during the summer.  I decided that since we were 
going to be in the area, it might be beneficial to my research to visit another location 
                                                            
1 Gary Y. Okihiro, Whispered Silences, 244. 
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referent to my writing.  I chose Moab, because of its proximity to our other ventures, but 
also because it was different than Heart Mountain.  Heart Mountain was a relocation 
center—a place where the U.S. government sent regular Japanese American citizens and 
Japanese immigrants.  These individuals were allowed certain freedoms, such as the 
ability to leave the center.  They were allowed some belongings and were near their 
families.  The isolation centers existed as prison centers for individuals that the W.R.A. 
deemed “persistent troublemakers.”2  In 1943, the War Relocation Authority created 
three sites for these individuals.  The Cow Creek center was a short lived site in southern 
California that acted more as overflow for the Manzanar Relocation Center than as an 
isolation center. The other two sites were located in Leupp, Arizona and Moab, Utah.  
The W.R.A. created these sites after a particularly violent riot at the Manzanar camp in 
December of 1943 when Fred Tayama, a leading JACL official was attacked and beaten 
by an unknown group of assailants.3  Sixteen Japanese activists, who harbored anti-JACL 
beliefs for their cooperation with the W.R.A., were blamed for the attack and summarily 
arrested.  Demonstrators demanding their release were tear-gassed by the military and 
caused a riot.  The War Relocation Authority then decided to separate any male U.S. 
citizens designated as troublemakers.  The W.R.A. shipped these individuals to either 
Leupp or Moab, both of which operated as miniature high-security prisons.4  The sixteen 
men arrested in Manzanar became the first individuals sent to the Moab Center. 
                                                            
2 Tetsuden Kashima, Judgement without Trial: Japanese American Imprisonment during World War II 
(Seattle & Washington: University of Washington Press, 2003), 139.  Kashima’s writing attempts to 
analyze the entire breadth of the Relocation process and its locations during the war. 
3 Wendy Ng, Japanese American Internment during World War II: A History and Reference Guide 
(Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 2002), 47. 
4 Tetsuden Kashima, Judgment without Trial, 145. 
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At first I didn’t know if I had actually found the correct place.  There was no 
memorial, no buildings like I had found at Heart Mountain, and no parking.  I could only 
see farmland and barbed wire fencing surrounding a small area.  We returned to our car 
and drove a short distance further on the dirt road before we finally saw a small plaque 
with a brief commemoration to the center.  I had printed a map of the area that I had 
found online (see Photo 4.2), and after finding the remains of building foundations, I 
attempted to plot out the various buildings.  The only buildings near our location were 
three barracks (see Photos 4.3 and 4.4).  We searched around for the mess hall, the well, 
and the supply building but found that they were located on private property which was 
protected by a barbed fence.  A mound of dirt also blocked our view of this part of the 
center.  I was able to get a photo of what I believe is the old well, but I didn’t feel 
comfortable getting any closer (see Photo 4.5). 
I had started this project almost five years ago with a paper written for only my 
second graduate level history course.  From there, the ideas within that original paper had 
permeated other writing assignments, and before I knew it, I had switched my thesis 
focus to the Japanese immigrants.  By the time I had made this trip, I had already 
submitted the first draft of my thesis and had made considerable inroads into my second 
draft.  When I visited Heart Mountain I had not even decided that this would be my topic.  
As I stood looking out at the barren desert and what remained of this ethnic prison, I 
could not help feel sad for anyone of Japanese descent who had been negatively 
influenced by nativism.  I also could not help feeling just a little relieved that the majority 
of my thesis work had finally been completed. 
 
   
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Photos for Preface 
 
Photo A.11 
 
 
Photo A.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Personal photo, “View of Heart Mountain” 
(June 12, 2007). 
2 Personal photo, “Tracks Leading to Heart 
Mountain Center” (June 12, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo A.33 
 
 
Photo A.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 Personal photo, “Heart Mountain Relocation 
Center Memorial” (June 12, 2007). 
4 Personal photo, “Glass Plaque with the Names 
of all Internees” (June 12, 2007). 
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Photo A.55 
 
 
Photo A.66 
 
 
Photo A.77 
                                                            
5 Personal photo, “Plaque with the Names of 
Nisei who died in WWII” (June 12, 2007). 
6 Personal photo, “View of the Heart Mountain 
Relocation Center Hospital” (June 12, 2007). 
7 Personal Photo, “View of the Heart Mountain 
Relocation Center Administrative Office” (June 
12, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
Photo A.88 
 
 
Photo A.99 
 
 
Photo A.1010 
                                                            
8 Personal Photo, “View of the Heart Mountain 
Relocation Center Speaker’s Platform” (June 12, 
2007). 
9 Personal Photo, “Heart Mountain Forgotten 
Relics 1” (June 12, 2007). 
10 Personal Photo, “Heart Mountain Forgotten 
Relics 2” (June 12, 2007). 
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Appendix B: Photos for Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Photo B.111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 Henry “Yoshitaka” Kiyama, The Four 
Immigrants Manga, 118–9. 
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Photo B.212 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 Henry “Yoshitaka” Kiyama, The Four 
Immigrants Manga, 66–7. 
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Appendix C: Photos for Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Photo C.113 
 
 
Photo C.214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 Dr. Seuss, “Don’t Let them Carve those Faces 
on our Mountains,” poster, 
http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/speccoll/dspolitic/pm/11
212cs.jpg (Accessed on October 16, 2009). 
14 Ben Sakaguchi, Postcards from Camp, acrylic 
on canvas (2000).  Sakaguchi uses a postcard 
from camp.  Also see W.H. Anderson “The 
Question of Japanese Americans,” for the quote 
Sakoguchi uses for his piece. 
 
 
 
 
15Photo C.3  
 
 
Photo C.416 
                                                            
15 “Help Bring them back to You,” poster, 
http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govinfo/col
lections/wwii-posters/ (Accessed on October 16, 
2009). 
16 “Stay on the Job,” poster, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/headovmetal/sets/
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Photo C.517 
 
 
Photo C.618 
                                                                                  
72157602730833017/ (Accessed on October 16, 
2009). 
17 “Go ahead, Please—Take Day Off!” poster, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/headovmetal/sets/
72157602730833017/ (Accessed on October 16, 
2009). 
 
 
 
 
Photo C.719 
 
 
Photo C.820 
                                                                                  
18 Guadalcanal Diary, movie poster, 
http://www.impawards.com/1943/guadalcanal_di
ary.html (Accessed on October 16, 2009). 
19 “Dutch Commander of the East Indies,” 
painting, in Time Magazine, cover (January 26, 
1942). 
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Photo C.921 
 
 
Photo C.1022 
                                                                                  
20 “War Worker with the Skull of a Japanese 
Soldier,” photograph, in Life, 35 (May 22, 1944). 
21 “Our Homes are in Danger Now!” poster, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/headovmetal/sets/
72157602730833017/ (Accessed on October 16, 
2009). 
22 “There’ll Be no Adolph Hitler nor Yellow Japs 
to Fear,” song cover, in The War in American 
Culture: Society and Consciousness during 
 
 
 
 
Photo C.1123 
 
 
Photo C.1224 
                                                                                  
World War II, 172 (Chicago & London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
23 “Japanese Americans Taking Oath of 
Loyalty,” screen caption, in Nisei Soldier: 
Standard Bearer for an Exiled People, Director 
Loni Ding, Interviewer Ken Hori, Narrator Russ 
Holcomb (Vox, 1983). 
24 “California Military Areas,” in American 
Concentration Camps: A Documentary History 
of the Relocation and Incarceration of Japanese 
Americans, 1942–1945, edited by Roger Daniels 
(New York & London: Garland Press, 1989). 
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Photo C.1325 
 
 
Photo C.1426 
 
 
                                                            
25 “Evacuation Sale,” screen caption, in Nisei 
Soldier: Standard Bearer for an Exiled People, 
Director Loni Ding, Interviewer Ken Hori, 
Narrator Russ Holcomb (Vox, 1983). 
26 Personal photo, “Copy of Processing Center 
Notification” (June 12, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
Photo C.1527 
 
 
Photo C.1628 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
27 “Japs Keep Out,” screen caption, in Nisei 
Soldier: Standard Bearer for an Exiled People, 
Director Loni Ding, Interviewer Ken Hori, 
Narrator Russ Holcomb (Vox, 1983). 
28 United States Army Signal Corp “Other 
Evacuees were Transported from their Residence 
Areas to Assembly Centers by Train,” 
Photograph at Library of Congress Prints and 
Photographs Division, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/catalog.html 
(Accessed on October 16, 2009). 
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Photo C.1729 
 
 
Photo C.1830 
                                                            
29 Seattle Post- Intelligencer, “Bainbridge Island, 
Washington, Evacuation, Mother and Her Brood 
of Children Await Transportation on Evacuation 
Day,” photograph at Library of Congress Prints 
and Photographs Division, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/catalog.html  
(Accessed on October 16, 2009). 
30 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, “Young Japanese 
Boy Standing beside Rifle Held by Soldier 
during Evacuation of Bainbridge Island, 
Washington,” photograph at Library of Congress 
Prints and Photographs Division, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/catalog.html  
(Accessed on October 16, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Photo C.1931 
 
 
Photo C.2032 
 
 
Photo C.2133 
                                                                                  
 
31 “Japanese Relocation Sites,”dDiagram, 
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38 “Moab Isolation Center,” map, 
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